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Abstract 
Background: The 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was 
the first pandemic influenza of the twenty-first century and 
presented the first major opportunity for the use of influenza 
vaccines en-masse during a pandemic scenario. National 
anticipatory policies of pandemic influenza vaccine 
preparedness were implemented, and vaccine guarantee 
agreements were activated. Large quantities of vaccines were 
purchased and made available to identified citizens over the 
course of the pandemic. The use of pandemic influenza 
vaccines has been examined in this research. 
Methods: A comparative health policy approach in five study 
countries (Sweden, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, and 
Canada) was conducted. Qualitative interviews (n= 36) were 
undertaken in each country with key pandemic influenza 
response personnel (n = 39). Participants included public 
health officials, policy makers and clinicians engaged at 
national country response level. Interviews facilitated 
discussions surrounding the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic response and use of vaccines. Documentary 
examination of available records supplemented the analysis of 
the interview data.  
Results: Several interview themes were identified following 
data analysis of the use of pandemic vaccines in the study 
countries. Themes of the vaccine use included: single or 
multiple vaccine supplier routes; hemisphere variation; 
historical pandemic legacy; targeted populations; setting 
vaccination priorities; side effect concerns; perceived 
effectiveness of vaccines during the pandemic influenza 
response. The themes which were most prominent comprised 
the sourcing and distribution of the vaccines during the 
response and the associated communication challenges. The 
necessary prioritisation of vaccines caused extensive 
discussions and uneasiness by the pandemic influenza 
response personnel as the initial vaccines arrived in small 
quantities and required allocation, especially in circumstances 
where country’s intended for all/most citizens to eventually 
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have access to the vaccine. The variation in timing of the 
vaccination campaigns and disease activity would suggest that 
subsequent influenza wave morbidities and mortalities could 
have been reduced if vaccines had been available more 
promptly. The southern hemisphere country, New Zealand, 
exemplified the circumvention of vaccine safety concerns 
through the use of a trivalent vaccine inclusive of H1N1. 
Conclusions: Pandemic vaccines were the cornerstone of two 
countries responses and were associated with high uptake 
rates. Vaccine discussions, such as prioritisation and essential 
workers estimates, can be established during interpandemic 
phases by pandemic influenza response personnel. The use of 
annual seasonal influenza vaccines that are inclusive of the 
novel pandemic influenza strain should play a greater role in 
future pandemic influenzas, should the vaccination campaign 
timing be appropriate, as this may reduce public anxiety 
concerning the perceived safety of novel vaccines. The use of 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic vaccines had varied 
in success and the lessons learnt from this event have 
important implications for future policy. Pandemic influenza 
response personnel are recommended to prepare as fully as 
possible during this interpandemic period.   
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1. Introduction 
 
This opening chapter begins with an introduction to the 
emerging infectious disease threats of the last decade and the 
associated international pandemic influenza preparations. The 
discussion moves on to provide a brief overview to the 2009-
10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic and common public health 
measure responses. The research interests are then explained 
in the project rationale, aims, and objectives. The evolution of 
the research project is conveyed through a discussion on the 
Ph.D. proposal which originally included four core policy areas. 
In the later stages, the thesis has concentrated on the use of 
pandemic vaccines, and this is reflected in the project write-
up. The last part of this chapter breaks down the thesis 
chapter structure and provides a summary of the introduction. 
 
 Twenty-first century emerging infectious disease 1.1
threats and global preparations 
In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended 
that all countries should prepare or strengthen their 
preparedness activities in the event of pandemic influenza, in 
order to limit the health and social effects should a pandemic 
occur (World Health Organization, 2005a). This report by WHO 
was published following outbreaks of A/H5N1 avian influenza 
in 2003, where 400 cases were reported, and a 60% case-
fatality rate was experienced (Sellwood, 2010). There was not 
only the concern that avian influenza or another sub-type 
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could manifest into pandemic influenza at any time, but also, 
the concern that many countries did not have plans in place 
and, therefore, pandemic preparedness activities were 
considered essential. Many countries responded to the WHO 
call and, to a varying extent, developed pandemic influenza 
plans.  
Some countries stockpiled antivirals with various treatment 
policies in place, which included the protection of healthcare 
workers, treating cases of influenza-like-illness (ILI), 
prophylactic use, etc. Some countries signed guarantee 
agreements with manufacturing pharmaceutical companies to 
ensure access to the developed pandemic influenza vaccine for 
at-risk groups, healthcare workers or the entire country 
population. In addition, other plans were made such as social 
distancing, communication strategies and surveillance 
strengthening. 
 
 The arrival of 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 1.2
On 18th March 2009, surveillance within Mexico observed 
outbreaks of ILI in certain parts of the country (World Health 
Organization, 2009a). 1,324 suspected influenza cases with 
severe pneumonia, and 84 deaths were reported between 17th 
and 27th April (Pan American Health Organization, 2009). On 
the 18th April, the United States reported two children in 
California with laboratory-confirmed A(H1N1) influenza (Pan 
American Health Organization, 2009). Over the course of the 
following weeks, the WHO communicated to the rest of the 
world the Swine influenza A(H1N1) laboratory confirmed cases 
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and deaths in other countries. The WHO declared that the 
A(H1N1) virus had reached Phase 6 pandemic status on the 
11th June 2009 (World Health Organization, 2009b), which 
made it the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. This 
was based on the evidence of a novel influenza strain of nearly 
30,000 confirmed cases in 74 countries which were sustained 
by human-to-human and country to country transmission 
(World Health Organization, 2009b).  
The WHO reported 18,449 deaths in 214 countries by 1st 
August 2010 (World Health Organization, 2010a). On the 10th 
August 2010, the WHO released a press report stating that the 
world had now entered a post-pandemic phase due to changes 
in the levels and patterns of A(H1N1) transmission (World 
Health Organization, 2010b). 
 
 Public health responses to the 2009-10 influenza 1.3
A(H1N1) pandemic 
During the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, many 
nations attempted to mitigate the effects of the pandemic by 
various public health measures such as antivirals for case 
treatment and prophylactic use, administration of the 
pandemic vaccine, social distancing measures (quarantine, 
avoidance of mass gatherings, public transport suspension, 
international border closures, flight restrictions), and public 
health communications. Countries which opted to use the 
pandemic influenza vaccine experienced a delay due to the 
need for the developed vaccine to be based on the circulating 
virus. Therefore, when the first vaccination campaigns 
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commenced in September 2009, previous alternative public 
health measures may have been utilised after the first case 
reports in April 2009.  
 
 Project rationale and objectives 1.4
Now in the post-pandemic phase, many countries have 
conducted or are currently processing, national and regional 
evaluations of their response to the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic. However, fewer evaluations were carried 
out at international level, and those that took place 
predominately focused on the coordination and operational 
responses and discussed areas of difficulty in the response, 
such as appropriate communications to the public. It was felt 
that there was a gap in the evaluations, and there was a need 
to attempt to analyse the public health policy responses made 
within individual countries, e.g. decisions taken to use or not 
to use vaccines.  
The intention of this thesis was to make specific international 
comparisons between health policies, in order to possibly 
improve future pandemic preparedness and highlight 
difficulties and problems that arose in pandemic influenza 
response. Such generated information would then feed into 
the ‘risk behaviours’ of governments as they balance 
preparedness for pandemic risk against alternative resource 
allocations.   
This research project (also referred to as the thesis) was 
created in order for an international study to be conducted, to 
make comparisons and contrasts of countries experiences of 
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the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. It was considered 
important to create a project which would not produce a 
quantitative international epidemiological analysis but rather 
examine the policy and implemented public health measures 
during a time of threat, uncertainty and pressure, and attempt 
to connect this information to the published epidemiological 
data. The purpose of this enquiry was that the questioning 
would delve beneath patterns identified in the epidemiological 
data. Due to these factors, the project became multi-
disciplinary and incorporated the research fields of health 
policy, sociology, epidemiology and public health. 
The studentship was an externally funded piece of research: 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) have provided the expenses covering 
the studentship at the University of Nottingham and fieldwork 
abroad in the five study countries. The research proposal was 
developed after the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic and 
the parameters reflected core policy areas of pandemic 
influenza response. GSK is a UK-created global pharmaceutical 
company that played a major role during the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic through the supply of millions of 
doses of A(H1N1) vaccine Pandemrix®.  
Due to GSK’s provision of healthcare products during the 
pandemic influenza, they have subsequently funded research 
in the post-pandemic period, one of which is this studentship. 
GSK’s role in this research has been to provide the financial 
means to conduct the research, but essentially they have been 
silent partners. GSK has not played a role in directing this 
research since the project proposal. 
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The project proposal outlined above and in the GSK research 
proposal was broad in content (see Appendix A). As this 
project progressed and after the interviews had been 
conducted, it proved too vast to include all four of the original 
proposal public health measures (antivirals, vaccines, non-
pharmaceutical measures, wider societal issues) in the thesis, 
and subsequently, vaccines became the focus of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the interview data collected included discussions 
on all of the proposal public health measures. By capturing 
this data in the interview, it will be possible to analyse the 
antiviral, non-pharmaceutical and wider societal aspects of 
response at a later date and outside of this thesis. With the 
narrowed focus in mind, the aims and objectives of the Ph.D. 
are listed below. 
 
 Aim of Thesis 1.5
To explore countries use of pandemic vaccines during the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic: using qualitative 
interviews with key pandemic influenza response personnel in 
several study countries. 
 
 Objectives of Thesis 1.6
1. To review pandemic influenza policies and their 
implementation in selected countries (reference the core 
policy areas and timing (in relation to disease 
occurrence)). 
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2. To explore countries implemented vaccine measures 
using qualitative interviews with key pandemic 
responders. 
3. To determine any apparent relationship between the 
vaccine policy implementation in countries and the 
pandemic influenza disease activity (in relation to the 
timing of response measures and disease activity; the 
extent and variation of vaccine policies in countries). 
4. To review the implications for public policy in relation to 
pandemic preparedness and the response to future 
pandemics of potentially greater severity. 
 
The objectives have taken a chronological order in this 
research project. Naturally, it was crucial to perform a 
literature review of the previous influenza pandemics, public 
health measures and pandemic influenza preparedness 
policies before undertaking interviews in the study countries.  
The researcher’s ambition for this research project was to 
undertake a systematic investigation of the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic in several countries. Indeed, the research 
conducted has resulted in the identification of transnational 
themes through the identification of similarities and 
differences by country comparison.  
An important feature of this international study is the timing: 
it is well recognised that evaluations contributing to the field 
of pandemic influenza are significant at the start of an 
interpandemic phase. It is essential to capture this information 
post-response in order for it not to be forgotten. Before 
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undertaking this research project, the researcher wished for 
the study to add to the body of research in the field of 
pandemic influenza and unique findings will be presented in 
this thesis. This study has in instances provided information to 
clarify some unanswered questions about pandemic influenza 
vaccine response, and at other times, it has further 
contributed to areas of existing debate and further issues for 
consideration. It is possible that this research will support on-
going practice and will contribute to increasing the confidence 
of responders in their decisions during a future challenging 
emergency event of pandemic influenza. 
 
 Thesis structure 1.7
The structure of this thesis starts with a background of 
pandemic influenza, the thesis methodology, pandemic 
preparedness policies and vaccine findings, discussions and 
conclusions. Chapter 2 outlines a historical overview of 
pandemic influenza events of the twentieth century and public 
health management measures, specifically the development of 
influenza vaccines. The last section of chapter 2 outlines a 
study country timeline of the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic disease patterns and response measures. Chapter 3 
discusses the methodological approach of this research and 
the research methods used.  Chapter 4 outlines pandemic 
influenza preparedness, the policies of the study countries and 
vaccine deployment in 2009-10. Chapter 5 presents the 
findings pertaining to pandemic vaccines from the interview 
data. Chapter 6 arranges the vaccine findings in a wider 
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discussion of published literature. Lastly, chapter 7 draws 
conclusions on the pandemic influenza research project.  
 
 Introduction summary 1.8
This introduction chapter has presented the focus of this 
research, provided an overview of 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic, and the common public health response measures 
utilised. A project rationale with the research aims and 
objectives has been discussed and lastly, a thesis structure 
has been included.  
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2 Pandemic Influenza and Public Health 
Management Measures 
 
A brief history of influenza pandemics is introduced in the first 
part of this chapter, commencing with a very brief background 
of the influenza virus and the definitions of pandemic 
influenza. The focus of the history of influenza pandemics is on 
pandemics of the twentieth century, and specific reference is 
made to the experiences of the countries of study within this 
thesis; Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, Sweden and Canada. 
The second part of this chapter will report on the development 
of public health measures that have been utilised to manage 
pandemic influenza historically.  
The third part of this chapter will describe the characteristics 
of the epidemiology of the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic, with special reference to the study countries 
individual epidemiological patterns and national responses.  
 
 Influenza background 2.1
Influenza is a global infectious disease and a common acute 
respiratory illness that presents rapidly in humans. Asides 
from the respiratory symptoms such as cough, sore throat and 
hoarseness, influenza symptoms are wide ranging and can 
include fever, fatigue, headache, vomiting, diarrhoea as well 
as more serious secondary complications affecting a wide 
range of organs, such as acute bronchitis, pneumonia, 
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myocarditis, etc. At the other end of the scale, influenza can 
also be an asymptomatic infection. There are three types of 
virus serotypes A, B and C: C is one of the 300 viruses that 
causes the common cold, A and B are responsible for seasonal 
influenza, and pandemic influenza is only caused by A. In 
temperate regions of the world, influenza epidemics typically 
occur during the winter months leading to the term ‘seasonal 
influenza’ (also referred to as interpandemic influenza). In the 
tropics, the seasons are less well defined and influenza is less 
consistent (Nicholson, 1998; Van-Tam and Sellwood, 2013). 
There are two epidemiological types of influenza: pandemic 
and interpandemic. Interpandemic influenza arises from the 
continuous circulation of familial influenza viruses that cause 
localised epidemics. Pandemic influenza refers to the rare 
instances where a novel influenza A virus emerges and causes 
high attack rates due to very low or no immunity in humans 
(Nicholson, 1998; Van-Tam and Sellwood, 2013). Although 
this research project is based on pandemic influenza, it is 
important to understand how interpandemic and pandemic 
influenza exist together as one disease. Familiarity with 
interpandemic influenza during an influenza pandemic, on the 
one hand, provides experience in public health responses, 
such as annual vaccination programmes, but on the other 
hand, it creates confusion due to the different epidemiological 
features of each influenza type.  
 
 12 
 
 Definitions of pandemic influenza  2.2
Annual (seasonal/interpandemic) influenza epidemics are the 
result of antigenic drift, whereas pandemic influenza is when 
the virus undergoes genetic reassortment (antigenic shift), 
and the consequence of this reassortment is the emergence of 
a new type A influenza virus (Potter 2001; Monto and 
Sellwood 2013). When this new influenza virus arises most, if 
not all, of the global population has little or no immunity and 
the influenza virus has the capacity to spread in major waves 
over several months. In order to discuss pandemic influenza 
further, the definition of pandemic influenza shall first be 
considered. Below are two pandemic influenza definitions 
presented in the literature to contemplate: 
 
Definition 1 
Monto and Sellwood (2013: p.40) set out the four criteria for 
pandemic influenza classification:  
1. “A new influenza A virus substantially different 
(antigenically) from the circulating pre-pandemic strains 
must emerge or evolve and circulate in humans. 
2. There must be little or no pre-existing immunity to the 
new subtype in major segments of the global population. 
3. The new virus must cause significant clinical illness. 
4. The virus must be able to spread efficiently from person 
to person and as a results spread globally.” 
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Definition 2 
“Two conditions must be satisfied for an outbreak of influenza 
to be classed as a pandemic. Firstly, the outbreak of infection, 
arising in a specific geographical area, spreads throughout the 
world; a high percentage of individuals are infected resulting 
in increased mortality rates. Secondly, a pandemic is caused 
by a new influenza A virus subtype, the haemagglutinin (HA) 
of which is not related to that of influenza viruses circulating 
immediately before the outbreak, and could not have arisen 
from those viruses by mutation (Webster & Laver 1975). Each 
influenza A virus subtype possesses one of 15 distinct Has 
designated H1, H2, H3, and so on, which do not cross-react in 
serological tests: immunity to influenza is principally related to 
antibody to the HA, and the appearance of a new virus 
subtype with a different HA means that immunity acquired 
from past influenza infection confers no protection against the 
new virus subtype, and the spread of infection by the latter is 
unchecked.” (Potter, 1998: p.3). 
The two definitions offer an excellent starting point for 
examining pandemic influenza. Although the definitions are 
different, they are equally correct. For instance, when Potter 
wrote in 1998 of the 15 Haemagglutinin (H) subtypes of 
influenza A viruses, this was what was known at the time. 
However, since 1998, we now have 17 H-subtypes, and this 
highlights the continuously evolving knowledge and nature of 
pandemics. With the pandemic influenza definitions in mind, 
the historical occurrences of pandemics shall be explored in 
the following segment.   
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 Pandemic influenza history 2.3
In order to understand pandemics and to prepare for a future 
pandemic influenza with effective public health measures, it is 
essential to conduct a detailed historical analysis of past 
epidemiological patterns of pandemics. Some questions 
remain regarding aspects of past pandemics, and this has 
public health implications for future pandemic responses 
(Taubenberger and Morens, 2006; Nishiura and Chowell, 
2007).  
 
2.3.1 Chronology of influenza pandemics 
Reviewers of pandemic influenza have attempted to identify 
early pandemics from historical documents.  It is difficult to 
ascertain, due to the poor recording of information, but it is 
possible that the first two influenza pandemics were in 1510 
and 1557. However, 1580 is the time of the first documented 
pandemic influenza in which the spread of disease over time 
and geography are known (Potter 2001). Figure 1 shows a 
timeline of the emergence of pandemic influenza events. 
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Figure 1: Year of influenza pandemics. 
 
For this history section on influenza pandemics, only pandemic 
events from the last ~300 years will be discussed, providing 
only a general summary, as it is not possible to provide an 
exhaustive description. Pandemics before the 18th century will 
not be covered because there is insufficient global certainty 
prior to this date.  
In the following section, Influenza pandemics between 1701 
and 1900 are described briefly, before the influenza 
pandemics of the twentieth century are looked at individually 
and in more detail. This presentation of the history of 
twentieth-century influenza pandemics will have specific 
reference to the individual study countries included in the data 
collection of this thesis.  
Figure 2 depicts influenza mortality in each influenza 
pandemic reported from 1701. As observed in Figure 2, the 
Spanish Influenza of 1918-1919 recorded the worst mortality 
outcome in comparison to all the influenza pandemics 
experienced in history. Table 1 provides an overview of 
1580 1729 1781 1830 1889 1898 1918 1957 1968 2009 
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influenza pandemics from the eighteenth century, including 
the areas affected, origins, influenza virus types (if known) 
and epidemiological features. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of timing of influenza peaks since 
1700, illustrating relative mortality impact (Reproduced 
with permission from Potter, 2001). 
 
Table 1: Influenza pandemics from the 18th-century 
summary (table assembled using information sourced 
from Monto and Sellwood, 2013; Potter, 1998; Potter, 
2001). 
Year 
Areas 
reported 
affected 
Origin Subtype 
Epidemiological 
features 
1729-
1733 
Europe, 
Americas, 
Russia 
Russia Unknown 
Two distinct waves; 
second wave more severe 
1781-
1782 
Europe, 
China, 
India, 
N.America, 
Russia 
Russia/ 
China 
Unknown 
Reported high attack 
rate, notably in young 
adult population 
1830-
1833 
Europe, 
China, 
India, 
N.America, 
Russia 
China Unknown 
High attack rates of 20-
25% of the population 
reported, but mortality 
rates low in comparison 
1889-
1892 
Global Russia A(H2)? 
First global influenza 
pandemic. Majority of 
mortality in later 
 17 
 
  
Pandemics from 1701 - 1800 
Two influenza pandemics occurred during the 18th century. In 
1729, an outbreak originating from Russia spread to Europe 
pandemic waves and in 
the elderly population. 
Global mortality rate 
estimated at 300,000 and 
attack rate estimates 
ranged between 25% and 
50% of the population. 
1898-
1900 
Europe, 
Americas, 
Australia 
Unknown A(H3)? Mainly mild outbreaks 
1918-
1920 
Global 
United 
States/ 
China 
A(H1N1) 
Coincided with end of 
World War 1, pandemic 
responsible for more 
deaths than the war. 
Second wave much more 
severe than the first, with 
the third wave of 
moderate severity. 
Estimated to have 
infected 50% of world’s 
population, with 40-50 
million deaths. 
Particularly affected the 
young, working age 
population. 
1957-
1958 
Global China A(H2N2) 
Mortality rates high but 
low attack rate in the 
elderly population. Some 
countries reported similar 
severity in both waves of 
infection, whilst other 
countries reported a more 
severe second wave. 
1968-
1969 
Global China A(H3N3) North America reported 
majority of deaths during 
the first wave, whereas 
Europe and Asia reported 
greater deaths during the 
second wave. Symptoms 
described as mild, and 
elderly population had 
some protection from the 
influenza. Estimation of 1 
to 3 million global deaths, 
meaning CFR of <0.5%. 
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and became widespread within three years. High mortality 
rates were recorded, with the latter waves more severe than 
the earlier (Monto and Sellwood, 2013; Potter 2001). 
In 1781-1782, a pandemic influenza, believed to have 
originated from China spread westwards to Russia and then 
Europe, as well as reaching North America and India. This 
pandemic influenza spread quickly across continents, and the 
attack rate was reported as high in the young adult population 
(Monto and Sellwood, 2013; Potter 2001). 
 
Pandemics from 1801 - 1900 
The 19th century witnessed the emergence of three influenza 
pandemics. In 1830, a pandemic influenza with high attack 
rate but low mortality rate emerged in China, spread southerly 
to Asia, then to Russia, Europe and North America over the 
course of about three years (Potter 2001).  
In 1889 a pandemic influenza (possibly of A(H2) subtype) 
originated from Russia with a population attack rate reportedly 
between 25% and 50%, causing high mortality in older 
persons. The 1898 pandemic influenza (possibly of A(H3) 
subtype) saw outbreaks in Australasia, Europe, East Asia and 
the Americas, and documents indicate that these were mild 
(Monto and Sellwood, 2013). 
 
Pandemics from 1901 - 2000 
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The twentieth century experienced another three influenza 
pandemics:  
1. 1918-1920 Spanish Influenza A(H1N1) 
2. 1957-1958 Asian Influenza A(H2N2) 
3. 1968-1969 Hong Kong A(H3N3) 
The following section will explore the three events of pandemic 
influenza during the twentieth century and make reference to 
the five study countries experiences. 
 
2.3.2 Twentieth-century influenza pandemics 
A review of the literature of twentieth-century influenza 
pandemics was conducted via a PubMed search last dated 
20/02/2015. The keyword terms were “pandemic influenza” 
OR “influenza” and individual pandemics were specified 
(“1918” AND/OR “Spanish”; “1957” AND/OR “Asian”; “1968” 
AND/OR “Hong Kong”) and study countries (“Sweden”; “New 
Zealand”; “Japan”; “Singapore”; “Canada”). For example: 
(pandemic influenza OR influenza) + (1918 AND/OR Spanish) 
+ (Sweden). Specific focuses of the reviews covered 
epidemiology (arrival, waves, mortality, age-specific patterns, 
and impact) and public health measures. Only English 
language texts were examined. Reference lists were 
scrutinised to identify original authors, and a grey literature 
search was also conducted. 
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2.3.2.1 1918 Pandemic Influenza 
It is argued that the 1918 pandemic influenza emerged either 
from the United States or from China before spreading to the 
United States (Hsieh et al., 2006). The United States first 
noted outbreaks in several locations including army camps in 
March 1918 (Detroit, South Carolina and San Quentin Prison), 
before appearances of the influenza were made in France and 
other parts of Europe, including areas associated with United 
States troop boat landings in World War One during 1918 
(Oxford, 2000; Hsieh et al., 2006). Outbreaks continued to 
occur during the course of the northern hemisphere summer 
of 1918 (see Figure 3). However, the virus became more 
severe and widespread by autumn of 1918 (Oxford, 2000). 
Over the following two years to 1920, A(H1N1) Spanish 
influenza spread globally in an eastwards direction at first, and 
along shipping trade routes (Potter, 2001). 
 
Figure 3: The 1918-20 influenza pandemic depicting 
first waves and second wave direction of infection 
spread and months timeline (Reproduced with 
permission from Potter, 2001, with study countries 
labelled). 
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Taubenberger and Morens (2006: p.16) report three global 
general waves of influenza activity over the course of a 12 
month period for the northern hemisphere region: “The first 
pandemic influenza wave appeared in the spring of 1918, 
followed in rapid succession by much more fatal second and 
third waves in the fall and winter of 1918–1919, respectively”. 
The Spanish influenza is believed to have infected 50% of the 
global population, of which half developed major clinical 
infections (Hsieh et al., 2006). 
Given the rate of infection, a major lesson learnt from the 
1918-19 A(H1N1) Spanish influenza pandemic was that it 
could cause severe illness and deaths in otherwise healthy 
persons, which lead to this pandemic ranking as one of the 
worst epidemics in human history comparable with historical 
events such as the Black Death (Potter, 2001). Although 
shipping routes provided a rapid mean of spreading, countries 
such as Australia managed to delay the arrival of infection for 
several months through implementing quarantine measures. 
The influenza characteristics evolved during the course of the 
pandemic meaning that the second and third waves of 
infection were more severe than first. Hospitals, morgues and 
the workforce, in general, were overwhelmed, and war 
strategies were hampered by the spread of infection and 
resulting deaths. The 1918–20 A(H1N1) Spanish influenza 
outbreak demonstrated that an influenza pandemic can pose 
as much risk, threat and uncertainty within the global 
population to rival war, natural disasters and other diseases.  
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In the 1918-19 A(H1N1) Spanish influenza pandemic, Japan 
was the first of the countries studied in this thesis to have a 
mild first wave of influenza in April-May in 1918. This was 
followed by a severe second wave in August-October 1918 and 
the third wave in January-March 1919. The death rate from 
the influenza pandemic was 4.5 per 1,000 persons across the 
three waves (Rice and Palmer, 1993). The Ministry of Home 
Affairs within the Government of Japan requested that 
prefecture governors regularly report influenza cases 
(Yoshikura, 2014). 
Singapore and New Zealand shared some similarities during 
the 1918-19 A(H1N1) Spanish influenza pandemic: both 
countries reported their first cases in June 1918 (Lee, et al., 
2007; Potter, 2001) and neither reported the third wave. 
Singapore’s first wave was mild and occurred in June-July 
1918 with a peak in early July (Lee, et al., 2007), whereas 
New Zealand’s first wave was later in August-September 1918 
and was also recorded as mild (Pool, 1973). The second waves 
were severe and experienced at similar times; Singapore 
experienced the second wave in October-November 1918, 
where cases peaked at the end of October (Lee, et al., 2007) 
and the second wave in New Zealand occurred in October-
December 1918 (Pool, 1973), peaked in the North Island in 
mid-November, then later in the South Island (Wilson and 
Baker 2008).  
The Spanish influenza event has been recorded in New 
Zealand’s history as ‘Black November’ (Rice, 2005). It was 
noted that New Zealand’s neighbour Australia kept influenza 
out in 1918 through operating marina quarantine measures. 
However, Sydney eventually followed a similar pattern to New 
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Zealand’s experience of a mild first wave in January-April 
1919 and a severe second wave in May-August 1919 with no 
apparent third wave. Subsequently, this pattern was 
replicated in time across the other Australian States. Australia 
reported a death rate far lower than New Zealand at 2.3 per 
1,000 persons compared to 7.4 per 1,000 (Rice, 2005). 
Interestingly, New Zealand experienced a severe second wave 
of influenza outside of their annual influenza season; by 
comparison, Australia’s severe second wave coincided with 
their winter seasonal influenza months. 
Sweden, similarly to Singapore and New Zealand, reported the 
A(H1N1) Spanish influenza pandemic in June 1918 with 
reports that the virus arrived in the southern region of the 
country from Norway and Germany (Holtenius and Gillman, 
2014). However, Sweden experienced a different timing of 
waves compared to Singapore and New Zealand. The first 
wave was spread out between July 1918 and February 1919. 
Initially, it was slow and mild but later became severe, 
peaking between October-November 1918. Two further mild 
waves were experienced in March-June 1919 and January-May 
1920 (Karlsson, Milsson and Pichler, 2014). It has been 
calculated that an estimated 20-60% of the population in 
Sweden became infected with pandemic influenza (Holtenius 
and Gillman, 2014).  
Canada’s experience of 1918-19 A(H1N1) Spanish influenza 
pandemic was different to the other study countries. Canada 
first reported cases in July 1918 in the Quebec province, with 
outbreaks first appearing at ports, before outbreaks appeared 
across Canada with remote areas not initially infected 
(McGinnis, 1977). Influenza was spread across Canada by 
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soldiers who had returned from World War 1 duties abroad 
and spread along railway transportation routes westwards 
towards Vancouver between 1918 and 1919 (Public Health 
Agency of Canada, 2006). Specific pandemic influenza disease 
activity waves were not found in the literature search for 
Canada, as local and regional waves of influenza activity were 
recorded rather than at the national level, primarily due to the 
vastness of the country. Indeed, twenty-first-century 
Canadian pandemic influenza planning and the response is 
conducted at provincial and territorial level with an 
overarching coordinating national organisation; influenza 
activity is reported regionally and locally, and then 
incorporated into the national surveillance system FluWatch 
(Public Health Agency of Canada, 2006). 
A comparison of the timing of the waves and severity of the 
1918-19 A(H1N1) Spanish influenza pandemic for the study 
countries are pictorially emphasised in Figure 4 below. In the 
figure the star indicates the first case recorded in the 
literature. The coloured lines indicate the waves with red for 
first, blue for second and green for third waves. Where the 
lines are thick this refers to literature that mentioned a severe 
wave and a thin line signifies a mild wave. Where a line fades, 
such as in the example of Canada, this indicates that the start 
of a wave was recorded and cases were reported in the 
literature but no wave end was found in the literature.  
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Figure 4: Study countries disease activity during 1918-
19 pandemic influenza. 
 
The 1918 pandemic influenza mortality rates plotted against 
age (Figure 5) give a W-shaped curve, meaning that mortality 
was raised in infants, the elderly and young adults. In typical 
interpandemic periods, the curve is U-shaped with fatalities in 
persons who are at opposite ends of the age spectrum: very 
young children and the elderly (Figure 5). Figure 5 shows the 
U-shaped curve of influenza disease activity in the 
interpandemic period of 1911-1917 in comparison to the W-
shaped curve during 1918 pandemic. The high mortality in 
young adults aged 20-40 years during the 1918 pandemic 
influenza was unusual (Luk et al., 2001). Over the course of 
months, the influenza virus became more virulent and resulted 
in a rapid death rate increase, making it accountable for more 
deaths than the war. Global mortality reporting is estimated to 
be more than 40 million deaths, but this calculation is debated 
(Hsieh et al., 2006; Monto and Sellwood, 2013; Potter 2001).  
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Figure 5: Influenza and pneumonia mortality per 
100,000 by age groups in the United States between 
1911 and 1918 demonstrating the contrasting U and W-
shaped curves (Reproduced with permission from 
Taubenberger and Morens, 2006). 
 
In Sweden, there were 34,374 (5.9 per 1,000 persons) 
pandemic influenza deaths in the 12 months from July 1918, 
with a 35% increase in acute pneumonia deaths. This gave 
7.1 per 1,000 persons to be the mortality rate for pandemic 
influenza and acute pneumonia between July 1918 and June 
1919 (Holtenius and Gillman, 2014). Karlsson et al. (2014) 
reported that there were nearly 38,000 deaths due to 
pandemic influenza overall, which at the time signified 
approximately 1% of the Swedish population. In Sweden, 
younger persons experienced higher infection rates and 
working-aged persons had the highest mortality rate. The 20-
40-year-old age group experienced a mortality rate rise of 
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nearly 200%, and the Swedish life expectancy decreased to 
50 years old in 1918 from 59 years in the previous year 1917 
(Holtenius and Gillman, 2014). Figure 6 shows the record of 
influenza deaths in Sweden during Spanish influenza. “With 
respect to the number of deaths caused, the Spanish flu is one 
of the most severe calamities ever to affect Sweden.” 
(Karlsson et al. 2014: p.5). 
 
 
Figure 6: Influenza and pneumonia deaths in Sweden 
between 1917 and 1920 (Reproduced with permission 
from Karlsson et al. 2014). 
 
New Zealand experienced higher mortality rates from 
pandemic influenza in the urban areas of the country (cities 
and towns) than compared to rural counties. This historical 
analysis contributed to “the limited evidence that remoteness 
provided some protection in past influenza pandemics” 
(McSweeny et al. 2007: p. 46). Wilson and Baker described 
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the impact and how the “1918 influenza pandemic remains the 
worst single human health disaster in recorded New Zealand 
history.” (2008: p.136). The grey literature search found a 
report from Christchurch City Library (2015) where it was 
explained that New Zealand had succumbed to widespread 
infection by November 1918, and there was uncertainty 
regarding which ship had brought the influenza virus to the 
country. Mortality rates were reported as high as 80% in some 
of the town’s populations and in other regions the rates were 
low. 
Pool (1973) reported that the Maori population had a higher 
incidence of pandemic influenza infection, which was more 
likely to result in death than the non-Maori population in New 
Zealand. The crude mortality rate for the Maori population was 
calculated as 22.6 per 1,000 persons in comparison to 4.5 per 
1,000 non-Maori population; with males (27.7 per 1,000 
persons) more seriously affected than females (16.3 per 1,000 
persons). These numbers are represented in Figure 7. Pool 
postulated medical availability, pre-existing immunity to 
influenza and living conditions as factors leading to this 
difference between the two groups. Other research presents 
that the Maori population was worse affected, with a mortality 
rate of approximately seven times that of the non-
Maori/European population of New Zealand (Wilson and Baker, 
2008). However at the time military personnel based overseas 
were not included in these rates so this may have skewed the 
results. 
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Figure 7: Mortality from pandemic influenza in 1918 in 
New Zealand (Reproduced with permission from Wilson 
and Baker, 2008). 
 
The records showed that Japan had three waves according to 
Yoshikura (2014). The first wave covered August 1918 to July 
1919 with 21,168,398 cases and 257,363 deaths reported; 
the second wave covered October 1919 to July 1920 with 
2,412,097 cases and 127,666 deaths; the third wave covered 
August 1920 to July 1921 with 224,178 cases and 3,698 
deaths. The case-fatality rates were determined as 1.22%, 
5.29% and 1.65% respectively (Yoshikura, 2014). Conversely, 
the number of deaths reported elsewhere in the literature 
differ from Yoshikura (2014), with a lower report of 350,000 
deaths by Patterson and Pyle (1991) and higher report of 
481,000 deaths by Richard et al. (2009). Johnson and Mueller, 
and Palmer and Rice, cited 388,000 deaths (Chandra, 2013) 
which would correspond to Yoshikura’s (2014) figure for when 
the three waves death figures are combined. As explained by 
Chandra (2013), all these various estimates tend to be lower 
than other country’s reports, and Chandra argues that the 
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dependence on official health statistics has led to repetitive 
published underestimations. Through utilising census data, 
Chandra (2013) puts forward a 4% loss of population 
(approximately 2 million persons) from the 1918-19 pandemic 
influenza in Japan, making it more on par with other densely 
populated countries. Furthermore, Chandra argues that this 
larger estimate presented shows that “Japan is not an 
exception to be studied for possible solutions or measures that 
might ameliorate the effects of such an epidemic in the future. 
Rather, its experience is typical of that of other Asian 
countries for which we have more reliable estimates.” 
(Chandra, 2013: p.621). 
Even in 1918, Singapore was considered a global trading hub 
and documented two waves of pandemic influenza occurring in 
June to July and October to November resulting in more than 
2,870 deaths (Lee et al., 2007). However, Lee et al., (2007) 
calculated the excess mortality rate during the pandemic 
influenza in Singapore to be 7.76 per 1,000 persons, but this 
was raised to 18 per 1,000 (6,656 deaths) when using Murray 
et al.’s formula (Lee et al., 2007). Figure 8 shows Lee et al.’s, 
(2007) calculation of excess deaths in the 1918-19 pandemic 
influenza in Singapore.  
 31 
 
 
Figure 8: Excess mortality rate in Singapore during 
1918-19 pandemic influenza (Reproduced with 
permission from Lee et al. 2007). 
 
Singapore’s second wave peaked at the end of October with 
97.6 per 1,000,000 deaths reported (Lee et al., 2007; Lee et 
al. 2008). Singapore experienced a mortality rate comparable 
or higher than temperate countries but lower than 
neighbouring countries in Asia, as shown in Figure 8 (Lee et 
al., 2007). 
 
2.3.2.2 1957 Pandemic Influenza ‘Asian Flu’ 
The second pandemic influenza of the 20th century occurred in 
1957, most likely originating from China, and was of the 
A(H2N2) influenza subtype, termed ‘Asian Flu’. In February 
1957, it originated from the province of Yunan in China, 
spread across China during March, to Hong Kong by April, and 
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onwards to Taiwan, Singapore and Japan (Potter, 2001; Payne 
1958).  
By May, infection was reported in Indonesia, India and 
Australia, and by June, Europe, North America, Pakistan and 
the Middle East were infected. In July infection reports came 
from South Africa, South America, New Zealand and the 
Pacific Islands, and in August large regions of Africa, Eastern 
Europe and the Caribbean had the novel influenza (Potter, 
2001; Payne 1958).  
Two transmission routes were identified as across land from 
Russia to Europe, and from a large international gathering in 
Iowa, United States. As well as these two events, infection 
was spread along sea routes. The influenza was considered to 
have spread throughout the globe in six months from onset, 
as seen in Figure 9 (Potter, 2001). 
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Figure 9: Spread of 1957-58 pandemic influenza 
(Reproduced with permission from Potter, 2001, with 
study countries labelled). 
 
The information available on the disease pattern within 
Singapore was limited due to influenza not being of notifiable 
disease status, and because sections of the population did not 
engage in Western type medical care (Lim et al., 1957). Payne 
(1958) noted that Singapore was the first country to notify the 
World Health Organisation in May of experiencing “an 
extensive outbreak of influenza” and it was believed to have 
been imported into the country from Hong Kong (Payne 1958: 
p.29).  
Asian pandemic influenza first appeared in Japan on the 10 
May 1957 (Sonoguchi et al., 1986). Fukumi (1959a) noted the 
virus was imported into Japan but from an unknown country, 
that the first case was recorded in a school in Tokyo and that 
the epidemic established in large cities first and then spread 
out across Japan to smaller urban and rural areas. 
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Singapore reported the first wave of influenza activity lasting 
the month of May 1957, with a peak in mid-May 
(Kanagaratnam, 1957), with Japan’s timing reported as 
slightly later in June to July 1957 (Sonoguchi et al., 1986). 
Sweden reported cases between July 1957 and January 1958 
with a peak in November (Skog et al., 2014). Unfortunately, 
journal article searches focusing on New Zealand only 
revealed that the epidemic reached New Zealand by July 1957 
(Payne, 1958; Oxford, 2000). Influenza H2N2 peaked in 
October and November 1957 (PHAC, 2010). 
Japan reported a second wave between October and 
December 1957 (Sonoguchi et al., 1986). Canada reported a 
much delayed second wave during the winter of 1959 (PHAC, 
2010). A second wave was not found in the literature search 
for Sweden, Singapore and New Zealand. 
A comparison of the timing of the first cases and waves of the 
1957/58 Asian influenza pandemic for the study countries are 
illustrated in Figure 10. In the figure the star indicates the first 
case recorded in the literature. The coloured lines indicate the 
waves with red for first and blue for second waves. Where 
question marks have been placed on a country line, such as in 
the example of New Zealand, this indicates that no waves 
were explicitly found in the literature. This is not to say that 
no waves were experienced, and in some countries there were 
reported elevated rates of illness that were not initially linked 
to pandemic influenza. 
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Figure 10: Study countries disease activity during 1957-
58 pandemic influenza. 
 
Swedish physicians were required to report influenza cases 
during the Asian Influenza, and 276,537 cases between July 
1957 and January 1958 were recorded (Skog et al., 2014). 
The reported influenza cases peaked in November 1957. Skog 
et al. (2014) reported that falling temperatures preceded the 
epidemic spread of Asian Influenza. 
During May in Singapore, there were 162,093 presentations at 
government and city council clinics, with 77,211 influenza 
cases recorded, 326 hospital admissions and 28 influenza 
deaths (Kanagaratnam, 1957). 
Figure 11 depicts the first and second wave for a number of 
cases, deaths and schools affected in Japan. Five to 20-year-
olds had the highest attack rate during the first wave in Japan, 
which was explained by school exposure rather than a higher 
susceptibility to the influenza virus in young people (Fukumi, 
1959a). Japan experienced the highest mortality rates in the 
young (<19 years old) and older persons (>50 years old) 
(Fukumi, 1959a). 
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Figure 11: Number of 1957 Asian influenza cases, 
deaths and schools affected in Japan (Reproduced with 
permission from Fukumi, 1959a). 
 
Globally, the younger population experienced high attack 
rates, but the majority of deaths were in the very young and 
old. It is proposed that the lower attack rate observed in older 
persons may be due to this group’s earlier exposure to the 
influenza virus (of possible A(H2) subtype) which appeared 
during the nineteenth century(Monto and Sellwood, 2013; 
Potter 2001).  
Payne (1958) observed that age distribution of Asian flu cases 
in most countries affected young persons. It was noted that in 
Bombay, India, 85% of cases were present in people up to the 
age of 40 years old, and the United States had most cases 
falling within the five to 19 years age range. Bombay, United 
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States, Chile and the Philippines all reported very few cases 
affecting older persons (Payne, 1958). 
However, despite the attack rate age distribution, the 
mortality was most experienced in younger and older persons. 
It was reported that 38% of deaths in Leningrad were for 
children aged ≤2years old, 53% of deaths in Manila were <4 
years old, 22% of deaths in Santiago were <12 months old, 
10% of deaths in the Netherlands were <4 years old, 20% of 
deaths in Tokyo were <10 years old (Payne, 1958). It was 
reported that 22% of deaths in Leningrad were in adults >45 
years old, 11% of deaths in Manila were >50 years old, 55% 
in Santiago were aged >55 years old, 40% of deaths in the 
Netherlands were in persons aged >60 years old, >50% of 
deaths in Tokyo were aged >50 years old (Payne, 1958). 
 
2.3.2.3 1968-1969 Hong Kong Pandemic Influenza 
Only a decade later, the third pandemic influenza, A(H3N2) 
originated from China in 1968. Quickly, Hong Kong reported 
500,000 cases in two weeks, and from this, it gained the term 
‘Hong Kong Flu’. The morbidity rate was likened to the 
previous 1957 pandemic, but the mortality was found to be 
lower. Again, as experienced during the previous pandemic 
influenza, older persons seemed to have some protection from 
their exposure to earlier similar influenzas, and this theory is 
supported by the serological link to the 1898 pandemic 
influenza (believed to be an (H3) subtype) (Monto and 
Sellwood, 2013; Potter 2001). 
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The 1968 A(H3N2) Hong Kong influenza pandemic first cases 
occurred in Asia in July 1968 and arrived in Singapore by 
August (Potter, 1998). Japan also reported imported cases in 
August (Fukumi, 1969).  
Cases did not take hold in Japan until October 1968, with a 
wave peaking in January to February 1969 (Fukumi, 1969). 
Cases peaked in Singapore in mid to late August 1968 (Lee et 
al. 2008). Canada’s first wave occurred in the winter of 1968 
and peaked in January 1969 (PHAC, 2010).   
Canada’s second wave was milder and occurred in the winter 
of 1970 (PHAC, 2010). European countries typically reported 
mild first waves and severe second waves, but Canada 
experienced the opposite pattern (PHAC, 2010). Singapore 
reported excess mortality between May and June 1970, which 
Lee et al. (2007) hypothesise may have been due to the 
second pandemic influenza wave. 
No literature on the 1968 A(H3N2) Hong Kong influenza 
pandemic was found for the Sweden, which may be reflective 
of the search only including English language sources. 
However, no literature was found for New Zealand either. The 
lack of literature for Sweden and New Zealand in regards to 
the 1968 pandemic influenza may instead be a reflection of 
the lower severity of disease compared to the previous two 
pandemics. It is speculated whether or not it was perceived as 
a ‘non-event’ in these countries. 
A comparison of the timing of the first cases and waves of the 
1968 A(H3N2) Hong Kong influenza pandemic for the study 
countries are illustrated in Figure 12. In the figure the star 
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indicates the first case recorded in the literature. The coloured 
lines indicate the waves with red for first and blue for second 
waves. Where question marks have been placed on a country 
line, this indicates that no waves were explicitly found in the 
literature. This is not to say that no waves were experienced, 
and in some countries there were reported elevated rates of 
illness that were not initially linked to pandemic influenza. 
 
 
Figure 12: Study countries disease activity during 1968-
69 pandemic influenza. 
 
The first outbreaks in Japan occurred in school settings in 
Tokyo and Osaka (Fukumi, 1969). Japan reported 127,086 
cases of influenza-like infections (ILI) and 985 deaths during 
the epidemic, with a 0.8% case fatality rate (Yoshikura, 
2014). In a similar trend to the 1957 Asian pandemic influenza 
in Japan, the Hong Kong influenza mortality was reported as 
highest in the young (<5 years old) and older persons (>60 
years old), with a movement towards older persons over the 
epidemic which correlates to typical seasonal influenza 
experience (Yoshikura, 2014). 
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In comparison to the previous two pandemics of 1918 and 
1957, the 1968 pandemic in Singapore was the least severe. 
The epidemic lasted just a few weeks; it began at the 
beginning of August, and the excess mortality rate was 
calculated as 0.27 per 1,000 persons (Lee et al., 2007). The 
1968 Hong Kong influenza in Singapore caused widespread 
sickness and work absenteeism, but was reviewed as mild and 
short lasting, and as such no significant public health 
measures were implemented (Lee et al., 2007, Lee et al., 
2008). 
 
2.3.3 Future pandemic influenza predictions  
Pandemic influenza predictions prior to 2009 were found in the 
literature search. For instance, Wilson et al. (2005:P.93) 
stated: “Even so, a future influenza pandemic virus strain may 
be far more virulent and infectious than those of the past, and 
it would arrive into a society with much higher levels and 
speeds of intra-country transport.” In addition: “with the 
increase in travel and trade, a future pandemic may reach a 
globally connected city before preparedness plans can be fully 
activated.” (Lee et al. 2007: p.1056). This demonstrated a 
commonly held concern about the global interconnectedness 
of modern day living and the uncertainty surrounding 
pandemics.  
Other literature explained the potential speed of infection 
transmission of future pandemics. It was found that the 
pandemics of the twentieth century had completed widespread 
transmission within 4 to 6 weeks within Singapore. It was 
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advised that “future plans must be able to weather this full 
impact over a short period of time.” (Lee et al., 2008: p.475). 
 
 Pandemic influenza public health management 2.4
measures 
The public health responses to pandemic influenza have been 
dependent on the discovery of measures at that point in time, 
as well as factors such as the affordability of measures by 
nations and how quickly a country is affected by a novel 
influenza. Historically, early measures included social 
distancing, border closures and quarantine enforcements. This 
section shall include country-specific literature referring to 
instances of public health measure responses to previous 
pandemics. 
 
2.4.1 Travel restrictions 
It has been described by Rice (2005) that the 1918 pandemic 
influenza rapidly spread along the transport routes of the 
coasts and rail services and Wilson et al. (2005) put this 
forward as a failure in New Zealand at controlling the 
pandemic influenza with public health measures.  
Kanagaratnam (1957) reported that during the Asian 1957 
pandemic influenza in Singapore, no quarantine measures 
were taken involving restricting the international movement of 
ships and aircraft because the disease did not warrant these 
actions.  
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Travel restrictions have remained a topic of discussion in 
pandemic influenza management. Mateus et al. (2014) 
examined the effectiveness of travel restrictions in delaying 
influenza spread and found that travel and country border 
restrictions may delay influenza spread by one week and up to 
two months. Effectiveness was diminished if measures were 
not promptly implemented in the early weeks of pandemic 
influenza. The researchers concluded that these measures 
were ineffective without the implementation of other public 
health measures. Restriction may delay, but ultimately not 
prevent the spread of disease.  
 
2.4.2 Personal protective measures  
Nishiura and Chowell (2008) reported that the Kanagawa 
prefecture in Japan educated the general public about the 
hazards and transmission of influenza through leaflets and 
posters during the 1918-19 pandemic influenza. Also, face 
mask use was recommended to medical staff and the general 
public. Although Nishiura and Chowell did not go on to 
mention the effectiveness of these measures, the authors 
indicated that social distancing of individuals in rural areas of 
Kanagawa may have been important for minimising the risk of 
death from infection.  
In Singapore during the 1918-19 pandemic influenza, the 
government and physicians recommended the public to self-
isolate themselves in the instance of influenza-like-illness, 
seek early medical attention, maintain high cleanliness of 
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public floors and to avoid high people traffic areas (Lee et al., 
2007; Lee et al. 2008).  
 
2.4.3 Social distancing measures 
In Singapore, it was put forward that visitors to hospitalised 
patients should be restricted or banned, and during the 
Spanish Influenza second wave, schools were closed for one 
week. Early treatment measures typically focused on treating 
patients’ symptoms. For example, during the 1918 pandemic 
influenza in Singapore, physicians worked in treating patients 
fatigue and increasing ventilation (Lee et al., 2007). Lee et al. 
noted that at the time of Spanish Influenza these measures 
were enacted without evidence of the effectiveness of the 
procedures, and in the twenty-first century the effectiveness 
of measures such as school closures remains disputed. 
The Coromandel County of New Zealand reported a successful 
local public health containment measure in 1918. The small 
isolated town of Coromandel isolated ferry visitors on a nearby 
island for 24 hours and following a medical examination these 
visitors were allowed into the town. Travellers by road were 
stopped by barricades and required a medical certificate to 
visit the town. At the time, the medical officer reported no 
cases in the town of 1000 occupants and endorsed strict home 
isolation of houses in the nearby Maori community with 
reported cases (Wilson et al, 2005). Wilson et al.’s (2005) 
analysis found that the European mortality rate was 
statistically significantly lower in Coromandel County in 
comparison to the wider area. However, the reduced Maori 
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mortality rate was not statistically significantly lower in 
Coromandel County (Wilson et al, 2005). 
The social distancing measures of public health officials, not 
simply the rurality of the Coromandel County, appeared to be 
the factor responsible for no cases in this example from New 
Zealand. In contrast, Nishiura and Chowell (2008) found that 
rurality without social distancing measures was not a 
protective factor in the Kanagawa prefecture in Japan in the 
1918-19 pandemic influenza. The village location had higher 
incidence compared to cities and towns which Nishiura and 
Chowell hypothesised this may have been due to the 
interconnectedness of village communities. The authors noted 
that rural areas had larger mean household size compared to 
large towns and cities. Towns and cities were advantageous 
compared to rural areas in that officials in the Kanagawa 
prefecture closed factories during outbreaks and imposed 
individual movement restrictions. Nishiura and Chowell (2008) 
expected that future pandemic influenza infection risk could be 
reduced through social distancing protective measures. Whilst 
villages had the highest morbidity levels, towns and cities had 
the highest case fatality rate which Nishiura and Chowell 
(2008) postulated could be due to different demographics e.g. 
young adults in urban areas, the worse health of persons in 
urban environments and poverty.   
During the 1918-1919 pandemic, influenza was not a 
notifiable disease in Sweden and as such individuals with 
influenza-like-symptoms (ILI) were not treated in epidemic 
specific hospitals outside of cities but rather local hospitals. 
Without notifiable classification and low mortality rates early 
on, the health authorities and Swedish Medical Board 
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reportedly did not implement any strategies to contain the 
pandemic influenza spread which led to criticism by the 
Swedish Medical Society (Holtenius and Gillman, 2014). 
Canada isolated patients with ILI during the 1918 influenza 
pandemic, however “the medical officer of health for the 
province of Alberta concluded that forced home isolation of 
patients, posting signs on houses, and “quarantine” (details 
unspecified) captured only ≈60% of patients in the community 
because of diagnostic difficulties involving mild cases and 
failure to notify cases to authorities.” (World Health 
Organization Writing Group, 2006: p.86). Successful small-
scale isolation measures in remote communities have also 
been reported in Canada by using 1918-19 influenza historical 
data. However, Sattenspiel and Herring (2003) found that 
very low mobility rates are required for success. 
In the United States, during the 1918-19 influenza pandemic, 
a number of social distancing measures were attempted. 
Bootsma and Ferguson (2007) found that a variety of 
measures were implemented in some United States cities but 
at different times. Measures included school closures, mask 
wearing, isolation of the infected and hygiene measures. It 
was found that the early timing of such measures slowed the 
localised epidemic and resulted in a notable reduction in 
mortality rates. However, other United States commenters 
have expressed how public health measures of this nature in 
practice proved difficult to implement; primarily as city 
dwellers did not stay at home. School and work attendance 
continued, and food shopping and recreational pursuit 
activities remained. “In the years immediately following the 
pandemic, commentators would continue to reflect on the 
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difficulty of controlling the urban ‘masses’ during a public 
health emergency.” (Tomes, 2010: p.59). 
During the Asian 1957 pandemic influenza, “A WHO 
consultation in 1959 concluded that the 1957 influenza 
pandemic tended to appear first in army units, schools, and 
other groups where contact was close. Also noting the reduced 
incidence in rural areas, the consultation suggested that 
avoiding crowding could reduce the peak incidence of an 
epidemic and spread it over many, rather than a few, weeks” 
(World Health Organization Writing Group, 2006: p.86). 
Singapore closed schools between 8th May and 20th May 1957 
during the Asian pandemic influenza (Kanagaratnam, 1957). 
The general public was encouraged to avoid crowded areas 
through the media and medical centres, and it was observed 
that cinema attendances dropped at the peak of the epidemic. 
However, not all persons with ILI symptoms stayed in their 
homes (Kanagaratnam, 1957). 
Interestingly, the WHO consultation in 1959 also discussed the 
role of schools during the 1957 Asian pandemic influenza and 
“concluded, “In the Northern hemisphere at least, the opening 
of schools after the summer holidays seems to have played an 
important role in initiating the main epidemic phase” (World 
Health Organisation, 1959). Despite the propensity of 
influenza epidemics to be amplified in primary schools (Neuzil 
et al., 2002), data on the effectiveness of school closures are 
limited. Apparently no data or analyses exist for 
recommending illness thresholds or rates of change that 
should lead to considering closing or reopening schools.” 
(World Health Organization Writing Group, 2006: p.86). 
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2.4.4 Healthcare structure   
The United States, as in other countries, put on emergency 
hospital facilities during the 1918-19 Spanish influenza to 
provide treatment centres for the sick (Monto and Sellwood, 
2013). 
Singapore implemented changes in their healthcare structure 
during the Asian 1957 pandemic influenza. Singapore cut back 
on elective surgery to free up medical staff to treat influenza 
patients. The maternal and child health centres and school 
health centres located across Singapore opened their doors to 
people presenting with ILI in order to relieve pressure from 
health services (Kanagaratnam, 1957).  
 
2.4.5 Antivirals 
The ‘1st Conference on Antiviral Substances’ was held in the 
1960s. In 1967, Kates and McAuslan published on the first 
viral enzyme, the first systematic basis for selective antiviral 
drugs. In 1969, the ‘2nd Conference on Antiviral Substances’ 
was held which heard that “amantadine had been shown not 
only to inhibit influenza virus, but also to cause resistance 
development (Oxford et al., 1970), later proposed to be a 
hallmark of selective antiviral effect (Hermann & Hermann 
1977).” (Littler and Oberg, 2006: p.155). 
Developments in the area of antivirals launched from 
infections of herpes (1970s) and HIV (1980s). Over the course 
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of decades, there has been ongoing research to develop drugs 
against influenza. The 1960s saw the discovery of amantadine 
against influenza, particularly in prophylactic use (Dawkins et 
al 1968). Amantadine was not used extensively, primarily due 
to the presence of a strong vaccine lobby against 
chemotherapy, and also, that Amantadine was only effective 
against some type A influenza viruses (Littler and Oberg, 
2006). 
The influenza-specific antivirals, Amantadine and the later 
produced Rimantadine, work against influenza through 
exploiting the M2 ion channel blockers (Littler and Oberg, 
2006). In 1999, the drugs zanamivir and oseltamivir were 
released which are active against both A and B influenza 
(Littler and Oberg, 2006; Nguyen-Van-Tam et al., 2014).  
Even with the apparent usefulness of these antivirals, wide 
scale use was not reported at the start of the twenty-first 
century. “…sales of oseltamivir in 2002 were only 
approximately £200 million (which in itself was a 184% 
increase from the previous year) and factors such as increased 
vaccination do not explain this poor use of what are good 
drugs. These sales figures were obtained during an 
interpandemic period – one may only speculate what the sales 
could be during a pandemic. However, unless a pandemic 
could be anticipated or planned for (by stockpiling drugs) it is 
unlikely that compound supply could keep pace with patient 
demand.” (Littler and Oberg, 2006: p.159) 
More recent research, post the 2009-10 pandemic, has 
indicated that the use of oseltamivir and zanamivir were 
effective in prophylaxis treatment (Okoli et al., 2014) and 
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significantly reduced mortality in hospitalised adult patients 
(Nguyen-Van-Tam et al., 2014). 
 
2.4.6 Influenza vaccines 
Early attempts at injecting an influenza virus into human 
subjects were first conducted in the United States during the 
1930s. The work tested to see if the humans injected with an 
influenza virus would go on to produce an antibody response. 
“This pioneering work was done with A/PR/8/34 (H1N1) and it 
was observed that neutralizing antibodies developed in serum, 
peaked after 2 weeks and persisted for up to 6 months.” 
(Wood and Williams, 1998: p.317). Work in the 1930s in the 
United States and the UK followed with inactivated influenza 
virus, however, the results were unconvincing and possibly 
due to low dosage or inappropriate use of vaccine strains 
(Wood and Williams, 1998). In the early 1940s, works by 
Burnett, and Hirst and Hirst et al. sparked exploration into 
“…large-scale growth of virus in hens’ eggs, purification of 
virus by adsorption to red blood cells and assessment of 
vaccine potency by haemagglutination. These techniques were 
used consistently during the next decade in the quest to 
demonstrate that vaccines were effective.” (Wood and 
Williams, 1998: p.317). 
In the early 1940s, the United States Army conducted a 
number of clinical studies using a large number of individuals 
whereby inactivated influenza A and B was injected, and a 
comparison control group was monitored. An influenza A 
epidemic occurred that winter and it was observed that the 
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control group had ILI 3.5 to 6 times more frequently than the 
vaccinated group, as well as a greater incidence of 
hospitalised cases. This was the start of the evidence 
supporting the effectiveness of influenza vaccination. By 1945, 
licences for United States companies to produce civilian 
vaccines were issued. Influenza vaccines were quickly utilised 
worldwide but the vaccination efforts during the winter of 
1947 provided little protection because although there was a 
great response to the vaccine strain, there was a lack of 
antibody response to the epidemic strain circulating. This 
experience led to the incorporation of the previous year strain 
in the following vaccines, and this practice has continued on in 
the production of modern influenza vaccines (Wood and 
Williams, 1998). 
During the 1957 Asian pandemic influenza, Fukumi (1959a) 
reported that several manufacturers in Japan worked towards 
producing a vaccine after isolating the new influenza virus in 
May 1957. The new vaccine was ready for the vaccination 
campaign from November 1957 in a limited amount and this 
timing corresponded to the second wave peak in Japan. It was 
reported that most vaccinations were conducted in the months 
of November and December (Fukumi, 1959a). However, due 
to the limited early availability of the vaccine, its usefulness 
during the pandemic was constrained “as a large proportion of 
the vaccine was furnished for public use a little too late, it was 
very difficult to evaluate its protective efficiency or to make a 
plan for mass vaccination.” (Fukumi, 1959b: p.355). 
Over the years, influenza vaccines enquiry worked towards 
producing a more concentrated virus and solving the problem 
of reactogenicity in young children. Over the course of 
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development, it was discovered that split vaccines produced 
significantly less febrile reactions. Split vaccines licences were 
first introduced in 1968 in the United States, and later clinical 
trials showed that second doses of a vaccine were required for 
adequate immunogenic response in unprimed individuals; 
influenza split vaccines have continued to be used (Wood and 
Williams, 1998). Later scientific developments from split 
vaccines involved “the purification of haemagglutinin (HA) and 
neuraminidase (NA) surface antigens” (Wood and Williams, 
1998: p. 319) resulting in surface antigen vaccines licenced in 
the UK by 1980. Later vaccine work focused on increasing the 
virus yield to produce adequate quantity of vaccine (Wood and 
Williams, 1998). 
The history of influenza vaccines demonstrates how influenza 
vaccines were not a possibility during the 1918-19 Spanish 
influenza, but has had a minor role to play in just a few 
communities within a limited number of countries during the 
1957 Asian pandemic influenza and the 1968 Hong Kong 
pandemic influenza. The challenges were to produce enough 
quantity of new influenza vaccines during these latter 
pandemics and before nations are heavily infected with the 
novel virus.  
Vaccination timing during pandemic influenza is challenging as 
it takes six to eight months before the new vaccine is available 
in large quantities (Leese and Tamblyn, 1998). As such, 
solutions to this issue have been sought. Pre-pandemic 
influenza vaccines have been explored in more recent years. 
From 2007, some countries stockpiled pre-pandemic vaccines 
of A(H5N1) as an insurance and preparation measure in 
response to the threat of avian influenza at that time. 
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A(H5N1) was a novel virus and had a high mortality rate in 
those infected, and therefore, there was a great concern for 
the consequences if it managed to develop into a pandemic 
(Carrasco and Leroux-Roels, 2013).  
Until now, this chapter that introduced the concepts of 
interpandemic and pandemic influenza, discussed the 
pandemic events up until the twentieth century and provided 
an overview of past public health management measures. The 
following section is concerned with the timeline of events of 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in the five study 
countries. 
 
 Pandemic Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 2.5
This section will describe the time, place and person 
characteristics of the epidemiology of pandemic influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 (also referred to as A(H1N1) and the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic), with special reference to the 
study countries individual epidemiological patterns and 
national responses. This section is structured in chronological 
order and spans from March 2009 until August 2010. It 
chronicles the first cases of (H1N1) influenza, WHO pandemic 
phases, response measures adopted, epidemiological data and 
the study country vaccination programmes. 
 
2.5.1 Novel influenza virus emerges 
On 18th March 2009, surveillance within Mexico observed 
outbreaks of ILI in parts of the country (World Health 
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Organization, 2009a). The area of Veracruz experienced an 
outbreak and, in accordance with the International Health 
Regulations, the then Mexican General Directorate of 
Epidemiology reported the occurrence of respiratory illness to 
the Pan American Health Organization on 12th April 2009. On 
17th April, Mexico enhanced surveillance across the country in 
response to the increased cases and hospitals were requested 
to report and sample patients presenting with respiratory 
illness symptoms (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2009a). Meanwhile in the United States in southern California, 
two unrelated children presented with respiratory illness and 
the CDC testing found that the infections were caused by 
influenza A(H1N1) of swine origin on 17th April. It was 
reported that this “new strain of swine influenza A (H1N1) is 
substantially different from human influenza A (H1N1) viruses, 
that a large proportion of the population might be susceptible 
to infection, and that the seasonal influenza vaccine H1N1 
strain might not provide protection” (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2009b: p.1). Laboratory confirmation 
of several cases in Mexico on April 23rd also detected influenza 
A(H1N1) virus of swine origin and a case definition was 
created detailing suspected, probable and confirmed case 
criteria (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009a). 
The Canadian National Microbiology Laboratory identified the 
new influenza A(H1N1) virus in the samples provided from 
Mexico and these were found to be identical to the California 
samples. On the 25th April, the WHO Director-General Dr. 
Margaret Chan announced an international public health 
emergency (World Health Organization 2009d). 
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Retrospective data analysis in Mexico covering 1st March to 
30th April found 1,918 suspected, and 97 confirmed cases and 
84 deaths (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2009a). The majority of these cases were from Mexican 
hospital reports therefore underestimating can be assumed. At 
the end of April, all Mexico City schools were closed, airport 
advice was provided to travellers about ILI symptoms, and 
encouragement was given regarding seeking fast medical 
attention, mass media circulated personal hygiene messages, 
masks and alcohol sanitizers were distributed, and social 
distancing measures encouraged (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2009a). 
The Mexico and United States developments fulfilled the initial 
WHO criteria for an influenza pandemic in April 2009. By 29th 
April, the WHO Director General released a statement 
declaring that the influenza pandemic alert had escalated to a 
Phase 5. At this time, it was recommended that country 
pandemic influenza preparedness plans were brought into 
action and national surveillance systems monitored for ILI 
outbreaks. This Phase 5 announcement not only initiated 
international and national pandemic response activities, but it 
also signalled a time of action to pharmaceutical companies 
regarding antivirals and vaccines, and charitable organizations 
tasked with providing resources to developing countries 
(World Health Organization, 2009a). 
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2.5.2 The arrival of first cases and initial responses in study 
countries (and the UK) 
The first H1N1 case announced in Canada occurred on the 23rd 
April 2009, shortly after the first case was reported in Mexico 
(Brien et al., 2012). New Zealand reported the first southern 
hemisphere case of pandemic A(H1N1) virus on the 25th April 
2009. It was imported by, and detected in, a group of high 
school students returning from Mexico. These identified cases 
triggered the New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan (NZIPP) 
into activation (Jennings, 2013).  
On the 27th April 2009, the United Kingdom reported the first 
European cases in two people returning to Scotland from 
Mexico, and the WHO announced Pandemic Phase 4. The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office advised for only essential 
travel to Mexico on the 27th April 2009; this advice ceased on 
15th May 2009 (Hine, 2010). By 28th April, Canada had 
reported six cases (Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2009c). The UK implemented their first school 
closure on the 29th April 2009. Soon after, the UK reported 
their first confirmed cases of human-to-human transmission 
on 1st May 2009 (Hine, 2010). 
The first two confirmed cases occurred in Sweden in early May 
2009 (World Health Organization 2009d), and a ‘search-and-
contain’ strategy was adopted (Örtqvist et al. 2011). At a 
similar time, Japan reported their first laboratory confirmed 
cases of pandemic A(H1N1) virus at Narita International 
Airport through the quarantine screening programme in people 
returning from Canada on the 9th of May 2009. These 
passengers were isolated in hospital for seven days as per the 
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Japanese Governments plan (Shimada et al. 2009). The first 
non-travel related laboratory-confirmed cases were identified 
on 16th May in high school students (one case in Osaka 
prefecture, four in Hyogo prefecture). Further outbreaks were 
reported in neighbouring regions, and this resulted in over 
4,200 school closures (accounting for approximately 650,000 
students) in these areas for one to two weeks, which is 
reported to have decreased the number of new laboratory-
confirmed cases (Shimada et al. 2009). The first A(H1N1) case 
in Singapore was identified on 26th May 2009 in a Singaporean 
female student aged 22 years old who had travelled from New 
York City (Cutter et al. 2010). This first detected case 
occurred one month following the announcement of the first 
cases of novel A(H1N1) influenza in California (Cutter et al. 
2010).  
Singapore adopted a containment strategy on 27th April 2009 
which involved active screening of travellers from affected 
countries with respiratory symptoms, and all confirmed cases 
were admitted to the Communicable Disease Centre. Liang et 
al. (2009) reported the first ten imported cases clinical 
characteristics which were identified between 26th May and 3rd 
June 2009. It was discovered that nine cases had travelled 
into Singapore from the United States, six were found to have 
travelled specifically from New York, and the one other case 
had travelled from the Philippines. Patients reported the onset 
of symptoms a mean of 1.4 days after arrival in Singapore and 
received emergency department treatment at a mean of 2.7 
days. Symptoms included fever (90%), cough (70%), coryza 
(40%), sore throat and myalgia/arthralgia (30%). All received 
antiviral treatment of oseltamivir had uncomplicated courses 
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of influenza, and clinical features appeared mild for influenza 
A(H1N1) (Liang et al. 2009). 
Over the course of the following weeks, the WHO 
communicated to the rest of the world the Swine influenza 
A(H1N1) laboratory confirmed cases and deaths in other 
countries. The UK implemented a policy of containment 
between May and June 2009 to try to slow the spread of the 
virus and to gather more information (severity, 
transmissibility, risk groups). This included measures such as 
swab testing of individuals with suspected A(H1N1), antiviral 
treatment of individuals meeting case definition without 
laboratory confirmation, contract tracing and close contact 
antiviral prophylaxis, school closures, self-isolation of 
community cases, etc. (Hine, 2010). By 12th May, there were 
330 confirmed cases to the WHO in Canada, seven cases in 
New Zealand, four cases in Japan and two cases in Sweden 
(World Health Organization, 2009d) in the countries of interest 
to this research project. By 20th May 2009, these confirmed 
cases increased to 496 (one death) in Canada, nine in New 
Zealand, 210 in Japan and three in Sweden (World Health 
Organization, 2009e). All Canadian provinces and territories 
had reported cases of A(H1N1) by the 11th June 2009 (Brien 
et al., 2012). 
 
2.5.3 Pandemic influenza declared 
The WHO declared that the A(H1N1) virus had reached Phase 
6 pandemic status on the 11th June 2009 (World Health 
Organization, 2009b), which made it the first influenza 
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pandemic of the 21st century. This was based on the evidence 
of a novel influenza strain of nearly 30,000 confirmed cases in 
74 countries which were sustained by human-to-human and 
country-to-country transmission (World Health Organization, 
2009b). By 11th June 2009, there had been 144 deaths, four 
of which were in Canada and the majority were in Mexico. The 
average age of a Canadian case was 17 years old, and 90% of 
the confirmed infections in Canada had no recent travel 
history (World Health Organization, 2009f) indicating 
extensive community transmission. 
 
2.5.4 Surveillance and response measures 
New Zealand made A(H1N1) influenza a notifiable and 
quarantinable disease on 30th April 2009 (Jennings, 2013). In 
comparison, the Swedish Communicable Disease Act made 
influenza A(H1N1) virus a notifiable disease on the 15th May 
2009 (Örtqvist et al. 2011). In both incidences, these 
countries made the disease notifiable within just a few days of 
it being discovered within their nations. Perhaps in future, this 
notifiable disease listing could be implemented before the first 
national cases emerge, based on intelligence gathered and 
shared from other countries. This would require mandatory 
reporting in line with WHO phase announcements. 
New Zealand had prepared six phases of strategy response in 
the NZIPAP and, once activated, containment measures were 
implemented in the early weeks. This involved border 
management (the ‘Keep It Out’ campaign) and cluster control 
(the ‘Stamp It Out’ campaign) strategies between 25th April 
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and 22nd June. At the end of June 2009, New Zealand 
switched strategy to the ‘Manage It’ phase of the response. 
The extensive containment measures are believed to have 
delayed community transmission of A(H1N1) by six weeks 
(Jennings, 2013). 
Auckland International Airport conducted a screening 
programme for influenza A(H1N1) in airline passengers  
between 27th April and 22nd June 2009 at the direction of New 
Zealand’s Ministry of Health. Air passengers travelling from 
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 infected countries where community 
transmission had occurred were screened, and a screening 
procedure was followed. Screening was increased to all 
passengers from any country as of 29th April 2009. If the cabin 
crew became aware of unwell travellers during a flight, a 
notification prior to landing was made so that public health 
officials could meet the aircraft and triage the travellers. A 
scripted health message was read by cabin crew to air 
passengers requesting that if they had symptoms to notify 
staff. All disembarked passengers left through a public health 
checkpoint where ill travellers were recommended to take up 
screening. Public health officials also observed passengers and 
targeted those with overt symptoms. Some thermal screening 
was utilised but not for every passenger. Unwell individuals 
were screened by nurses and medical officers to see if their 
illness met the definition of a suspected case. Where case 
definition was met, nasopharyngeal swabs were taken, 
oseltamivir offered and isolation instructed. Reverse 
transcription PCR was conducted in order to confirm infection 
(Hale et al. 2012). 
 60 
 
The quiet lead-in period to June 2009 enabled the New 
Zealand Emergency Management Steering Group (EM-SG) to 
review surveillance, front-line capacity, diagnostic services 
and primary and secondary health care, whilst following the 
global situation. Importantly, this time enabled key public 
health messages to be released regarding hygiene and social 
distancing (for example, staying home when unwell) and when 
to seek medical advice. These public health messages were 
delivered by radio, television, regular press releases, posters 
and websites. In addition, ‘Healthline’, a free telephone 
service triaged patients and provided health information 
(Jennings, 2013).  
New Zealand enhanced influenza surveillance from April, and 
this measure was in accordance with the NZIPAP plan. There 
were two existing sentinel general practitioner systems which 
reported epidemiological and virological data for disease 
burden calculations, identifying circulating virus strains and 
real time A(H1N1) pandemic information. The EM-SG used the 
MoH newly developed HealthStat system which reported ILI 
data electronically each week from >100 general practices. As 
influenza A(H1N1) was a notifiable disease, EpiSurv recorded 
all laboratory confirmed cases and cases from primary and 
secondary care. With the introduction of the ‘Manage It’ phase 
in June, changes to virological testing occurred, as testing was 
only conducted on severe cases, so an underestimation is 
probable (Jennings, 2013). 
The Ministry of Health in Singapore created an A(H1N1) 
Taskforce to provide public health control measures and 
supervise the nation’s medical services during the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. The Taskforce included experts 
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in policy, clinicians, infectious disease specialists and other 
experts (Tay et al. 2010). Alterations were made to the 
Infectious Diseases Act to make it compulsory for all 
confirmed 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic virus cases to 
be reported to the Ministry of Health within 24 hours of 
diagnosis on 27th April 2009 (Tay et al. 2010, Cutter et al. 
2010). The timing of this alteration corresponded to the WHO 
Phase 5 announcement. 
In 2008, Singapore had nearly 10 million tourist arrivals which 
were approximately double the size of the Singaporean 
population (Department of Statistics Singapore, 2008). This 
demonstrates Singapore’s global connections through tourism, 
business and education, and reflects the Ministry of Health’s 
expectation during pandemic influenza planning that a novel 
influenza virus would enter the country by travel very soon 
after being discovered in another country.  
Singapore had three phases for the management of pandemic 
influenza (Hospital Influenza Workgroup Singapore, 2009): 
1. Preparedness phase – no A(H1N1) cases identified in 
Singapore 
2. Containment phase – imported cases or small clusters 
3. Mitigation phase – sustained community transmission 
 
When the World Health Organization pandemic alert level was 
Phase 3, the Singaporean DORSCON (Disease Outbreak 
Response) was Green Alert Level 1, when WHO was increased 
to Phase 4 the Singaporean DORSCON was raised to Yellow 
Alert Level, and then when WHO announced Phase 5, the 
Singaporean DORSCON became Orange Alert Level. However, 
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when the virus was believed to be less severe than first 
thought, Singapore reduced the DORSCON to Yellow Alert 
Level on 7th May 2009 but continued enhanced influenza 
surveillance, border control, and ensured that laboratory, 
infection control measures and clinical management protocols 
remained in place and were reviewed (Tambyah and Lye, 
2009). 
Case-fatality ratio (CFR) is used in calculating the pandemic 
severity index (PSI), and the PSI is a pre-pandemic planning 
tool that has a scale 1 to 5. Singapore also uses the FluAid 
modelling software from the United States CDC, which uses 
CFR to calculate the hospitalisations, outpatient visits and 
deaths from pandemic influenza in order to estimate the 
potential impact to health services. This FluAid software was 
used by the Ministry of Health in Singapore during pandemic 
preparations. It was calculated using data from the 1968 
pandemic and 25% attack rate in the population of 4.2 million, 
which projected that there would be 1,900 deaths and 11,200 
hospitalisations. Transmissibility could be reduced if public 
health interventions such as quarantine, isolation, social 
distancing and treatment were used (Hospital Influenza 
Workgroup Singapore, 2009). 
The Singaporean Ministry of Health adopted a national 
containment strategy between 25th April and 18th June 2009 
which was a period when imported cases were identified in 
individuals that had previous overseas travel history (Ang et 
al., 2010). Travellers who had arrived from infected countries 
and who were identified by thermal screening at border entry, 
in addition to individuals displaying acute respiratory illness 
symptoms, (Chan et al., 2010) were referred to Tan Tock 
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Seng Hospital (TTSH) Communicable Disease Centre, the 
designated screening centre for A(H1N1) (Leo et al. 2010). 
The suspected and confirmed cases were isolated to individual 
rooms and infection control procedures were followed (Ang et 
al., 2010). National mass media broadcasted that any persons 
who were at risk of 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
infection due to travel history, fever, and respiratory systems, 
should attend TTSH for screening. Testing included collecting 
combined nasal and throat swab specimens (Leo et al. 2010).  
Before the first positive case of 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic was identified in Singapore, 300 individuals 
underwent screening for influenza infection between 27th April 
and 24th May 2009. 244 reported returning from an affected 
country with respiratory illness, and 56 had symptomatic 
contacts. H3N2 subtype influenza was found in 24%, seasonal 
subtype A(H1N1) was found in 1.6%, influenza B was found in 
2.7%. Common symptoms included fever (92.9%), cough 
(82.4%), sore throat (57.6%) and rhinorrhoea (62.4%). The 
median age was 36 years, and some had co-morbidities 
(14.7%) (Leo et al. 2010). 
Community contact tracing was undertaken with A(H1N1) 
infected patient’s contacts of 24 hours before symptom onset 
to isolation, with contacts offered chemoprophylaxis and 
quarantine measures to avoid local transmission. Healthcare 
workers in Accident and Emergency wards and the isolation 
facility had N95 respirators, eye protection, gloves and gowns. 
When community transmission was identified, all healthcare 
workers working in clinical areas wore surgical masks from 
19th June 2009 (Ang et al., 2010). 
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Tan Tock Seng Hospital continued the enhanced surveillance 
through the emergency department, and it was not until the 
week beginning 14th June 2009 that A(H1N1) influenza was 
detected in the community, after which the incidence rate 
rapidly increased until 25th July 2009 week. By 25th July 2009 
the A(H1N1) influenza cases had suppressed the seasonal 
circulating influenza viruses, and Tan Tock Seng Hospital 
emergency department had seen 838 individuals with 
confirmed A(H1N1) influenza. The patients had a median age 
of 22 years, and common symptoms of fever (85.3%), cough 
(87.2%) and sore throat (55.4%) (Leo et al. 2010). 
The Hospital Influenza Workgroup Singapore (2009) 
recommended the following management strategies against 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in hospitals: 
 Basic infection control measures (hand hygiene, cough 
etiquette, personal protective equipment (PPE), airborne 
and contact precautions for staff) 
 Masks (surgical, high filtration, powered air purifying 
respirator (PAPR) (specific situations) 
 Gown and gloves 
 Eye protection (specific situations) 
 Environment infection control (disinfecting contaminated 
surfaces) 
 
The study by Chen et al. (2010) found that healthcare workers 
at the Tan Tock Seng Hospital who treated confirmed A(H1N1) 
pandemic influenza cases, were at no greater risk of 
contracting A(H1N1) than individuals in the community. The 
authors indicate the high level of pandemic preparedness and 
infection control measures as likely factors which minimised 
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the incidence rate and indicated that they were effective. 
However, whilst healthcare workers, in general, were not at 
greater risk, the authors found that nurses were 
disproportionally affected which indicated that specific 
occupations had increased risk, and future pandemic 
preparedness should account for this (Chen et al., 2010). 
Sweden had various surveillance and reporting systems in use 
during the influenza pandemic. SMI reported the systems and 
methods used to gather surveillance information concerning 
the pandemic influenza, which covered (Swedish Institute for 
Communicable Disease Control, 2011):  
 Population-based surveillance (Sjukrapport) 
 Web search 
 Telephone advice line 
 Sentinel surveillance 
 Sentinel laboratory testing 
 Mandatory Laboratory Reporting of Influenza A(H1N1) 
 Aggregated Voluntary Laboratory Reporting of 
Denominator Data 
 Mandatory Clinical Reporting – All Cases of Influenza 
A(H1N1) (13May09 to 15Jul09) 
 Mandatory Reporting of Hospital Admissions (16Jul09 to 
present) 
 Intensive Care Data (Partly retrospective reporting, 
14Dec09 to 30Apr10) 
 Mandatory Reporting of Deaths and Official Death 
Registry 
 Sero-epidemiology 
 Virus Characterisation 
 Vaccine Coverage 
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Following early illness characterisation from Mexico and United 
States, authorities and experts in Sweden predicted that 25% 
of the country’s population could contract the novel swine 
influenza. The NBHW evaluated that there was considerable 
risk that A(H1N1) influenza would spread to Sweden, and, 
therefore, A(H1N1) influenza became a notifiable disease 
under the Swedish Communicable Disease Act on 15th May 
2009  (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency & Socialstyrelsen, 
2011). 
When it was announced that a new influenza A(H1N1) virus 
had emerged and the WHO had made announcements, the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of the Japanese 
Government began surveillance for cases of this new infection. 
This accompanied the existing system which monitored 
seasonal influenza strains. People who travelled from the 
affected countries (Mexico, United States and Canada), went 
through entry screening from 28th April 2009 (Shimada et al. 
2009). Those displaying ILI had a rapid diagnostic test for 
influenza performed by a quarantine officer, and positive 
results for influenza A required a polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) test for the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic virus. 
The Quarantine Law and PIPAP recommended that confirmed 
cases and close contacts of confirmed cases were isolated 
either in hospital or at home for approximately seven days 
(Shimada et al. 2009). Suspected and confirmed case 
definitions were developed for the monitoring of the 
epidemiological disease patterns. 
On 29th April 2009 the Japanese National Institute of 
Infectious Diseases released the developed “primers for 
conventional and real-time RT-PCR for the detection of 
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A(H1N1)v virus”, and by 4th May all 75 prefectural and 
municipal public health institutes and quarantine stations 
became ready to perform conventional and real-time PT-PCR 
testing (Shimada et al. 2009: p.1). 
A review of Canada’s surveillance system during the influenza 
pandemic reported that Canada had one of the world’s leading 
surveillance systems for monitoring patient pathways covering 
hospitalisations, ICU admissions and mortalities for health 
analysis. However, there were limitations to the system during 
the influenza pandemic because the data was not generated in 
real time (Eggleton, 2010). During a public health emergency, 
such as an influenza pandemic, public health professionals 
require real-time data to make informed decisions for an 
effective response. 
The independent provincial and territorial areas of Canada 
have led to variations in surveillance across Canada. For 
instance, in terms of monitoring vaccination rates Quebec 
province collects this information, whereas the province of 
British Columbia does not (Eggleton, 2010). This disparity of 
information collection across Canada respects the independent 
decision making in provinces and territories. However, this 
approach would be a challenge for public health professionals 
responding to an emergency, and could place limitations on 
the effectiveness of response in some areas.  
New Zealand identified community transmission of 
A(H1H1)pdm09 in the week of 16th June 2009 within three 
main population areas, and it became no longer possible to 
contain all the clusters. Public health services and virus 
diagnostic services were reportedly stretched to full capacity. 
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The national response was moved into management phase on 
22nd June. At this time, the disease was mainly in the large 
population areas and had not reached some small population 
centres in the country (Jennings, 2013).  
In the management phase, those cases with moderate to 
severe disease were the priority. Antivirals were used for 
cases, particularly for individuals at risk of severe outcomes, 
and antiviral prophylaxis treatment was no longer continued. 
Cluster control community measures were no longer 
implemented and ‘Flu Centres’ were opened to manage ILI 
patients in some District Health Boards (there are 21 DHBs in 
New Zealand). In some instances, pharmacists could prescribe 
oseltamivir through remote telephone triaging (Jennings, 
2013).   
Community mitigation measures covered complete or partial 
school closures (<20 schools or childcare centres formally 
closed, others were closed due to high absenteeism levels) 
and education to individuals about transmission reduction. The 
school holidays in New Zealand occurred between 4th and 19th 
July 2009 which could have played a part in transmission 
reduction as it occurred at the peak of disease reports 
(Jennings, 2013). School closure due to influenza goes back 
many years in Japan. In 1958, Japan enacted a law (School 
Health Law) which enables school authorities to close schools 
when infectious diseases are experienced, which includes ILI 
disease. For example, a class may be closed if 5 to 10 
absentees are reported, and a school may be closed if 2-3 
classes are closed (Shimada et al. 2009). 
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Canada has two antiviral stockpiles, one owned, funded and 
held by the federal government for use in an influenza 
pandemic and the other provided by provinces and territories. 
The national supply came into use “during the H1N1 pandemic 
and that its use increased significantly between the first and 
second waves resulting in a reduction in complications, 
hospitalizations and death.” (Eggleton, 2010: p.35). Roche 
Canada, the Tamiflu antiviral supplier, noted that half a million 
doses were prescribed over the eight months of May and 
December 2009 in Canada. When the influenza pandemic 
emerged, it was initially professed that “antivirals would only 
be effective if administered within 48 hours of the onset of 
symptoms. However, it was later determined that they should 
be administered even after that time period, despite perhaps 
having a diminished effectiveness.” (Eggleton, 2010: p.35).   
In 2007, the UK’s Department of Health and the Cabinet Office 
published ‘Pandemic Flu: A national framework for responding 
to a pandemic’ and prepared an antiviral stockpile with the 
capacity of treating half the UK’s population. However, when 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic emerged, the Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown announced on 29th April 2009 that the 
antiviral stockpile would be increased to cover 80% of the 
UK’s population. This raised the 33.5 million dose stockpile to 
50 million doses (Hine, 2010). The UK had approximately two 
months of containment policy period between May and June 
2009 where antiviral treatment was prescribed based on case 
definition, not laboratory confirmation. 
In Singapore, all influenza patients belonging to high-risk 
groups were recommended for antiviral treatment, as well as 
patients without associated risk factors that were hospitalised 
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with ILI. Treatment was recommended within the first 48 
hours of symptom onset time window. Antiviral treatment 
recommendations covered both containment and mitigation 
phases of a pandemic according to the pandemic severity 
index rating (Hospital Influenza Workgroup Singapore, 2009). 
Lee et al. (2010) evaluated the effectiveness of public health 
measures in three groups (normal, essential, healthcare) of 
military personnel in Singapore. The authors found that 
enhanced surveillance, isolation involving home leave and 
small group segregation measures were effective in limiting 
influenza transmission in closed environments. 
Singapore ran a campaign to educate the public about 2009-
10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. The campaign included “the 
importance of personal hygiene and social responsibility” e.g. 
temperature control (Lee and Pang, 2013: p.218). Front-line 
healthcare workers in Singapore were given personal 
protective equipment, visitor numbers were regulated and 
temperature screening used, all of these measures may have 
reduced healthcare workers risk of infection (Lee and Pang, 
2013). 
Singapore wanted the response to be in proportion to the 
pandemic severity, so the Asian Youth Games 2009 took place 
in Singapore as planned, which ran alongside mitigation 
strategies, contingency planning and communication (Lee and 
Pang, 2013). 
The Singaporean Ministry of Health altered the containment 
strategy to that of mitigation on 25th June 2009 due to 
evidence of community transmission. Individuals with chronic 
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medical conditions and those at high risk of complications 
were the only screened people for A(H1N1) and antiviral 
treatment reserved for these individuals. Not all A(H1N1) 
confirmed cases were admitted to hospital, only those who 
required care (Ang et al., 2010). During the mitigation phase, 
the response policy emphasis was that of outpatient care 
(Chan et al., 2010). Contact tracing was stopped when this 
phase was introduced. Between 19th June and 21st July 2009, 
Tan Tock Seng Hospital treated 689 confirmed A(H1N1) 
patients (Ang et al., 2010). 
 
2.5.5 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic disease activity 
The epidemiological knowledge is limited by national 
surveillance practices and the proportion of cases of A(H1N1) 
that presented to health services. The typical structure of 
patient presentation to health services is well demonstrated in 
the influenza experience of disease population pyramid by 
Watson and Pebody (2013). Figure 13 is an adaption of the 
pyramid explained by Watson and Pebody.  
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Figure 13: Influenza experience of disease population 
pyramid. 
 
The pyramid shows an example of one million persons during 
a pandemic influenza wave; 80% do not contract influenza 
infection, 10% have asymptomatic infection, 8% treat 
influenza themselves, and the remaining top part of the 
pyramid represent the 2% of the population that engage with 
health services with varying healthcare needs. Much of the 
information in this section corresponds to the top of the 
pyramid: mortality; intensive care unit patients; hospital 
admissions. A broad timeline approach has been taken from 
May 2009 to August 2010. 
By 20th May 2009, Canada had reported their first fatality due 
to A(H1N1) influenza (World Health Organization, 2009e).  
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On the 4th June 2009, Japan had reported 401 laboratory 
confirmed cases in 16 of the 47 prefectures, of which 357 
cases were in the two prefectures of Osaka and Hyogo.  Many 
cases date of onset occurred between 14 and 20 May. 
Shimada et al. (2009) reported that none of the cases by 4 
June 2009 had reports of pneumonia/respiratory failure, and 
no ventilator support was reported. Only three of the cases 
required hospitalisation for medical reasons (due to these 
cases having underlying medical condition), however, 135 
cases were hospitalised for isolation as part of the Quarantine 
Law and the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Action Plan of 
the Japanese Government. By the 4th June 2009, it was 
considered that the severity of disease was similar to that of 
seasonal influenza. However, it was expected that the winter 
season would bring more severe cases (Shimada et al. 2009).  
The UK reported 1,000 influenza cases on the 13th of June 
2009, shortly after the WHO Pandemic Phase 6 announcement 
and soon after reported their first A(H1N1) fatality on 15th 
June 2009 (Hine, 2010). By the 17th June 2009, the number of 
global cases reported neared 35,000 across 74 countries and 
included 163 fatalities. Whilst in the UK, the number of cases 
reported had doubled since the previous week to 1,582 in two 
geographic regions (Hine, 2010).  
Singapore’s first locally infected case of 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic virus was reported on 18th June 2009 
indicating community transmission, with 80% of local cases 
reporting between 27th May and 9th July 2009 experienced by 
10-29-year-olds (Cutter et al. 2010). On 18th July 2009 a 49-
year-old man with co-morbidities was the first 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic virus death case in Singapore. 
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There were no reported deaths in pregnant women during the 
pandemic (Cutter et al. 2010). 
In Singapore’s first 50 adult confirmed cases of 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic virus, 44% of people were aged 
between 20 and 29 years old, and the cases had a median 
time of 3 days from symptoms onset to hospital admission. Of 
these first 50 cases, 50% were female, all had travelled into 
Singapore, and 62% were Singaporean residents. Symptoms 
reported by patients included fever (90%), respiratory 
symptoms (92%), gastrointestinal symptoms (4%), 
temperatures ≥37.8°C (56%). Only 46% of patients met the 
influenza-like-illness case definition provided by the United 
States CDC, so the use of active screening and testing of 
travellers resulted in more confirmed case.  All were admitted 
to the Tan Tock Seng Hospital (Singapore’s Communicable 
Disease Centre) between 26th May and 18th June 2009 and 
received antiviral treatment involving oral oseltamivir 75mg 
twice daily. Patients required two negative consecutive 
combined nasal and throat swabs >6hours apart before 
hospital release. All patients recovered, and the mild 
symptoms were compared to other common influenzas (Chan 
et al., 2010). 
In Singapore, the first locally infected case of pandemic 
A(H1N1) virus was reported on 18th June 2009 indicating 
community transmission, with 80% of local cases between 
27th May and 9th July 2009 experienced by 10-29-year-olds 
(Cutter et al. 2010). In the first few weeks in Japan, 74% of 
confirmed cases were in people aged between 10 and 19 years 
old making the median age 16 years old. Nearly all cases had 
clinical symptoms of fever, and most had cough, however, 
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only clinical symptom information was available for 217 of the 
confirmed cases. Of these 217 cases, 90% received antiviral 
prescriptions of either oseltamivir or zanamivir (Shimada et al. 
2009). 
A government review of Canada’s response to the pandemic 
reported that Canada had two waves; the first wave during 
spring with a peak at the beginning of June 2009 and the 
second wave during autumn with a peak at the beginning of 
November 2009. Overall, Canada had 40,185 laboratory 
confirmed cases, of which 8,678 were hospitalised, of whom 
1,473 cases were admitted to ICU and 60% needed 
ventilation. 428 people died, creating a mortality rate of 1.3 
per 100,000 population (Eggleton, 2010). 
The Singaporean Ministry of Health required hospitals to 
provide daily admission information on severe cases of 
A(H1N1) which resulted in Intensive Care Unit (ICU) 
treatment from the 4th July 2009, reporting epidemiological, 
demographical, symptoms and hospital management of 
patients in reports. Chien et al. (2010) reviewed all confirmed 
A(H1N1) ICU cases between 4th July and 30th August 2009 
admitted to Singapore General Hospital. In total, 15 patients 
were cared for in SGH ICU with a range ICU length of hospital 
stay of between two and 50 days, aged between 34 and 76, 
admitting diagnosis were pneumonia (n=7), heart disease 
(n=5), sepsis (n=1), bronchitis (n=1), upper respiratory tract 
infection (n=1), males (n=9)/females (n=6); all received 
oseltamivir antivirals with one having oseltamivir and then 
amantadine. In total, two patients died (Chien et al., 2010). 
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In Sweden, the first wave peaked in epidemiological week 29 
with 179 laboratory confirmed cases mostly (80%) from 
overseas travel. The second wave peaked in week 36 with 197 
laboratory confirmed cases found and the timing occurred at 
the end of August, which is when a new school year 
commenced, and many adults returned to work following 
summer vacation (Figure 14) (Swedish Institute for 
Communicable Disease Control, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 14: Weekly influenza reporting  between 2006 
and 2010 (Reproduced with permission from Swedish 
Institute for Communicable Disease Control, 2011). 
 
In New Zealand, there had been 3,179 notifications (74.5 per 
100,000 population) of A(H1N1) influenza, with 98% of these 
as laboratory-confirmed cases by late August 2009. 972 of 
these cases were hospitalised and 114 admitted to ICU. In 
total, 16 died of pandemic influenza as the primary cause. 
During this time, there was significant geographical variation 
of hospitalisation cases with 0.0 per 100,000 in the Wairarapa 
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district compared to 52.9 per 100,000 in the capital city 
Wellington (Baker et al. 2009). 
New Zealand’s first wave of 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic occurred between April and December 2009. 
Influenza activity rapidly increased during June 2009, peaked 
in July and then fell back by August 2009, spanning an eight 
week period (Jennings, 2013). In this time, 3,211 laboratory 
confirmed cases were reported, with 1,122 hospitalisations 
and 48 deaths (Bandaranayake et al. 2011). A seroprevalence 
survey estimates that 18.3% of the national population were 
infected in the first wave, including infection of one-third of 
children (Bandaranayake et al. 2010).  
Sweden abandoned the search-and-contain strategy which 
had been in place to delay the spread of influenza in the 
country on the 15th July 2009 and adopted a mitigation 
strategy instead, aiming to protect the most vulnerable 
population groups, as the disease could not be stopped from 
spreading (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency & 
Socialstyrelsen, 2011). Children and teenagers returned to 
school in August, and this was associated with a small 
increase in reported cases. However it was not until October 
that the pandemic cases rapidly increased (Figure 15) 
(Örtqvist et al. 2011). 
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Figure 15: Weekly incidence of A(H1N1) in Stockholm 
county, Sweden (Reproduced with permission from 
Örtqvist et al. 2011). 
 
From the 5th October, the number of cases reported rapidly 
increased. Cases firstly affected school children, then infants 
and young adults, then middle-aged people, and later older 
people. Overall, the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
predominately affected children and young adults in Sweden. 
During 2009, Sweden had 11,000 laboratory confirmed cases, 
with nine cases reported in Spring 2010 and this was five to 
ten times higher than seasonal influenza. Of the 11,000 
people, 1,600 required hospitalisation and 135 required ICU 
treatment. In total, 31 deaths were reported, of which 23 
deaths were people from risk groups and two fatalities were 
children. Sweden reported lower pandemic fatalities compared 
to other countries; the October 2009 vaccination program is 
argued to have contributed to this outcome. 60% of the 
national population were vaccinated against A(H1N1) 
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influenza. The virus in Sweden reportedly spread from north 
to south, and by the time the disease reached southern 
Sweden a larger proportion had been vaccinated (Swedish 
Civil Contingencies Agency & Socialstyrelsen, 2011). 
The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions 
(SKL) and the National Board of Health and Welfare funded 
the Swedish Association of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care to 
electronically collect a national register of people with 
laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H1N1) that required ICU 
treatment during the pandemic. These parties also identified 
further cases from reviewing information held with the 
Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control. Only 
adult cases were included in the study (Brink et al. 2012). 
Between August 2009 and February 2010, 136 influenza 
A(H1N1) cases required ICU treatment in Sweden, which was 
an incidence of 1.5 per 100,000 inhabitants. For the Brink et 
al. study (2012), 126 (95% of ICU influenza A) cases were 
used. It was identified that ICU admission had an uneven 
geographical spread, with a higher incidence in the northern 
region (3.3 per 100,000 inhabitants in the four most northern 
healthcare regions) compared to central and southern regions 
of Sweden (1.2 per 100,000) (Brink et al. 2012).  
The characteristics of the 126 ICU patients in Sweden included 
a median age of 44 years with just 7% of patients over 65 
years old, 56% were male, co-morbidities were identified in 
41% of cases, and obesity in 39% which is double that of the 
national Swedish adult population (Brink et al. 2012). The 
Brink et al. (2009) study found similar patient characteristics 
for age and risk factors (cardiorespiratory diseases, diabetes 
mellitus, haematological malignancies, obesity, pregnancy) 
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that had been published in other studies. Also, they reported 
that the 11% mortality risk within 28 days was comparative to 
other countries similar to Sweden. 
The Brink et al. (2012) study found that ICU patients were 
treated with non-invasive ventilation (NIV) (59%), with two-
thirds of NIV receiving patients having to be converted to 
invasive ventilation. Interestingly, they also reported that 
56% of admitted patients had firstly presented to a health-
care centre with flu symptoms and that antibiotic prescriptions 
(54%) were far more often prescribed than antiviral 
oseltamivir prescriptions (5%). The authors were unable to 
determine whether this was a drug prescription reluctance on 
behalf of the outpatient services or if the oseltamivir 
treatment were typically highly successful in preventing critical 
illness and thus did not lead to these cases presenting to ICU. 
Brink et al. (2012) reported that 1.5 per 100,000 Swedish 
residents required ICU treatment during August 2009 and 
February 2010 which was comparable to Denmark but 
different to ICU reports by Australia and New Zealand of over 
double this incidence. Brink et al. (2012) refer to Sweden’s 
timing, availability and high uptake of the pandemic vaccine 
as a possible explanation for a reduced need for ICU 
treatment. 
Towards the end of 2009 in Japan, 85 confirmed deaths were 
reported by the 1st December 2009, with 27% of these in the 
0-14-year-old categories (Kamigaki and Oshitani, 2009). 
New Zealand’s second wave in 2010 coincided with the 
country’s usual influenza season, with cases peaking in August 
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(Figure 16). Between January and middle of October 2010, 
there were 1,768 laboratory confirmed cases, with 732 
hospitalisations and 15 confirmed deaths (Figure 17) 
(Bandaranayake et al. 2011). 
 
Figure 16: Influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic 
notifications in 2009 and 2010 in New Zealand 
(Reproduced with permission from Bandaranayake et 
al. 2011). 
 
 
Figure 17: Influenza A(H1N1) 2009/10 pandemic 
hospitalisations in 2009 and 2010 in New Zealand 
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(Reproduced with permission from Bandaranayake et 
al. 2011). 
There have been reports that remote and isolated 
communities in Canada experienced higher incidence and 
more severe disease outcomes than urban populations. 
Hospitalisation rates during the first wave varied, with reports 
from Nunavut of 2.44 per 1,000 in comparison to 0.033 per 
1,000 population in Ontario. Similarly, Nunavut had ICU 
admission rates of 0.20 per 1,000 whereas Ontario had 
0.0056 per 1,000. These populations have a differential 
prevalence of health conditions, including diabetes, 
pregnancy, and morbid obesity, which previous research has 
focused on for providing an explanation of differing severity of 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. The northern 
territories have predominately aboriginal populations 
compared to the provinces. Research by Mostaço-Guidolin et 
al. (2012) suggests that there was differential transmissibility 
of infection, with the remote and isolated communities in the 
territories experiencing more affected individuals and faster 
spread. The authors postulate that this may be due to 
environmental and demographic factors. For instance, 
Nunavut has a low average age of 23 years old with only 2.7% 
of the population being >65 years old and a high average 
number of people per household. This low average age may 
have meant that these communities lacked the buffering effect 
of pre-existing immunity, as well as crowded living conditions 
which may have provided the opportunity for the spread of 
infection (Mostaço-Guidolin et al. 2012). 
By the 18th March 2010, 457 UK deaths had been reported 
(342 in England, 69 in Scotland, 28 in Wales, 18 in Northern 
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Ireland) (Hine, 2010). The WHO reported 18,449 deaths in 
214 countries by 1st August 2010 (World Health Organization, 
2010a).  
When the WHO announced on the 10th August 2010 that the 
world was now in the post-pandemic period, the WHO 
referenced that some countries, such as New Zealand, would 
still be dealing with A(H1N1) transmission. In August 2010, 
New Zealand reported that there was a lot of regional 
variation and at that time cases were localised in the centre of 
the North Island. By August 2010, there had been 332 
hospitalisations for laboratory confirmed A(H1N1), 46 ICU 
admissions and 10 fatalities in 2010 (Hunt, 2010). 
By using publically data available on the FluNet website, the 
five study countries have been included in the graph in Figure 
18. The graph reflects the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic cases reported in the study countries. Whilst 
Canada and Sweden reported the highest rates of cases per 
100,000 persons in the Autumn of 2009; this may, in fact, 
indicate a surveillance and notification bias. This highlights the 
difficulty of data reporting during pandemic influenza and the 
challenges posed to international organisations reporting on 
the global epidemiological situation, as well trying to make 
comparisons between nations. Some countries may have 
scaled back their reporting before the WHO announced that 
the pandemic influenza was technically over, and this may be 
reflective of their national disease activity or resources. 
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Figure 18: 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic cases 
detected in study countries (data sourced from FluNet 
World Health Organization, 2013)                 
 
2.5.6 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic vaccination 
During early May 2009, Ministers in the UK decided ahead of 
the WHO Phase 6 announcement that the UK would secure 
A(H1N1) vaccines to cover 45% of the population. The 
advance-purchase agreements for vaccines were triggered 
when the WHO raised the pandemic Phase to 6 on 11th June 
2009 (Hine, 2010). Following the Phase 6 Pandemic Alert 
announcement the Ministers in the UK agreed to purchase 
enough A(H1N1) vaccines for 100% of the population. On 26th 
June 2009, 132 million doses of A(H1N1) vaccine was 
contracted with GlaxoSmithKline and Baxter Healthcare (Hine, 
2010). 
The UK began their vaccination programme in October 2009 
and rolled it out in phases. Phase One began on 21st October 
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2009 and prioritised front line health care workers and at-risk 
patients. Phase Two commenced on 19th November 2009 for 
children aged between 6 months and 5 years old (Hine, 2010). 
Canada secured a pandemic influenza domestic vaccination 
supply contract in 2001 to source enough coverage for the 
entire Canadian population in the event of a novel influenza. 
The order for the number of doses was made once the novel 
influenza had emerged. Canada requested 50.4 million doses, 
based on the need for two doses per person and an uptake of 
75% of the population. However, as the same experience 
shared by other countries, it emerged over the course of the 
influenza pandemic that one dose would suffice to provide 
protection, so Canada reduced their initial order with this 
information (Eggleton, 2010). Therefore, Canada had enough 
vaccines for the entire population. 
On the 16th of September 2009, Canada published their 
A(H1N1) vaccine priority (pregnant women, health care 
workers, persons based in remote community locations, 
persons aged <65 years old with chronic conditions, children 
aged between 6 months and 5 years old) in preparation for 
the launch of their vaccination campaign roll out. At the 
beginning of October, a media sensation regarding a First 
Nation reserve in northern Manitoba broke. A community 
health professional had ordered a supply of body bags which 
was perceived as preparation for 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic outbreak, but it was emphasised by the Health 
Minister that this was not related to the pandemic 
management. At this time, a poll of Canadians reported that 
approximately 33% intended to have A(H1N1) vaccination, 
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which was a reduction from 45% a few weeks early (Canadian 
Pharmacists Journal (no author listed), 2009). 
Canada distributed 2 million doses of A(H1N1) vaccines to the 
provinces and territories on the 19th October and on the 21st 
October the vaccine was approved by Health Canada for use. 
At this time, the largest disease activity was reportedly 
underway in the British Columbia (western region of Canada) 
and a localised second wave was present. New Brunswick 
(eastern region) was purportedly the first province of Canada 
to begin vaccinating people and initially priority access was 
provided to pregnant women and persons located on reserves 
(Canadian Pharmacists Journal (no author listed), 2009). 
Sweden received the inactivated AS03-adjuvanted monovalent 
vaccine (Pandemrix®) against pandemic influenza from 
GlaxoSmithKline and in the middle of October 2009, the first 
doses were distributed for Sweden’s mass vaccination 
campaign. The timing corresponded with the beginning of the 
major peak of pandemic influenza in the country. At the start 
of the campaign, it was recommended that everyone receive 
two doses of the vaccine: 0.5mL for persons 13 years and 
older; 0.25mL for children aged between 3 and 12 years. 
Children with chronic conditions aged between 6 months and 3 
years old were offered the vaccine, but this was expanded to 
include all children this age four weeks into the campaign. 
Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. shows the 
age distribution of the delivered campaign in Stockholm 
County (Örtqvist et al. 2011). Inhabitants of Sweden were 
offered the vaccine for free or at low cost (Brink et al. 2012). 
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The vaccination campaign uptake was reported in Stockholm 
County which accounts for 2 million inhabitants 
(approximately 22% of Sweden’s population). The majority of 
the uptake was in medical risk groups, especially in the first 
few weeks of the campaign; in pregnant women the take up 
was 80%, and was 100% in people with chronic diseases by 
week 50 (Figure 20). By the end of 2009, 52% of the 
Stockholm County population had received one dose or more 
of vaccine (Örtqvist et al. 2011). 
Figure 19: Cumulative percentage of Stockholm 
county population which received pandemic vaccine 
dose in 2009 by age groups (Reproduced with 
permission from Örtqvist et al. 2011). 
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Figure 20: Cumulative number of people vaccinated 
from the start of the vaccination campaign until the end 
of 2009 by priority groups and total in Stockholm 
county (Reproduced with permission from Örtqvist et 
al. 2011). 
 
During 2009, when 52% (n=1,051,316) of Stockholm County 
population received the vaccine, there were 2,594 diagnoses 
of influenza A(H1N1) in people aged over 6 months of age, of 
which 11% (n=285) were hospitalised, and 0.4% deaths 
(n=11). Of the 2594 diagnoses, 7% (n=188) were in people 
that had received the vaccination, of which a small group 
(n=25) required hospital care, however, none of these vaccine 
failure patients died (Örtqvist et al. 2011). Örtqvist et al. 
(2011) conclude that the monovalent AS03-adjuvanted 
influenza vaccine was highly effective, with 87%-95% 
effectiveness over the vaccine campaign weeks. 
The Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control 
statistics indicated that approximately 50% of the national 
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population received a minimum of one dose of Pandemrix® 
vaccine by December 2009 (Figure 21), and this gradually 
rose to 60% by February 2010 (Brink et al. 2012; 
Socialstyrelsen, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 21: 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
disease activity and vaccination coverage in Sweden 
(Reproduced with permission from Swedish Institute 
for Communicable Disease Control, 2011). 
 
Singapore purchased the greatest number of pandemic 
monovalent vaccine doses per capita in South-east Asia at 
25,560 per 100,000 (Gupta et al. 2012). In December 2009, it 
was reported in a media article that Singapore had purchased 
two vaccine products; 700,000 doses of Panvax® (with 
300,000 extra doses expected to be delivered) and 300,000 
doses of Pandemrix®. At this point in time, 405,000 doses 
had been used. The Singaporean Ministry of Health 
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recommended that pregnant women had the Panvax® dose 
for safety because it did not contain adjuvant (Vaughan, 
2009). 
Japan was not able to instruct mandatory pandemic influenza 
vaccination under the Japanese Vaccination Law, due to the 
novel influenza virus emerging and the time required to 
produce a sufficient number of vaccinations for the population. 
Therefore, vaccination was centred on emergency measures, 
not the Vaccination Law, and led by the national government 
with the support of prefectures, municipalities and medical 
institutions. Nationally there was a standard vaccination 
programme, but this could be amended according to individual 
prefectures situations. Four Japanese manufacturers produced 
the pandemic vaccines; one produced 10ml vials and the other 
three provided 1ml vials (Shobayashi, 2011). 
The Japanese vaccination campaign commenced in November 
2009. Japan had to prioritise the vaccines as in the early 
stages of development, supply was limited, but this increased 
over time. Vaccinations began with pregnant women, persons 
with chronic illnesses, children ≤5 years old and people aged 
65≥ years old. The A(H1N1) vaccine became widely available 
to all in January 2010 (Yi et al., 2011). However, a low uptake 
was reported nationally. 99.7 million doses were not used, and 
this accounted for 81.8% of the total influenza vaccines 
ordered (Wada and Smith, 2013).  
New Zealand’s vaccination campaign resulted in approximately 
1.05 million people receiving the vaccination by the end of 
June 2010. This amounts to one-quarter of the country’s 
population (The ANZIC Influenza Investigators, 2011).  
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Figure 22: Japanese Ministry Health Law and Welfare 
source showing country comparisons of 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic death rates from 2009 
(Reproduced with permission from Shobayashi, 2011). 
 
All study countries except Sweden are highlighted in this 
graph from Japan showing an international comparison of 
mortality rates from pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 
(Shobayashi, 2011). 
 
2.5.7 Pandemic declared over 
On the 10th August 2010, the WHO released a press report 
stating that the world had now entered a post-pandemic phase 
due to changes in the levels and patterns of A(H1N1) influenza 
transmission (World Health Organization, 2010b). 
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2.5.8 Chapter summary  
This chapter introduced interpandemic and pandemic 
influenza, discussed the pandemic events up until the 
twentieth century and provided an overview of public health 
management measures. The main components of this chapter 
were the experiences of the five study countries of Sweden, 
New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and Canada and greater 
weight was given to the public health measure of vaccine use. 
The focus of the five study countries and vaccine use was 
explained in the previous introduction chapter.  
This chapter also provided an overview of the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in the five countries included in 
the research project. The WHO pandemic phases were 
provided in chronological order of events during 2009-10. 
Information about reports of cases, hospitalisations and 
fatalities have been provided as well as the various response 
measures attempted. Towards the end of the discussion, the 
chapter focused on the study countries vaccination 
programmes. The chapter was structured by country 
comparisons, although it was difficult to build a complete 
picture for comparison due to data record differences. For 
instance, countries stopped collecting 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic data at different dates and the record 
keeping quality varied between countries. 
This chapter has provided the necessary background to move 
the discussion on to the research methodology of this thesis. 
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3 Research Methodology  
 
This chapter discusses the methodology and methods used in 
this project. The first section on methodology begins with the 
rationale for the thesis and the comparative nature of using 
the study countries to find similarities and differences in 
addition to cross-cutting themes. The appropriateness of 
selecting a qualitative enquiry is explained, as well as the 
administrative anthropology approach taken in this project. 
This first section finishes with a discussion on the quality of 
qualitative research. 
The second part of the chapter discussion includes the study 
methods. It begins with the core policy areas focused upon in 
the interviews, and the sampling of the study countries is 
explained. The last part of the chapter explains the data 
collection and analysis undertaken.  
 
 Methodology 3.1
At the beginning of this thesis, when the research was at the 
proposal stage, it was intended that an international study 
would be conducted. Thus comparing and contrasting 
countries formed the foundation of the research approach. The 
intention behind this funded research was for several countries 
to be selected. After undertaking the country sampling 
approach (outlined towards the end of this chapter) and where 
access was successful, Sweden, New Zealand, Japan, 
Singapore and Canada were included. The research was 
 94 
 
concerned with asking questions about four types of public 
health measures implemented in each country. These four 
measures included the extent of use of antiviral drugs, 
pandemic vaccines, non-pharmaceutical measures and wider 
societal issues during a pandemic influenza response. As 
explained in the introduction chapter, vaccine use formed the 
focus of this thesis at a later date, but the methods are 
reflective of including all four public health measures and 
indeed the data collection has included all. Therefore, with the 
desire to conduct research that was comparative in nature and 
asking questions about pandemic influenza response, it was 
found that the best way to do this was to use an approach 
using comparative health policy and qualitative interviews 
coupled with documentary analysis of available records.     
 
3.1.1 Comparative element of the research 
The comparative element of this research project is important 
and has been incorporated in the design, data collection, 
analysis, and discussion. Bryman (2004) discussed how 
comparative research design can be utilised in both 
quantitative and qualitative research and that this design 
frequently lends itself to cross-national research whereby 
explanations are sought through the examination of 
similarities and differences in various nations.  
The use of qualitative methods offers a reflexive and in-depth 
understanding of the complexity of policy making. Where just 
one case is used in health policy analysis, there is the danger 
that the analysis will simply provide a descriptive account. The 
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comparison element provides further depth of explanations 
and generalisability to the dynamics of policymaking and 
provides an approach to structure qualitative analysis. This 
allows for the transferability of frameworks that are applicable 
to not one but a range of cases: “…comparison therefore 
presupposes analytical frameworks that surpass the specific 
case so that the cases to be compared can be interrogated in 
relation to each other, allowing the search for both similar and 
different dynamics (Bradshaw and Wallace, 1991).” […] “[T]he 
term comparative health policy traditionally refers to 
comparisons across countries, states or nations.” (Wrede, 
chapter within Bourgeault, Dingwall, and De Vries, 2013: 
p.89). Within each country, there are different contexts, but it 
is useful to identify cross-cutting ‘transnational’ themes. 
The textbook by Blank and Burau (2014) regarding 
comparative health policy selected ten study countries for 
inclusion in their health policy analysis (which usefully 
included the countries of interest Sweden, New Zealand, 
Japan, and Singapore). Their selection of countries for 
comparison included countries that had three broad types of 
healthcare systems: National Health Services (e.g. UK, 
Sweden, New Zealand), social insurance (e.g. Japan), and 
private insurance (e.g. Singapore). Canada, the study country 
not included in Blank and Burau’s (2014) comparison, has a 
healthcare system that is a form of socialised health insurance 
plans (Canadian Health Care, 2007). Both this thesis and that 
conducted by Blank and Burau (2014) have provided a 
comparative sample that covers a range of health systems, 
but all countries share Western-type medical systems and are 
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developed nations that have wealthy populations with 
associated expectations and demands.  
Interestingly, Blank and Burau’s (2014) in-depth analysis 
found that frequently used countries in comparative analysis 
include the UK, United States and Sweden, and is biased 
towards North American and European based literature. 
However, countries such as New Zealand are included less 
frequently, as well as Japan and Singapore, which provide 
important insights into health policy and demonstrate a gap in 
the literature. As Blank and Burau note, there is a wide range 
of health care system variation globally but the inclusion of 
countries from other categories (e.g. former communist-
socialist and less economically developed countries) entails 
further complications at analysis level, thus the preference for 
only including similarly developed countries. Also, covering 
several countries will not provide a comprehensive analysis of 
each specific country’s health policy; rather it will provide an 
overview of each country.  
Additional comparative analysis studies in health research 
have included a study by Lee et al. (1998) regarding family 
planning policies and programmes in eight study countries. 
Lee et al.’s (1998) research is different to this project 
framework because they matched countries to form four pairs. 
The countries were matched based on political, social and 
geographical similarities. The Global Fund Tracking Study 
(Brugha et al. 2005) also involved a cross-country 
comparative analysis of four countries experiences of funding 
applications and implementation of health systems. 
Similarities and differences between the countries were 
reported, and overall generic lessons stated. 
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The comparative health policy approach was applicable to this 
piece of research due to the multiple study country structure. 
The sampling of study countries is explained in detail in 
section 3.2.2, the methods section, of this chapter. In line 
with previous comparative health studies, such as the Blank 
and Burau (2014) research, this project has analysed trends 
within and across countries.  
 
3.1.2 The research inquiry paradigm 
The research proposal outlined that an international study 
would be conducted that involved visiting several study 
countries to further understand the use of public health 
measures during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. As 
with any research, unpicking the research purpose led to 
further exploration surrounding: the methods that would be 
used; the methodology directing the choice and use of 
methods to fulfil the research intentions; the theoretical 
perspective underpinning the methodology; the epistemology 
rooted in the theoretical perspective. Each of these four 
elements is entwined into the other (Crotty, 1998). The 
epistemology of this research project will be considered in this 
section. 
Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. It has a 
philosophical foundation that enables the researcher to delve 
into the types of knowledge, its possibilities, that they are 
appropriate and valid (Crotty, 1998). Before the epistemology 
embraced in this research is acknowledged, described and 
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justified, a range of possible epistemologies will first be 
outlined.  
There are several epistemologies, of which objectivist, 
constructionism and subjectivism are frequently discussed. 
Objectivism is where knowledge is acquired through reason, 
through reality, where humans use their physical senses to 
give consideration of what it means to know. The research 
participants will objectify these understandings.  For instance, 
a bird in the rainforest exists as a bird before it was seen, 
heard, touched by any humans, before any humans had 
knowledge of its existence. The discovery of the bird in the 
rainforest provides humans with the knowledge of the bird, 
but it’s existence was there before the human knowledge. In 
undertaking a project, the research may reveal knowledge but 
the subject will have existed before, the researcher may 
discover the objective truth (Crotty, 1998). 
On the other hand, constructionism differs to objectivism. 
Constructionism rejects the premise that objective truths are 
out there waiting to be revealed. Rather it is the interaction 
with realities that brings knowledge into existence and these 
meanings are not possible without a mind. Where objectivism 
discovers, constructionism constructs meaning. This is how 
meanings have changed over the course of history. Meaning in 
constructionism is created from the interaction between 
subjects and objects. Another epistemological positioning is 
subjectivitism, where meaning is applied to the object by the 
subject (Crotty, 1998). 
The epistemological perspective of this research has been 
constructionism: the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
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was an interaction of disease, human activity and public health 
measures. This interaction of objects and subjects has 
constructed meaning and it was the intention of this project to 
uncover, document and reflect upon these meanings to 
contribute to knowledge of pandemic influenza. The method of 
qualitative interviewing allowed for participants to explain 
their experiences and understanding of the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic and to offer reflections on their country’s 
public health response measures.  
 
3.1.3 Choosing the research methodology  
The essence of research is “about asking questions, exploring 
problems and reflecting on what emerges in order to make 
meaning from the data and tell the research story.” (Clough 
and Nutbrown, 2012: p.4). Research is concerned with ‘finding 
out’ (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996) and as such the process of 
research is often investigative, exploratory and enquiring, with 
the purpose of understanding phenomena further, or even 
contributing to situational change (Clough and Nutbrown, 
2012). It results in knowledge construction and an improved 
understanding of the study subject (Goodwin and Goodwin, 
1996). Through the research process, an important aspect is 
that no harm is caused (see the latter part of this chapter 
regarding ethical considerations) and that an appropriate 
research methodology is applied. Therefore, the quantitative 
and qualitative possibilities were examined in reference to this 
research project. 
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It can be argued that research in public health, as Ziebland 
and Coulter (2013) reason in regards to healthcare, is a 
knowledge-based system. Ziebland and Coulter outline four 
distinct knowledge types: “scientific knowledge about 
biological processes”; “epidemiological knowledge about 
patterns of disease and risk factors”; “clinical knowledge about 
how to treat medical problems”; “how people experience 
health, illness, treatment and the delivery of care” (2013: 
p.1). The first three of these knowledge types, biological 
processes, epidemiology and clinical practice, typically utilise 
quantitative research strategies. The latter, health 
experiences, may more frequently be favoured by qualitative 
research methods.  
The distinction between quantitative and qualitative research 
is that quantitative research uses measurement and 
quantification of data, whilst qualitative research is more 
concerned with words (Bryman, 2004). There is extensive 
work detailing the differences concerning research theory (e.g. 
deductive and inductive theory), epistemological 
considerations (positivism and interpretivism) and ontological 
considerations (objectivism and constructionism). However, 
space is only given in this section to explore the differences 
between research designs. 
Features of quantitative research include measurement, 
causality, generalisation and replication (Bryman, 2004). 
Quantitative research methodologies in medicine often utilise 
randomised control trials. For instance, newly developed drugs 
by pharmaceutical companies will need to progress through 
various stages of randomised control trials (RCTs) before 
drugs are available for prescription to the general public. RCTs 
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are focused on testing for outcomes (e.g. does x vaccine 
provide protection against y disease in 500 people?), and the 
results can be statistically analysed (i.e. to determine the 
effectiveness of vaccine). RCTs are important in research and 
play a significant role such as in the development of drugs, 
however, there are limitations to the scope of RCTs. RCTs will 
not provide findings on experiences: for instance the 
experience of people undergoing trials and the reasons for 
participation. Also, RCTs also do not provide information about 
experiences in implemented public health measures, such as: 
why were antivirals used infrequently during pandemic 
influenza response in x study country?; why were vaccines 
used at x time during the response?; why was there a low 
uptake of vaccines?  
Other forms of quantitative research methods include (but are 
not limited to) surveys, structured interviews, and 
questionnaires, which provide an opportunity to ascertain text 
regarding experiences in a rigidly structured format. Likewise, 
as explained previously regarding RCTs, these quantitative 
methods have strengths such as in generating large quantities 
of data and are less researcher-resource intense in the field, 
but will not provide detailed and rich information about 
experiences. In order to examine experiences, such as the 
social phenomenon of pandemic influenza response, a 
qualitative research method is more appropriate. 
The features of qualitative research generally include meaning 
attributed to the environment (seeing through the eyes of 
those studied), detailed participant context, process 
importance, relaxed and flexible structures of data collection 
and concepts and theories emergent from data (Bryman, 
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2004). Types of qualitative research methods include 
ethnography and participant observation where a researcher 
immerses themselves in the environment of study for 
extended periods of time. Qualitative interviews refer to 
several types of interview method which are less controlled 
and formal than quantitative structured interviews. Focus 
groups are also a form of interview that engages with several 
participants to generate discussion on a particular research 
issue. Language focused research, such as conversation 
analysis and discourse analysis is concerned with determining 
linguistic structures and framework of concepts and events in 
the social world (Bryman, 2004).  
Ethnography and participant observation were not possible in 
this research project because the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic was being studied after moving into the 
interpandemic period. The pandemic quickly emerged and 
lasted several months so it was unlikely that a researcher 
from outside of an organisation would gain access. Also, this 
project is concerned with several study countries and key 
response personnel which span more than one institution, 
therefore, the above approaches would have been impossible 
given the resources available. Language focused research 
would have been inappropriate due to the multiple study 
country approach, different mother tongue languages and the 
difference of meaning attributed to words and phrases 
between countries. The use of focus groups, for example, one 
focus group per study country, would have been logistically 
difficult as not all participants would be located in the same 
location or would be available at the same time. Also, by using 
focus groups, the student researcher would have less control 
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than interviews offer with regards to steering the conversation 
to focus on the work packages. It is also possible that one 
participant (e.g. most senior person) would have responded 
and perhaps simply restated organisational policies and 
rhetoric. If focus groups had been pursued, then it may have 
reduced the number of participants, for instance ‘this person 
from the Ministry of Health can tell you all about x country’s 
pandemic influenza response’.  
Qualitative interviewing was by far the most appropriate 
research method because it allows for flexibility, probing, 
follow-up questions, interviewer-interviewee build-up of 
rapport and the opportunity of a greater breadth of coverage 
of the research topic.  
 
3.1.4 Administrative anthropology  
This research was concerned with making country 
comparisons of national pandemic influenza response during 
2009-10. As explained in the earlier part of this chapter, it has 
used a comparative health policy framework as supported by 
similar previous health research in the outlined case studies. 
Asking questions about the public health measures used 
naturally led to the use of qualitative interview methods and 
this approach has been informed by the literature. In order to 
provide a complete picture of the core public health measures 
utilised (ultimately, the thesis has focused on the use of 
vaccines), it was necessary to support the qualitative 
interviews with documentary analysis. This led to the inclusion 
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of an administrative anthropology approach in the research 
project. 
“That rather eclectic field which includes historical 
documentary analysis, structured interviews and observation 
of practice. We might call it “administrative anthropology.”” 
(Korman and Glennerster 1990: p.6). 
This study has utilised an administrative anthropology 
approach because it has examined documentary health policy 
in the form of pandemic influenza plans, conducted interviews 
with key pandemic influenza response personnel and reviewed 
published data on epidemiological trends and public health 
measures implemented in countries. It also explored 
respondents’ perceptions of change during the pandemic 
process. Thematic analysis, the interviewing method, and 
triangulation of data will be explored in the second part of this 
chapter. 
 
3.1.5 Quality in Qualitative Research 
Thought has been given towards quality in this qualitative 
research; such as validity, reliability, generalisability, 
reflexivity and sensitivity to context.  
In terms of validity, the researcher has strived to avoid an 
anecdotal approach in the analysis of the data by employing 
methods such as triangulation and the constant comparative 
element of the study countries (Silverman, 2005). It is 
recognised that triangulation alone cannot provide validity in 
qualitative research: triangulation does not simply operate to 
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provide a complete picture, but it can support findings 
(Murphy and Dingwall, 2001; Melia, 2013).  
With regards to the external validity of findings from the five 
study countries in this project to the generalisation of other 
countries, it is accepted that transnational themes may or may 
not be applicable to other countries due to varying pandemic 
influenza responses, national context, and disease activity 
experiences. The sampling technique approach employed in 
this project, as discussed later on in this chapter, attempts to 
provide a diverse sample of countries to enable greater 
generalisability across other countries.  
This research has avoided internal reliability issues due to the 
student researcher undertaking all data collection and analysis 
in person. With regards to reflexivity and sensitivity to 
context, it is recognised that the researcher’s UK background 
presents limitations to conducting international research. In 
order to address this concern, the researcher studied each 
country prior to undertaking data collection in the field and 
had a key contact in each study country to discuss both 
pandemic influenza response and wider issues relating to 
cultural contexts (Potvin, Bisset and Walz, 2013; Bryman, 
2004). For example, one contact explained business meeting 
etiquette that they had learnt from their experience of working 
in Japan for over ten years. The researcher believed that this 
additional knowledge enabled interviews to proceed smoothly 
and respectfully observe each contextual country setting.  
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 Methods 3.2
 
3.2.1 Study Design 
The thesis focused on policy, public health response and 
nationally available data concerning the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic from several countries, with the intention 
of an investigation that is of a comparative nature. Face-to-
face qualitative interviews with key pandemic influenza 
response personnel in each country, with the assistance of an 
aide memoire, was the data collection method in this thesis. 
The data analysis strategy followed the analytic induction 
process, and the hypotheses were built from the data; no 
hypotheses were pre-conceived before data collection.  
This research project used qualitative interviews to explore 
health decision-making and policy implementation in light of 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic disease activity in 
various countries. 
 
3.2.1.1 Core policy areas studied 
At the beginning of the research project, the intention was to 
study the four key areas listed below, and the interviews that 
followed reflected this. However, the results and discussion in 
this thesis have focused on pandemic influenza vaccines due 
to word count constraints. The data on antivirals, non-
pharmaceutical measures and the broader societal aspects of 
the pandemic influenza response in 2009-10 have been 
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collected and provide an opportunity at a later date to include 
this information in journal papers. 
A. Antiviral drugs  
Examine, compare and contrast selected countries overall use 
or non-use of antiviral drugs (for post-exposure prophylaxis in 
households, aimed at the slowing of initial spread within 
countries and for the treatment of cases). This will include an 
examination of the potential impact of policy differences 
related to ‘treat all’ or ‘treat high-risk only’ policies. 
B. Pandemic influenza vaccines 
Based on selected countries, this will examine the use or non-
use of monovalent pandemic influenza vaccines, including the 
timing of deployment and type (inactivated, live, adjuvanted, 
etc.), policy intention (pre-pandemic) versus policy 
implementation (and reasons for any discordance). 
C. Non-pharmaceutical measures used during pandemic 
Based on selected countries, this will examine public health 
(non-pharmaceutical) measures such as restrictions on mass 
gatherings, border closures/restrictions, suspension of urban 
mass transportation systems to the limited extent that these 
were practiced during the 2009-10 pandemic influenza. 
D. Societal communication, coordination and roles for the 
pandemic response   
An examination of broader societal aspects of the pandemic 
response in 2009-10. To include: the role of the media; the 
effectiveness of government health communications; the 
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impact of centralised vs. decentralised health communication; 
the role of HCPs in providing a pandemic response (use of 
existing health care provision vs. establishing special 
vaccination centres etc.). 
 
3.2.1.2 Research Questions 
How were antivirals used during the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic? 
How and when were the pandemic influenza vaccines used in 
reaction to the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic? 
What other public health measures were used during the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic? 
What were the other societal aspects of the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic response? 
 
3.2.1.3 In-depth Interviews 
Wrede explains that “policy researchers commonly use 
interviewing to explore policy processes and related action, 
and to systematize information about policy making and about 
the views of specific policy actors vis-à-vis the issues in 
question.” (2013: p.98). Interviews of this nature are 
conducted with key informants (experts) and at a macro level, 
and this is the type of interview used in this research project. 
Wrede furthermore describes how the interview allows 
participants to speak on their area of expertise. For example, 
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in this research project, the in-depth interviews allowed 
participants to spend longer discussing their specific area (e.g. 
antivirals and social restrictions) and spend less time in the 
interview on topics which may not concern their work. 
Therefore, as later discussions will show concerning the 
interview aid memoire, the interviews were semi-structured 
but allowed for flexibility in response to the participants.  
An important point raised by Wrede is the need to be familiar 
with the terminology used by experts in each study country. 
This issue can be addressed by the researcher through 
documentary research. “Documentary research conducted 
prior to interviews serves as a method of identifying key 
‘vocabularies’ and ‘dialectal uses’ of the shared policy terms.” 
(Wrede p.99).  
There are three broad types of interview that can be used in 
research and the structure chosen will impact on the 
generated data. In qualitative interviews, researchers typically 
use unstructured or semi-structured types of interviews. 
These involve the interviewer asking a few prepared factual 
questions at the start and then broad open ended questions 
with the use of prompts as and when required (Holloway and 
Galvin, 2017).  
At the beginning of this research, it was apparent that the 
structured interview would be inappropriate to use. The 
structured interview utilises prepared questions that are asked 
in the same way and order, similar to a job interview 
experience or a verbal survey (Holloway and Galvin, 2017). 
The inflexibility of this structure and the quantitative type data 
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was contradictory to the aims of the qualitative research of 
this project.  
In the planning phase, it was apparent that the interviews in 
this research were going to be either unstructured or semi-
structured. However, determining the particular type required 
time to read further about qualitative research methods. 
Following this, it was felt that the breadth of the research 
topics to discuss during meetings and the singular country 
visits would require the use of a semi-structured interview 
type to ensure that the meetings covered the necessary 
content. Table 2 provides detail of the semi-structured 
interview content concerning vaccines and this was used by 
the researcher when questioning, prompting and probing in 
response to participants’ accounts.  
Table 2. Vaccine related content in semi-structured 
interviews. 
Did [country name] use the monovalent pandemic influenza 
vaccine? 
How many vaccines were ordered? 
What were the major considerations and decisions which had to be 
made about pandemic vaccine?  
Can you tell me about the national vaccination strategy?  
Was prioritisation a feature? 
When did the vaccination campaign begin? How did this compare to 
the annual seasonal influenza vaccination campaign? 
Were the vaccine supplies appropriate? 
Tell me about the vaccine uptake. 
Was the vaccination timing ideal for Canada in respect to influenza 
activity at the time? 
Were there any particular difficulties or challenges that concerned 
the pandemic vaccine in [country name]? 
Some countries did not purchase the pandemic influenza vaccine, do 
you think that [country name] may ever do this? 
If we were to have pandemic influenza in the future that was of 
greater severity, do you think that the pandemic vaccination 
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approach taken by [country name] would be used again? What 
might be different? 
Is there anything else of interest relating to the vaccines used 
during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic that we have not 
covered today? 
 
3.2.2 Sampling  
The study countries and matched reserves were chosen after 
undertaking consultations and a literature review of pandemic 
preparedness plans and research articles. The selected 
countries required an element of differing public health policies 
in relation to the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
response. This was in addition to the need for sufficient 
epidemiological data in order for some description of disease 
activity and intensity at the national level.  
 
3.2.2.1 Selection of study countries 
The process of selecting study countries involved consultations 
with some leading influenza specialists who worked during the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic influenza. With an 
awareness of the thesis objectives, these experts made 
suggestions of countries to consider for study. The 
consultations were held with the supervisors, the WHO 
influenza working group, an influenza specialist at the United 
States Communicable Disease Centre (CDC) and the project 
funders GlaxoSmithKline.  
In July 2012, members of the WHO influenza working group in 
Geneva were consulted, which resulted in many country 
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suggestions for a variety of reasons. The deputy director of 
the CDC influenza division made five country suggestions. All 
of these suggested countries had been mentioned by the WHO 
influenza group and Professor Van-Tam. No suggestions were 
made by the funders GlaxoSmithKline as they did not wish to 
influence the direction of study. With the list of suggestions 
made during the consultations as a starting point, these 
countries and some others not bought up in consultation were 
further researched, in order to create a list that best reflected 
the aims and objectives of the thesis. The suggestions were 
then placed into a Venn diagram to assess similarities and 
differences. 
Japan, Argentina, and Chile were suggested by all parties 
which made these three priority countries to study. Singapore 
was suggested by three of the four contributors, thereby 
making it a strong suggestion. A total of fifteen countries were 
nominated by two of the four contributors. The remaining 
thirteen countries were only suggested by one of the four 
contributors. Countries which fell outside of the suggested list 
were not prioritised because the list had been developed after 
reviewing information and backgrounds about individual 
countries in line with the thesis’ aims and objectives.  
The final eight countries selected for study in the thesis were: 
1. Chile 
2. Argentina 
3. Japan 
4. Singapore 
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5. Canada 
6. New Zealand 
7. Sweden 
8. Turkey 
Following the review process, it was believed that these eight 
countries would provide excellent material to compare and 
contrast in the thesis according to the work packages. The 
countries have strong epidemiological data concerning the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic which formed an 
essential component of the thesis. The country choice included 
both high and low use of pandemic influenza vaccines and 
antivirals. Some of the countries implemented strong social 
distancing measures and invested in strong societal health 
communications whereas other countries encountered 
unexpected problems and public resistance to public health 
measures. Risk perceptions from island nations in comparison 
to those landlocked with open border crossings could also 
have formed an interesting component of the research. The 
list included a selection of northern and southern hemisphere 
countries, and some of the countries had global events 
scheduled during the pandemic which would have allowed risk 
perception during mass gatherings to be explored. The 
selected countries offered a mix of those immediately affected 
by confirmed cases following the WHO announcement 
compared to countries which did not report confirmed cases 
until weeks later. The selection also offered an assortment 
between the burden of confirmed cases and deaths per 
countries.  
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3.2.2.2 Reserve study countries 
Reserve countries were prepared in the event that any of the 
chosen countries could not participate. The reserve countries 
were matched to the selected countries on the basis of sharing 
similar criteria during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic. The following criteria were considered important in 
the assessment of identifying the reserve countries: 
• Good epidemiological data collected during the pandemic 
• Likeness of experience of confirmed cases and deaths 
per 100,000 in country 
• Similar use of antivirals and/or pandemic vaccine 
• Similar non-pharmaceutical measures taken 
• Located in the same geographical region as the refusal 
country 
• Same geographical characteristics as selected country  
 
Where possible, reserves were selected from the consultation 
pool. The selected countries matched to reserve countries 
were: 
1. Chile – Brazil 
2. Argentina – Brazil 
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3. Japan – Taiwan 
4. Singapore – Thailand 
5. Canada – United States 
6. New Zealand – Australia 
7. Sweden – Finland 
8. Turkey – Ukraine  
 
After pursuing study countries to include in the project, Japan, 
Singapore, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden were secured. 
When Chile and Argentina refused, Brazil was approached, but 
no significant developments followed. Other than New 
Zealand, no other study country was from the southern 
hemisphere which was regrettable, and there was concern 
that imbalance would form in the reporting of the results. 
There was initial interest from Turkey, but no interviews could 
be secured later on in communication. After speaking to the 
thesis funders and supervisors, several months after the fifth 
country visit, it was agreed that sufficient data had been 
gathered from five study countries and that no further study 
countries would be pursued. 
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3.2.2.3 Purposive and snowball sampling 
Gatekeepers were encountered in gaining access to potential 
participants in the sampling process. Overt participant access 
was sought. 
The research utilised purposive sampling by the identification 
of key individuals who were involved in a national response to 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. The key individuals 
were able to give an overview of their country’s national 
response. These participants were asked if, in their opinion, 
the researcher should speak with any other individuals who 
had important roles in their national pandemic influenza 
response. Therefore, the study was primarily a purposive 
sample, but the snowballing technique was also used in the 
country during the fieldwork phase. 
Sadler et al. (2010) explain that snowball sampling is an 
effective strategy in instances of trying to recruit hard to reach 
groups. The researchers describe the usefulness of adapting 
the snowball sampling technique in health. Purposive sampling 
with the snowballing technique was considered the most 
effective method to use in this study due to the limits 
associated with one person only being able to visit a country 
for a short amount of time. Multiple interviews were scheduled 
before embarking on a country visit, to ensure productivity, as 
no budget was available for return country visits. 
An excel document (Table 3) was compiled regarding mapping 
the project scene for participants: 
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Table 3: Identifying potential interview participants  
Name Role What we might learn 
   
   
 
3.2.2.4 Key actors involved in national response to 
pandemic influenza 
The 2005 WHO checklist for influenza pandemic preparedness 
planning discusses the need to consult with the following 
representatives (directly extracted from World Health 
Organization, 2005b, p.12) in the development of countries 
national and regional plans: 
— “national and regional public health authorities including: 
preventive, curative and diagnostic services; the national drug 
regulatory authority; the national influenza centre(s); and 
representatives of physicians’ associations (e.g. general 
practitioners and respiratory disease specialists), nurses and 
pharmacists; 
— recognized national virologists and epidemiologists, and 
representatives of scientific and academic institutions; 
— veterinary authorities and experts in animal influenza 
viruses; 
— representatives of public or private organizations that 
monitor health indicators, use of health-care facilities and 
pharmaceuticals; 
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— representatives of pharmaceutical manufacturers or 
distributors; 
— representatives of social service administrations; 
— representatives of military or other government emergency 
response organizations or teams; 
— representatives of nongovernmental and voluntary 
organizations, such as the national Red Cross or Red Crescent 
Society; 
— representatives of telecommunications, and media relations 
experts.” 
 
The key stakeholders to speak with were identified after 
reading the WHO guidelines (2005b, 2005c) and study 
countries national pandemic influenza preparedness plans. 
Interviews were held with individuals who were involved in the 
national response to the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
and had a health decision-maker role. The sample reflected 
members of multi-agency, national pandemic influenza 
preparedness, and response committees. 
To identify potential key participants, the following three 
approaches were taken to develop the sampling strategy: 
1. Exploration of the literature to identify key stakeholders 
at national level.  
a.  WHO reports (e.g. 2005 checklist, 2009) and 
guidelines 
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b.  National pandemic plans, guidelines and 
appendices (environmental scan) 
c.  Journal publications 
2.  Consultation with pandemic influenza specialists 
3. Review of other similar work conducted in this field. 
The key individuals’ roles included: 
• Public health official 
• National medical officer 
• Policy maker 
• Epidemiologist 
• Virologist 
• Public health researcher - Influenza academic 
The organisation names varied by country, but included 
derivatives of: 
• Ministry of Health  
• National public health authority 
• Emergency service 
• National Influenza Centre  
• University 
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Contacts were sought and approached by way of an 
introductory letter (see Appendix D). Where possible, this was 
assisted by the project supervisors. The WHO offered 
assistance, in areas where the project supervisors did not 
have contacts, to help connect with key individuals in 
countries. 
  
3.2.2.5 Sample size and saturation 
The concept of data saturation is used in qualitative research 
to denote that new data from more participants will result in 
no further findings (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This concept of 
saturation in relation to the sample was considered following 
each country visit and after five study countries formed the 
research sample.  
The literature regarding saturation in qualitative interviews 
offers varying opinions about what is an adequate sample size 
and factors that determine sample size. Charmaz (2006) 
argues that the study aims will be reflected in the design and 
thus sample size. Morse (2000: p.3) presents several factors 
to consider for sample size: “the quality of data, the scope of 
the study, the nature of the topic, the amount of useful 
information obtained from each participant, the number of 
interviews per participant, the use of shadowed data, and the 
qualitative method and study design used.” 
Interviews were with key pandemic response personnel and 
included clinicians, government officials, medical officers, 
surveillance, agency staff, policy makers, etc.  Before 
embarking on study country visits, it was intended that 6-8 
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interviews per study country would be secured with the 
intention of gaining an understanding of similarities and 
differences in pandemic response. This was based on the 
assumption that every participant would provide useful 
information.  
Mason (2010) investigated sample size in published thesis 
studies using qualitative interviews. Mason reported 429 
grounded theory studies, of which 174 were used after 
exclusion criteria were applied. The number of interviews 
ranged between 4 and 87, and a mean of 32 interviews 
conducted. This thesis research project generated 36 
interviews, which is slightly above the average given by 
Mason. 
The assessment of reaching data saturation was reviewed 
after the interviews were conducted and analysed. Although 
no return country visits were budgeted in this research, the 
possibility of conducting telephone interviews with new 
participants from the existing study countries was raised in 
the event that the sample size was inadequate and saturation 
was not obtained. Fortunately, the robust sampling methods 
deployed ahead of the country visits meant that no additional 
data collection was required per study country and the 
saturation was reviewed after country visits.  
 
3.2.3 Research and Ethics Committee approval 
As the thesis involved conducting research with human 
participants in various countries outside the UK the ethical 
guidance produced by the British Sociological Association and 
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the International Sociological Association was considered. A 
University of Nottingham research governance officer was 
consulted, and the thesis proposal was submitted for ethical 
approval through the University of Nottingham School of 
Sociology and Social Policy. 
The ethical issues that this thesis needed to consider in the 
research design, conduct, and analysis were (Bonita et al. 
2006):  
• Informed consent 
• Confidentiality 
• Respect for human rights 
• Scientific integrity 
 
3.2.3.1 British Sociological Association guidance 
The ‘Statement of ethical practice for the British Sociological 
Association’ (2002) provides guidance and raises a number of 
ethical issues which potentially could involve sociological 
research practice. After consideration of this guidance, it was 
found that the following ethical points required addressing for 
this research project: 
 
Professional Integrity of sociological inquiry 
The need to report the research findings accurately and 
truthfully were recognised. In addition, the need to adhere to 
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national laws and regulations e.g. Data Protection Acts, 
Human Rights Act was also understood. The relevant national 
laws and regulations were explored for each study country 
prior to country visits. 
Consideration was given to the safety issues concerning the 
research data collection in relation to travelling alone, and a 
person based at the University of Nottingham was designated 
to be the main contact whilst research was being undertaken 
in other countries.   
 
Relations with and Responsibilities towards Research 
Participants 
It was recognised the rights of individuals participating in the 
study and that these rights came before the goals of the 
research project. The research did not harm the physical, 
social or psychological well-being of those participating. 
The research required undertaking the process of gathering 
informed consent from all individuals partaking in interviews. 
This involved providing participants with enough information 
about the study, the researchers working on it, the financiers, 
the justification for the project and how the findings will be 
disseminated and used. Informed consent covers participation 
refusal rights, anonymity, and confidentiality, rejection rights 
of tape recorders, copyright or data protection laws, copyright 
clearances for audio recordings, clarification of interview 
transcript access and adjustments, and publication 
consultation. Where access to a research setting involved 
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negotiation with a gatekeeper, informed consent was also 
required from individual participants. 
 
Covert research 
No covert research or methods were used in the study. 
 
Anonymity, privacy, and confidentiality 
Research participants had the right to anonymity and privacy 
in the study, and any personal information was kept 
confidential. Generated data were stored securely. The 
reputation of the sociology discipline needs to be maintained 
for future researchers. 
 
Relations with & Responsibilities towards Sponsors 
and/or Funders 
The studentship was funded by GlaxoSmithKline. 
GlaxoSmithKline had a distanced role in the research project 
so that the research could progress without their involvement.  
 
Clarifying obligations, roles, and rights 
A written contract was signed by three parties - the student, 
the supervisor, and the funders, which outlined obligations of 
the research project by each party. Raw data from this thesis 
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was not shared with the funders due to confidentiality 
reasons. 
 
Pre-empting outcomes and negotiations about research 
GlaxoSmithKline incorporated research direction flexibility into 
the proposal, and the research was not restricted by 
GlaxoSmithKline in terms of publications of any research 
results. 
 
Obligations to sponsors and/or funders during the 
research process 
Any major changes to the original proposal were notified to 
GlaxoSmithKline after discussions with the project supervisors. 
 
3.2.3.2 International Sociological Association (ISA) 
The ISA has a code of ethics (2001) for research members to 
follow. After reading the code of ethics, no additional items or 
conflicting comments to the information provided in the more 
detailed guidance produced by the British Sociological 
Association were found. 
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3.2.3.3 School of Sociology and Social Policy Ethics 
Committee  
This thesis shared joint registration with the School of 
Medicine and the School of Sociology and Social Policy. An 
application for ethical approval from the School of Sociology 
and Social Policy Ethics Committee was submitted, and the 
project gained ethical approval prior to country visits (see 
Appendix C). 
 
3.2.4 Data Collection: In-depth interviews 
After a period of liaising with potential participants, meetings 
were organised and interviews were conducted during country 
visits. The interviews were completed by Spring 2014. 
 
3.2.4.1 Interview aid memoire  
An interview aid memoire was prepared before each country 
visit to help guide the interviews and to ensure that the 
interviewer covered the work packages. The aid memoire 
covered each subject area with prompts of questions or topics 
to help the interviewer. Aid memoires are similar to interview 
guides which help to supply the interviewer with prompts of 
what is to be covered during the interview (Bryman, 2004). 
Appendix E provides further information about the aid 
memoire used. 
The interviewer used the national overview section at the start 
of each interview to act ‘introductory questions’. During the 
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course of the interview, the interviewer asked ‘follow-up 
questions’ and ‘probing questions.' ‘Structuring questions’ 
(e.g. I am now going to move on to antiviral drugs) were 
useful for focusing the following conversation to the topic at 
hand and ‘interpreting questions’ were useful for clarifying 
meaning. Also ‘silence’ was important at times to allow 
interviewees space to continue with their response. These six 
of the nine types of qualitative interview questions outlined by 
Kvale (1996) were most frequently used in this research.  
 
3.2.4.2 Pilot interviews 
Two pilot interviews were undertaken in England prior to the 
overseas data collection phase. These pilot interviews were 
valuable as they provided the opportunity to use the aid 
memoire with the English equivalent key pandemic influenza 
response personnel. Piloting served different purposes 
(Silverman, 2010), including the development of interview 
technique and trialling of the question types and structure 
(e.g. which questions required clarification). It also provided 
an indication of which lines of questioning generated more or 
fewer data than others. These interviews were coded and 
transcribed, which helped with the aid memoire review phase.  
 
3.2.4.3 Fieldwork timetable 
The audio recordings of the interviews from one country visit 
were transcribed before undertaking the following country 
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visit. The timetable of the data collection stage is shown in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Fieldwork timetable 
 2013 2014 
 J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N 
Pilots *                  
Sweden    *               
New 
Zealand 
    *              
Japan      *             
Singapore        *           
Canada         *          
Turkey           ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Brazil           ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
3.2.4.4 Interview venues 
Interviews were conducted in participants’ work locations, 
either in personal offices or meeting rooms. 
 
3.2.4.5 Confidentiality and data security 
Data was stored in compliance with the University Of 
Nottingham regulations, and research participants remained 
anonymous.  
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3.2.4.6 Transcribing the interview data 
All the interviews were audio recorded, with the consent of the 
participants, to enable the transcription of the interview 
content. The process of reproducing the spoken words into 
typed text was conducted entirely by the researcher upon 
return to the UK using the aid of a foot operated stop-start 
pedal and the Express Scribe software that offers audio speed 
modifications. These two tools were helpful in improving the 
speed of transcription and helped to determine speech in 
instances where interviewees spoke quickly, quietly or 
mumbled. As Silverman notes, “transcribing takes a great deal 
of your time” (2010: p.200), but it was very important part of 
the process of beginning to analyse the data in this research 
project.  
Verbatim transcripts were created from the audio recordings. 
The transcripts mainly comprised of the text of the 
participants spoken word, but it also contained responses 
(“yeah”, “mmmm”, “eerrr”), vocalisations such as laughter 
(recorded as [laughter]), interruptions [phone call], 
recollections of what someone else had said (text was put in 
quotes and italics), repetition (“no, no, no, no”), muffled or 
mumbled speech [inaudible timestamp], reference to 
published material in interview (e.g. “You see here, 400,000 
doses were purchased” [participant points at page in book 
whilst answering question]).  No details that could not be 
conveyed from the audio recordings were recorded, such as 
visual data (facial expressions, gestures, body language). 
Also, the researcher did not attempt to interpret how things 
were said (e.g. speech speed, tone, emphasis) because this 
could be a source of inaccuracy such as when participants 
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conversed in English but this was not their first language 
(Halcomb and Davidson 2006; Bailey 2008). 
One interview diverged from the typical interviews conducted 
in this research project: in Japan, an interview was 
accompanied by a translator. During the interview, the 
interviewer asked a question in English, the translator 
repeated the question in Japanese, the participant spoke in 
Japanese and the translator reproduced each sentence into 
English until the participant had finished their response. The 
interviewer paused to listen and often reframed the answer or 
asked a follow up response to clarify that they had understood 
the participant and that the translation was conveyed as the 
participant had intended - this again followed the interviewer-
translator-participant-translator pattern. The English 
translated content of the audio recording was transcribed by 
the researcher. 
 
3.2.5 Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
3.2.5.1 Analytic induction 
The principles of inductive methodology were used to generate 
theory from the conducted research, although the strategy 
used is based in the analytic induction process. In analytic 
induction, a hypothesis is built from the collected data and is 
not pre-conceived. Figure 23 shows a flow chart of analytic 
induction as a process in research data collection and analysis. 
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Rough estimation and hypothetical explanation is made of the phenomenon 
to be explained 
 
Cases are studied with the hypothesis in mind.  
Does the hypothesis fit each case? 
 
     Yes hypothesis fits    No hypothesis does not fit 
 
Continue with further cases    Reject/revise hypothesis/phenomena 
Can the hypothesis be disproven? 
 
Reference: Evaluating Public Programmes: contexts and issues 
(Shaw, 2000). 
Figure 23. Flow chart developed from Shaw (2000) text 
explanation of analytic induction.  
  
Lindesmith’s (1968) work in Addictions and Opiates describes 
the use of analytic induction and explains the process of 
identifying the central theoretical problem under examination. 
Lindesmith goes on to explain the process that the initial 
hypothesis formulation was found to be inadequate, so was 
rejected by negative evidence and revised in light of new 
evidence from a case. This second hypothesis was found to be 
much more valuable, but after further evidence it was found it 
did not fit and required revision. The final formulated 
hypothesis was found to be ‘superior to the others’ and 
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Lindesmith goes on to explain the theory of addiction to 
opiates, to answer the central theoretical problem of why 
similar circumstances result in some people becoming addicts 
whilst others do not. 
Lindesmith (1968) discusses the analytic induction method as 
an evolving process, in which a theory is constructed, and 
evidence goes on to force change in theoretical structure. He 
argues that by observing the negative instances, the 
researcher should arrive closer to theory. Lindesmith (1968) 
explains analytic induction through an excerpt from Znaniecki 
(1934) about the method. Znaniecki explains that botanists 
and zoologists describe and categorise species, but that 
further discoveries may contradict their generalisations. New 
findings would lead to new research that may confirm their 
theory or invalidate their generalisation requiring them to 
develop a new, more appropriate theory. 
Lindesmith’s (1968) work shows a practical example of 
analytic induction (Shaw, 2000) that is useful for the data 
collection and analysis phase of this research project. Analytic 
induction was useful in this research project because each 
country became a case. An example of a worked hypothesis 
used for the specific public health measure of vaccines is 
presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Worked example of analytic induction used in 
this research project. 
Hypothesis: early vaccination increased uptake rates and low mortality 
rates were reported 
Case Does the 
hypothesis fit? 
Comments 
Sweden Yes Early vaccination campaign compared 
to other countries, high uptake rates 
and low national mortality  
New 
Zealand 
Yes Late vaccination campaign, low uptake 
rates, some mortality 
Japan No Late vaccination, low uptake rates but 
low national mortality 
Revisit phenomena 
Revision: early disease activity and other public health measures affected 
vaccination uptake rates and mortality rates 
Case Does the 
hypothesis fit? 
Comments 
Japan Yes High use of antivirals early on, late 
vaccination deployment, low uptake 
rates, low mortality 
Singapore Yes Vaccines arrived post first wave disease 
peak 
Canada Yes Vaccines arrived post first wave disease 
peak, vaccination uptake rates varied 
(high early on) 
 
The benefit of analytic induction is that the data analysis 
began during the data collection phase, and this allowed the 
researcher to ask additional relevant questions during 
subsequent country interviews.  
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3.2.5.2 Thematic analysis 
Following the analytic induction approach to hypothesis 
generation, the next stage was to analyse the qualitative data. 
When analysing qualitative data, either a deductive or 
inductive approach can be taken. A deductive approach makes 
use of a previously prepared framework to analyse the data 
and by this process the researcher enforces a structure onto 
the data.  In contrast, an inductive approach does not apply 
framework but examines the data to develop the structure of 
analysis (Burnard et al., 2008). The deductive approach was 
inappropriate to use in this research project because it is 
inflexible and can limit the theme generation. Instead, the 
inductive approach was time consuming but comprehensive 
and allowed the interview data to direct the findings. There is 
a choice of inductive approaches that can be selected to 
analyse qualitative data: thematic analysis was used in the 
data analysis of this project.  
“Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and 
reporting patterns (themes) within data.” (Braun and Clarke, 
2006: p.6). The thematic analysis approach outlined by Braun 
and Clarke (2006) was utilised in this research project. 
Braun and Clarke (2006) provide a six stage guide for 
conducting thematic analysis:  
1. Become familiar with your data.  
2. Generating initial codes 
3. Searching for themes 
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4. Reviewing themes 
5. Defining and naming themes 
6. Producing the report 
The thematic analysis steps listed were useful in this research. 
Firstly, the interview data was read and re-read. Fortunately, 
as all interviews were conducted by the researcher, an initial 
knowledge of the data was held. Through repeatedly listening 
to the verbal data in the transcription part of creating the 
typed data, and by reading the transcripts repeatedly, this 
formed an active part of data immersion. Although the 
transcription and repeated reading of the data was time 
consuming, on reflection it was not time wasted as it formed a 
firm foundation for data analysis.  
Secondly, once the verbal data was heard multiple times, the 
transcripts were produced and the typed data read repeatedly, 
the first basic codes were applied. These first codes were 
initially applied in NVivo, a software programme, which 
assisted the handling of the data. The researcher also 
manually applied codes to paper documents to make the 
process more applied through the use of highlighters and 
pens. At this stage, all data had simple codes assigned and 
many parts were coded more than once. The researcher 
wished to make sure that all data was carried onto the next 
stages of data analysis and not lost. Instead of coding one 
sentence, the researcher would often code data either side of 
the sentence, such as an entire paragraph or section ensuring 
that the context was not lost. This stage created vast 
quantities of data. 
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The third step in the thematic analysis involved examining the 
codes and attempting to establish order by re-focusing the 
data into broad themes. This process resulted in several codes 
placed together to form a central theme. In some instances, 
there were many codes placed to one theme. The researcher 
realised at this stage that this was too vast and would likely 
require sub-themes within them. Also, a small number of 
codes floated outside of the main themes so these were placed 
into a temporary ‘other’ theme in order for the researcher to 
revisit these at a later date.  
Step four is where the themes are reviewed and refined. In 
this step some of the themes were lost as when the data was 
re-examined there was not enough data in support. The 
researcher found that on more than one occasion, two 
separate themes from the earlier step were actually the same 
theme. This step required reading the data extracts to 
evaluate the fit of the themes and to check if any additional 
themes could be assigned.  
Figure 24 provides an example of the thematic analysis 
approach taken. The example illustrates how the early coding 
step progressed over time to a final theme.  
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Figure 24. A worked example of thematic analysis. 
 
At this stage the researcher sought support from their 
supervisor. A section of the data was discussed in relation to 
the themes to examine if a senior researcher would apply the 
same or different themes. The researcher was shown how an 
example theme could be defined and refined. This took the 
concrete themes to more abstract themes, where the essence 
of the theme was captured and replaced with an expressive 
theme. Checking the coding and theme process gave the 
researcher assurance to progress the data analysis. The fifth 
step of the thematic analysis concentrates on defining and 
naming the themes; each theme has a brief explanation 
attached. 
Step six, the final step, relates to the final data analysis and 
written document; in essence the results chapter presenting 
the story of the data.  
Initial 
coding 
•Vaccines 
•Priority 
•Uptake 
•Demand 
•Resistance 
Broad 
themes 
•Early prioritisation 
•Vaccine hostility 
•Vaccine suspicion 
•Vaccine fears 
Final 
theme 
•Human guinea-pigs 
•History of medicine 
scars (subtheme) 
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To summarise, thematic analysis involved searching across 
data to find repeated patterns of meaning. Codes were applied 
to the transcripts without checking previous research codes on 
a related topic. Data was repeatedly read, themes reviewed 
and revised. This has resulted in data driven themes in this 
research. 
 
3.2.5.3 Handling the data 
Interviews in text document format were imported into the 
program NVivo 8, for coding and thematic analysis. The 
analysis process was inductive, meaning that themes were 
identified in the data analysis stage.  
The text documents were handled in NVivo for simplistic 
coding in the first instance. NVivo was favoured for basic 
organisation and core category coding of the public health 
measures because frequently the conversation flipped 
between different measures. As the coding process developed 
to themes, other approaches were utilised, such as multiple 
Microsoft Word documents and paper copies: here concepts 
and categories were utilised (Bryman, 2004).  
On reflection, the thematic analysis and analytic induction 
process were a particularly challenging element of the project. 
The interview transcription had generated hundreds of 
thousands of words and the data frequently had multiple 
codes assigned. The researcher expected the process to 
reduce the size of the data to themes however initially the 
coding swelled the data. The researcher was also fearful of 
losing data that may be of significance later on so nearly the 
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entire transcripts were coded at first. It was only through 
reviewing the codes and doing the process several times, that 
more abstract codes were applied, and themes emerged.  
 
3.2.5.4 Triangulation of data  
This research has also benefited from the use of triangulation 
of data. Triangulation is “the use of more than one method or 
source of data in the study of a social phenomenon so that 
findings may be cross-checked.” (Bryman, 2004: p.545). The 
primary benefit of triangulation is that data is cross-
referenced, and this provides a higher degree of confidence in 
the research findings. In this thesis, published pandemic 
influenza plans and policies, and literature on epidemiological 
trends and public health response measures in the study 
countries, have been examined both before interviews were 
conducted and afterwards in the analysis and write up stages.  
The amalgamation of information was always pertinent in this 
research due to plans, policies and epidemiological reports 
providing a quantitative research foundation that facilitated 
qualitative research. As Bryman (2004) explains, the 
triangulation of data using mixed methods allows for the 
researcher to fill in the gaps, whereby using one method 
would not enable the researcher to collect all the information 
required for analysis. In this thesis, secondary data sources of 
plans and policies, and literature on the epidemiological trends 
and public health response methods have provided a platform 
for the qualitative interviews; the interviews alone would not 
have allowed for a thorough understanding of study countries 
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history and experience during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic. As pointed out in the introduction chapter, the 
quantitative data published from the pandemic influenza has 
led to questions that have not been provided in literature 
elsewhere, and interviews were necessary to explore public 
health measures in greater depth. Therefore, it is natural that 
the quantitative basis which has led to the research is 
examined and included in conjunction with the qualitative data 
collected. It is felt that this type of research allows for “…light 
being shed on relationships between variables derived from 
quantitative research by a related qualitative one.” (Bryman, 
2004: p.460). 
Upon reflection, triangulation in this research has been 
achieved by using pandemic influenza policies, literature on 
epidemiological trends and public health response measures 
during 2009-10 and interviews. An example of the process of 
triangulation is depicted in Figure 25 where the study 
countries had vaccine purchasing agreements arranged prior 
2009, with the intention of clarifying the number of doses 
required in the event of an influenza pandemic. The literature 
demonstrated that for some of the study countries, the 
vaccination campaigns were implemented after the first wave 
of disease activity and late implementation was associated 
with low vaccine uptake. The disease activity and the need to 
wait for vaccines to be manufactured and delivered, resulted 
in the participants emphasising that communication messages 
to the public frequently changed. Each piece of information in 
the triangulation data led to the identification that there were 
unforeseen issues with the vaccine supply, which created 
uncertainty, contradictions and required a lot of resources in 
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order to implement vaccination campaigns. The triangulation 
example (Figure 25) demonstrates the improved knowledge 
that was gained from using multiple sources.  
 
Figure 25. Example of triangulation in practice. 
 
3.2.5.5 Relationship and patterns between categories 
After undertaking the coding of interview data, relationships 
between categories were examined, which helped assemble 
the results and discussion chapters. The example in Table 19 
illustrates the relationship between vaccine uptake in an 
interpandemic period (thin inner arrows) and a pandemic 
influenza event (thick outer circle arrows). It highlights the 
continuous cycle of providing influenza vaccines and how 
regular experience contributes to high uptake rates. 
Plans & 
Policies 
Epi & 
PHM 
literature 
Findings 
Interview 
themes 
Vaccine 
agreement: 
Receive 
vaccines 
Vaccines 
arrive post 
disease peak 
Vaccine 
supply 
uncertanity 
Varying 
comms 
messages 
 142 
 
 
Figure 26. Factors contributing to vaccine uptake. 
 
 Summary of research methodology chapter 3.3
This chapter has provided an outline of the research 
methodology and the study methods. It has explained the 
thinking behind the research conducted and what indeed 
occurred in the fieldwork and analysis stages. The chapter 
explained that this comparative health policy research used 
qualitative interviews with the support of the documentary 
analysis of available records, and this has taken an 
administrative anthropology approach. Countries were 
sampled by the means outlined, and this resulted in interviews 
conducted in five study countries to explore the four core 
policy areas of pandemic influenza response. A qualitative 
data analysis was undertaken using the strategy of analytic 
induction process; interviews were transcribed and coded, and 
thematic analysis was undertaken. This process has led to the 
Pandemic 
influenza 
activity 
Vaccine 
demand 
Vaccine 
shortage 
initially 
Prioritisation 
High uptake 
Seasonal 
influenza 
vaccine 
experience 
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following chapter on the pandemic influenza preparedness 
prior to 2009 in both the international community and the 
individual study countries. The discussion then progresses 
onto countries vaccine agreements and vaccines utilised in the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. 
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4 Study 1: Pandemic Influenza Policies 
 
Chapter 2 focused on the three pandemic influenza events of 
the twentieth century and gave a historical overview of the 
public health management measures with a particular focus on 
pandemic vaccines. The chapter moved on to discuss the 
events of the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. The 
previous chapter detailed the research methodology and 
methods which is a critical precursor to this chapter.  
In this chapter, it is now appropriate to examine the national 
policies regarding influenza pandemics. Firstly, the global 
importance of planning and policies will be examined with 
reference to the pandemic preparedness in the years prior to 
2009. Secondly, the discussion will progress on to the study 
countries pandemic influenza plans and the vaccine 
agreements in place before the pandemic influenza event. The 
final part of the chapter will examine the actual vaccines 
ordered and deployed in the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic. 
 
 Pandemic preparedness 4.1
Pandemic influenza preparedness activities and investment by 
nations and international organisations have largely increased 
over the last 15 years. The pressing need for pandemic 
preparedness has grown from a greater consciousness that 
infectious diseases do not observe country borders. Therefore, 
in order to respond to emerging infectious diseases, such as 
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pandemic influenza, there is a need to complement national 
and local government actors with transnational actors to 
facilitate a coordinated globalised response (Brown and 
Hegermann-Lindencrone, 2013; Dingwall, Hoffman and 
Staniland, 2013). Globalised public health risks and 
uncertainty require not only a country response at the three 
tiers of national, regional and local levels but also an 
international involvement. A mixture of these different layers 
of actors is a vital component for the success of responses, 
and although this research project has focused on a national 
level response, it is important to explore the part played by 
international communities towards pandemic influenza events. 
Globalised emerging health threats have notably included the 
Black Death of the fourteenth century in Europe and more 
recently HIV from the 1980s. At each time, both were new 
infectious diseases that required a novel response and caused 
public panic, fear, stigma and uncertainty at supra-national, 
national and subnational levels (Dingwall, Hoffman and 
Staniland, 2013). “Emerging diseases disturb our assumptions 
of a known universe of risk. A new hazard disrupts our 
established strategies for managing our everyday lives. What 
appears as irrational may be a locally rational response to 
uncertainty, or at least an attempt to use locally available 
resources to re-establish sufficient certainty for practical 
action.” (Dingwall, Hoffman and Staniland, 2013: p.168). 
Countries varying responses to emerging infectious diseases 
are understandable given the varying knowledge about what 
action is politically and culturally appropriate and what is 
financially feasible. Transnational organisations have 
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recognised these differences but nevertheless highlighted and 
encouraged the importance of preparedness activities. 
HIV, and in more recent years, Ebola, Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), avian influenza virus 
A(H5N1) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
infectious diseases outbreaks, as well as the threats of 
bioterrorism, and susceptibilities generated by ever increasing 
globalisation, have resulted in intense work towards pandemic 
preparedness. Transnational organisations are prepared in 
advance and on stand-by for newly emerging infectious 
diseases: ‘known unknowns’ (Brown and Hegermann-
Lindencrone, 2013; Dingwall, Hoffman and Staniland, 2013). 
The United States Secretary of State in 2002, Donald 
Rumsfeld, stated at a defence meeting that: “There are known 
knowns. There are things we know that we know. There are 
known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now 
know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. 
There are things we do not know we don’t know.”  Substantial 
investments in surveillance to rapidly detect infectious disease 
outbreaks, as well as plans and policies, build resilience 
against these ‘known unknowns’ have been made at the start 
of the twenty-first century. 
Avian influenza virus A(H5N1) materialised in 1997 in Asia, 
with further outbreaks appearing in 2003, which highlighted 
the threats of the animal-to-human route of infection and 
transmission. This influenza virus was designated ‘highly 
pathogenic’ because nearly all infected poultry died; it also 
happened to be extremely lethal in the limited number of 
humans infected but this is never the reason why a virus is 
denoted ‘highly pathogenic’ by animal health authorities. This 
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extraordinary outbreak caused worldwide concern about the 
lethality of this disease and future pandemic influenza 
potential if the disease evolved to successful human-to-human 
widespread transmission. Large scale coordinated responses, 
such as poultry culling throughout Hong Kong, were 
undertaken and appeared to halt the outbreak (Monto and 
Sellwood, 2013; Brown and Hegermann-Lindencrone, 2013). 
Historical impacts of pandemic cases, such as the 1918-19 
Spanish influenza, remained well known in the twenty-first 
century during the time of the Avian influenza outbreaks. 
Indeed, Taubenberger argues persuasively that the 1918 
pandemic probably arose from an avian influenza virus after 
undertaking analysis of tissue samples from 1918 influenza 
victims (2006). Although medical care has vastly improved 
since 1918, unprecedented new risks were apparent, such as 
the radical change of modern day global interconnectedness 
and the dense living conditions in vast cities. There were swift 
flights from one region of the world to another in a matter of 
hours, and with the incubation period of influenza prior to the 
display of symptoms contested, it was widely accepted that 
outbreaks in Asia would not be held back from the global 
community. It was not so much of a question of ‘if’ a 
pandemic influenza would occur but more of ‘when’. 
At the same time, the 2003 SARS transmission compounded 
the threat from emerging infectious diseases, and the impact 
of SARS was extended beyond Asia to various cities across the 
world (Monto and Sellwood, 2013). The research study 
countries of Singapore and Canada (Toronto regional area) 
had the first-hand experience of emerging infectious diseases 
response to SARS. The timeline of infectious disease events in 
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the preceding years sharply focused pandemic preparedness 
across the world.   
In 1999, 2005 and 2009, the WHO developed guidance for 
pandemic influenza preparedness planning; the majority of 
countries national plans were prepared using the 2005 WHO 
guidelines. The guidelines outlined pandemic preparations, 
phases 1-6 and response measures, and contained a number 
of core areas, one of which included vaccination strategy 
(Brown and Hegermann-Lindencrone, 2013). At this time, the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
was established in 2005. Based in Sweden, the “ECDC’s 
mission is to identify, assess and communicate current and 
emerging threats to human health posed by infectious 
diseases.” (ECDC About Us, 2016). The WHO is concerned 
with various health conditions across the world, whereas ECDC 
is a highly specialised infectious disease agency concerned 
with European health protection; in 2005 pandemic 
preparedness was ECDC’s primary disease priority. The ECDC 
and European Commission published various documents, such 
as pandemic surveillance, preparedness assessments and EU 
reviews, and held workshops prior to 2009. One of the five 
study countries, Sweden, is based in Europe and the research 
project was conducted at a UK university. The International 
Health Regulations (IHR) were implemented in June 2007 and 
legally binds all 196 countries (including WHO Member States) 
to report specific diseases to the WHO and the outlines the 
responsibilities of the WHO. The aim of the IHR is to: “help the 
international community prevent and respond to acute public 
health risks that have the potential to cross borders and 
threaten people worldwide.” (WHO, IHR, 2016). Lastly, two 
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other notable transnational organisations are the United 
States Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). PAHO is an 
international health institution covering the Americas (PAHO, 
2016). The CDC published pandemic influenza guidelines and 
played a significant role in the early weeks of the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic due to the emergence of the 
virus in North America. 
 
 Literature review of study countries pandemic 4.2
influenza policies and 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic events 
Documentary methods and a literature review of country-
specific literature were conducted ahead of the country visits. 
In advance of the data collection, it was important to make 
use of existing materials in order to prepare the interview aid 
memoire. As Wrede (2013) explains, documentary methods 
make use of materials that have been published at a set point 
in time and “it is common for researchers to combine 
documentary materials with other means of acquiring data, 
such as interviewing” (Wrede, 2013: p.95). “Documentary 
research is a basic source of data for health care policy study 
in general and comparative analysis in particular.” (Wrede, 
2013: p.96). In this research, documents predominately 
included country pandemic influenza preparedness plans and 
WHO pandemic influenza guidance in the lead up to the 2009-
10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. The documentary method 
enabled the identification of key pandemic influenza response 
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personnel as well (discussed in the sampling section of the 
methodology chapter). 
A literature review was conducted for the purpose of detailing 
each study countries pandemic influenza preparedness 
policies, as well as to develop an epidemiological picture and 
collation of information about pandemic influenza response 
and impact in each study country. The literature search was 
planned using the Population Intervention Comparison 
Outcome (PICO) search strategy which involves setting an 
answerable research question and terms to use in a search. 
The research question: How was the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic managed in the study countries and what 
were the outcomes? 
Search terms: 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic + public 
health measures + study countries + outcome (the second 
row are synonyms which contain the various spellings of the 
keywords). 
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Figure 27. PICO search strategy 
 
The search terms and generated results have been included in 
Appendix B. References which were not followed up included: 
 Specific case studies (e.g. an individual’s treatment and 
experience) 
 Other pandemic influenzas (e.g. 1918 Spanish Flu) 
 Seasonal influenzas / SARS  
 Different word meanings (e.g. Turkey – reference to the 
bird, not the country) 
 Economic focused articles 
 A single hospitals’ experience (only included if it is the 
single designated/reference hospital) / very localised 
experience (e.g. city/town/small region) / a university’ 
experience / highly specialised ICU issues 
Patient or 
Population 
or Problem 
2009/10 H1N1 
pandemic 
influenza 
Intervention 
/ Exposure 
Public health 
measures: 
Antivirals 
Vaccine 
Social distancing 
Personal hygiene 
Comparison 
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 Non-study countries (e.g. mention study country in 
abstract but actually article is focused on another 
country and their response/experience) 
Once abstracts were examined and articles such as the above 
examples excluded, it was typically found that <25% of 
articles were appropriate to follow up. 
 
 Pandemic influenza planning  4.3
In 2011, the WHO compiled a document with the title 
‘Comparative Analysis of National Pandemic Plans’, which 
looked at the pandemic plans of 119 countries and this 
included a table of national preparedness plans. All five study 
countries were found in this document, and the information 
was extracted for inclusion in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: National pandemic plans from study countries 
Country Date Title Pages Language 
Canada 2006 
The Canadian pandemic 
influenza plan for the health 
sector 
609 English 
Japan 2005 
Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Action Plan of 
the Japanese Government 
75 English 
New 
Zealand 
2006 
New Zealand influenza 
pandemic action plan 
198 English 
Singapore 2005 
Influenza pandemic 
readiness and response plan 
– Draft 
26 English 
Sweden 2005 
Contingency planning for an 
influenza pandemic - 
national measures 
23 English 
 
 153 
 
Since this document was compiled, all of the study countries 
have published more recent plans. Japan released an updated 
version of ‘Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Action Plan of the 
Japanese Government’ in 2007. Singapore also had a revised 
‘Influenza pandemic readiness and response plan’ released in 
January 2009. The Public Health Agency of Canada lists all the 
documents relevant for the ‘Canadian Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness: Planning Guidance for the Health Sector’ online 
and each core area is a separate PDF. Therefore, nearly all 
documents have been updated since 2006 but this process has 
been conducted over several years. The 2006 New Zealand 
plan was no longer available and had been superseded by the 
2010 ‘New Zealand and Influenza Pandemic Plan: A framework 
for action’. Likewise, Sweden had a new plan published in 
2009: ‘National plan for pandemic influenza – including a basis 
for regional and local planning’. Both New Zealand and 
Sweden’s country plans were published during the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic at the time of the WHO Phase 6. 
The following section shall summarise each study country’s 
pandemic influenza plans. 
 
4.3.1 Canada 
Canada began pandemic planning early on, in 1983. In 1988, 
the first draft of the Canadian Contingency Plan for Pandemic 
Influenza was completed, and redrafts have followed. The plan 
is for people in the health sector who would be involved in the 
planning and response to an influenza pandemic (such as 
health emergency responders, health planners, health care 
workers, laboratories, pharmaceuticals). As Canada is a 
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federal country, the responsibility for pandemic influenza 
planning and response detailed in the plan lies with the 
provinces and territories to provide health care and essential 
services. Therefore, the plan specifically focuses on health 
sector response to a national public health emergency and is 
intended for guidance in the development of operational plans 
at provincial and territorial, regional, local and facility level by 
each government and health care institution (Public Health 
Agency of Canada, 2010). The Public Health Agency of Canada 
supplied the provincial and territorial Ministries of Public 
Health with a framework for organising their preparedness and 
response activities. National working groups and 
subcommittees addressed specific issues in the plan and 
developed guidelines. These were organised into the following 
components: surveillance, vaccines, antiviral drugs, public 
health measures, communications and health services. Health 
services were divided into infection control, clinical care, non-
traditional sites and workers and resource management 
(Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010). 
 
4.3.2 New Zealand 
New Zealand has a National Health Emergency Plan (NHEP) to 
manage emergencies, which is a whole-government approach 
and includes available expertise and resources. Within the 
NHEP, the New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Action Plan 
(NZIPAP) was created in 2002. Prior to this, a response 
framework for pandemics was developed in 1997. The NZIPAP 
has undergone several revisions since its creation to include 
improvements and further understanding since the SARS 
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outbreak response, and two national response simulation 
exercises (Exercise Virex 2002; Exercise Cruickshank 2007) 
which tested the pandemic influenza plan. The Ministry of 
Health created the Pandemic Influenza Technical Advisory 
Group to provide advice on matters concerning clinical, 
virological, epidemiological, infection control and ethics. New 
Zealand’s 21 District Health Boards (DHB) lead the planning 
and response at local levels (Jennings, 2013; NZIPP, 2010). 
 
4.3.3 Sweden 
Following A(H5N1) avian influenza and SARS outbreaks and 
the WHO calls for pandemic planning and the establishment of 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) in 2005, the Swedish government instructed the 
National Board of Health and Welfare to produce the National 
Pandemic Plan, which was published in 2005 and revisions 
followed up to 2009. In 2005, the National Pandemic Group 
(NPG) was established to co-ordinate the planning, 
implementation and communication of pandemic control 
measures. The NPG has representatives from the National 
Board of Health and Welfare (NBHW), the Institute for 
Communicable Disease Control, the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency, the Swedish Work Environment 
Authority, the Medical Products Agency, and the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions (Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency & Socialstyrelsen, 2011). The National 
Board of Health and Welfare has the responsibility for 
organising and managing the pandemic influenza contingency 
planning in Sweden. Strategies cover the legal, medical and 
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organisational measures against influenza (The National Board 
of Health and Welfare, 2012). The 2009 ‘National plan for 
pandemic influenza – including a basis for regional and local 
planning’ was used by Sweden during the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic and was developed by a working group. 
This group included representatives from the Swedish Institute 
for Infectious Disease Control, the Medical Products Agency, 
the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Swedish Work 
Environment Authority, the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions, the County Medical Officers and 
supervising nurses from some municipalities (Social Services, 
2009).  
The agencies responsible for containing influenza at the 
national level in Sweden are managed by the National Board 
of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) and the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och 
beredskap). At the regional level, Sweden has County Medical 
Officers of Communicable Disease Control 
(Smittskyddsläkarna) who manage the surveillance and 
practical implementation measures employed to alleviate 
outbreaks in their responsible counties. The Swedish Institute 
for Communicable Disease Control (Smittskyddsinstitutet, 
SMI) gathers surveillance data to report epidemiological and 
microbiological information on infectious diseases in Sweden. 
 
4.3.4 Japan 
In 2005, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of the 
Japanese Government produced the Pandemic Influenza 
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Preparedness Action Plan (PIPAP). The Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Action Plan of the Japanese Government was 
drafted with reference to the WHO Global Influenza 
Preparedness Plan of 2005. In the estimation of the potential 
burden of a new influenza pandemic, PIPAP calculated that if 
25% of the population were to become infected, then this 
would result in approximately 17 million medical attendances. 
Within the Japanese Government, the Inter-ministerial Avian 
Influenza Committee was established in order to enable 
collaboration. The Headquarters for Pandemic Influenza 
Counter-measures was established by the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare. The PIPAP would involve local 
governments, organisations (e.g. health services) and the 
public (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2005). The 
Japanese PIPAP refers to the six phases of events in 
pandemics detailed in the WHO Global Influenza Preparedness 
Plan. The PIPAP separated these WHO phases into two 
categories of ‘no outbreak in Japan’ and ‘outbreak in Japan’. A 
revised version of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Action 
Plan of the Japanese Government was released in 2007.  
 
4.3.5 Singapore 
The Ministry of Public Health in Singapore released the 
Influenza Pandemic Readiness and Response Plan in 2007 
which detailed public health and medical measures to prevent 
and manage pandemic influenza within the country. In the 
plan, the Singaporean Ministry of Public Health would be 
responsible for leading, coordinating and managing a response 
to an influenza pandemic. Singapore’s response plan expected 
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that a novel influenza virus would be highly pathogenic, 
develop outside of the country, spread at a rapid pace and 
perhaps take a while for it to be laboratory confirmed as a 
new influenza virus. The plan expected that a new virus would 
enter the country by infected cases travelling into Singapore 
very quickly after the novel virus emerged from the South 
East Asia region and that this would be highly unpreventable. 
The plan intended the Ministry of Health to work towards 
delaying the spread of disease within the country (Singapore 
Ministry of Health, 2009). Singapore’s national strategy for 
pandemic influenza was for the creation of a surveillance 
system, the reduction of associated consequences of pandemic 
influenza during the first wave (minimise mortality and 
morbidity) and then work towards immunising the population 
of Singapore with the developed vaccine. The Ministry of 
Health’s pandemic influenza preparedness plan specially 
referred to preparations for the occurrence of avian influenza 
(A/H5N1). The case definition was sub-categorised into 
confirmed and suspected cases and would be announced 
during a pandemic. Clinical criteria were expected to be more 
frequently utilised for diagnosis of most patients rather than 
laboratory confirmation because this would involve time delay 
(Singapore Ministry of Health, 2009). 
 
Table 7. Key characteristics of pandemic preparedness 
plans. 
Study 
country 
Key characteristics  
Canada Pandemic influenza could emerge from country in the world 
and at any time. There may be no lead in time before arriving 
within the country. Illness and mortality peaks will occur within 
weeks of first confirmed cases in Canada. Vulnerable 
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populations expected to be most affected. 
New 
Zealand 
Creation of Pandemic Influenza Technical Advisory Group. All-
of-Government approach to planning and response. Six phases 
of strategy actions in response to pandemic influenza covering 
humans, social and economic. Planning model based on 2% 
CFR. Severe impact of 1918 pandemic influenza in NZ noted.  
Sweden National Pandemic Group Established. Unlikely a vaccine will 
be available at the start of an influenza pandemic. Expectation 
of a 2-6 month wait. Knowledge of the uses of antiviral drugs 
in a pandemic is incomplete.  
Japan Inter-Ministerial Avian Influenza Committee established. If 
25% of the Japanese population was infected during an 
influenza pandemic, then it was calculated that there would be 
17 million medical attendances. Pandemic events related to 
WHO pandemic influenza phases. Expectation of avian 
influenza. 
Singapore Pandemic influenza expected to originate from outside 
Singapore and enter country by travellers. Intention to 
implement measures that would delay the spread of disease 
within Singapore. 
 
 Summary of plan purposes 4.4
The overarching purposes common to the study country 
pandemic influenza plans were to minimize serious illness and 
deaths and reduce societal disruption (see Table 8). Each 
study country pandemic influenza plan purposes are outlined 
in the below table.  
 
Table 8: Objectives of pandemic plans from study 
countries 
Study 
country 
Purpose of pandemic plan 
Canada 
“First, to minimize serious illness and overall deaths, and 
second to minimize societal disruption among Canadians as 
a result of an influenza pandemic.” (Public Health Agency of 
Canada, 2010: p.n/a). 
Japan 
The Inter-ministerial Avian Influenza Committee stated that 
the 2007 PIPAP was developed to “minimize health risks of 
people and prevent possible damage to social and economic 
functions” (2007: p.2). 
New The main objective of the NZIPAP is to “minimise deaths, 
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Zealand serious illness and serious disruption to communities and 
the economy arising from an influenza pandemic” (New 
Zealand Ministry of Health, 2010: p.1). 
Singapore 
The response plan aimed for three outcomes (Singapore 
Ministry of Health, 2009: p.8): 
1. “Maintain essential services in Singapore to limit 
social and economic disruptions. 
2. Reduce morbidity and mortality through treatment of 
influenza cases. 
3. Slow and limit the spread of influenza to reduce the 
surge on the healthcare system.” 
Sweden 
The objectives of the Swedish pandemic influenza plan are 
(Socialstyrelsen, 2009: p.15): 
1. “That the effect of the influenza on public health is 
as limited as possible 
2. That negative effects on the community are as 
limited as possible 
3. That the resources available to mitigate the effects 
are used as efficiently as possible.” 
 
 Vaccine-specific policies  4.5
Many countries had prepared pandemic influenza national 
plans prior to the emergence of the novel (H1N1) influenza in 
April 2009, as outlined in the earlier part of this chapter. 
International organisations had urged countries to prepare for 
a new influenza against which people would have very little to 
no immunity. Events preceding 2009, such as avian influenza 
virus A(H5N1) and SARS, also played a part in igniting 
motivation to plan for, as well as enabling countries to test 
their plans for such a pandemic influenza response. Some 
countries, including Japan and Singapore, made avian 
influenza A(H5N1) specific pandemic plans. This is 
understandable due to the commonplace expectation that 
A(H5N1) posed a severe pandemic threat, that it was the 
cause of much pandemic influenza planning and these study 
countries close proximity to outbreaks in Asia. All five of the 
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study countries had plans for the event of a future pandemic 
influenza and all made mention of using vaccines in such an 
event. The preparedness policy included seeking and securing 
pandemic influenza vaccine orders with pharmaceutical 
companies. Therefore, this section shall focus on each study 
country’s vaccine plans. 
 
4.5.1 Sweden 
Socialstyrelsen published Sweden’s National Plan for Pandemic 
Influenza (2009) and emphasised the need for vaccines during 
an influenza pandemic: “Mass vaccination is currently the only 
measure which could possibly stop a pandemic, but a vaccine 
will not be available during the first few months of a pandemic 
since in all likelihood it will not be possible to produce a 
vaccine in advance.” (Socialstyrelsen, 2009: p.39). This 
statement highlights the belief in the effectiveness of a 
pandemic vaccine but also the concern of the time delay in 
vaccine production during the event of a novel influenza. 
Socialstyrelsen in Sweden explained the reason for a 
monovalent, adjuvant and two dose vaccine: “The vaccine that 
will be developed for a pandemic virus strain will be different 
from the vaccine used for the annual influenza. Since the virus 
in question will be known, the vaccine does not need to be 
trivalent – instead it will be monovalent, i.e. contain only one 
virus type. It will likely also contain a smaller quantity of the 
active substance and include immune-stimulating additives 
(adjuvants), all to maximise the amount of vaccine available. 
Two vaccine doses will probably be needed to achieve 
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protective immunity, administered with an interval of at least 
a few weeks. This will require partially new logistics, both for 
administration and follow-up of the effects and side-effects of 
the vaccine.” (Socialstyrelsen, 2009: p.40). 
In times of seasonal influenza, Sweden runs an annual 
vaccination campaign against influenza, targeting people 
deemed at “an increased medical risk of a serious course of 
illness and complications, primarily in the form of pneumonia. 
People in these risk groups more often require hospital care 
and also represent a considerable proportion of the increased 
mortality seen in connection with influenza. In Sweden these 
medical risk groups are defined in the National Board of Health 
and Welfare general guidelines on vaccination against 
influenza (SOSFS 1997:21). These apply primarily to people 
with heart and/or lung disease, as well as people over 65. 
Together these groups are estimated to make up more than 
1.5 million people in Sweden.” (Socialstyrelsen, 2009: p.40). 
Sweden considered the annual vaccination programme as a 
way to learn, develop and prepare for implementing a mass 
vaccination campaign in the event of pandemic influenza and 
gain experience in the use of influenza vaccines. However, it 
was noted that: “In the face of a threatening pandemic, the 
vaccination recommendations will differ considerably from 
those used during normal influenza seasons, for several 
reasons. The overall ambition will be for everyone to be 
vaccinated. As the vaccine will be delivered in batches, 
priorities may have to be made as to which groups should be 
vaccinated first.” (Socialstyrelsen, 2009: p.40). 
It was recognised that initially the pandemic vaccine would 
arrive in limited supplies. The reasons given were: “production 
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can only begin after the virus strain has been identified and 
profiled, and additionally it will probably take two doses to 
achieve good protection in an immunologically naive 
population, which implies a need for larger amounts of 
vaccine. Furthermore, vaccine manufacturer have only a 
limited capacity to produce large amounts of a new influenza 
vaccine in a short period of time. This means that countries 
with no influenza vaccine production of their own must rely on 
cooperation or agreements to create the conditions for 
receiving vaccine deliveries when a pandemic threatens or has 
broken out. Guidelines are already in place for the speedy 
approval of a new influenza vaccine needed in a pandemic. 
Talks have also been held with representatives of the 
European pharmaceuticals industry about the conditions for 
making production and distribution more efficient in a 
pandemic.” (Socialstyrelsen, 2009: p.41).  
In order to provide guaranteed access to the pandemic 
vaccine, Sweden’s National Board of Health and Welfare, like 
many other countries, signed guarantee access agreement in 
2007 for a vaccine to be supplied for the Swedish population 
in the event of an influenza pandemic. The agreement was 
explained as: “Under the guarantee agreement, the vaccine 
manufacturer pledges to reserve a fixed share of its 
production capacity for Sweden during 3-6 months, which is 
equivalent to 18 million doses of pandemic vaccine. Production 
will begin when WHO declares that a pandemic has broken 
out, or earlier following a possible vote arranged by the 
manufacturer. The vaccine manufacturer also pledges to have 
its own preparedness in order to be able to manage 
production during a pandemic, as well as to give the National 
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Board of Health and Welfare feedback on developments and 
status every quarter. Sweden, for its part, will support the 
manufacturer financially in its continued work on developing 
the vaccine. The agreement is valid for three years, with the 
possibility of a further extension. Under the delivery contract 
the supplier pledges to deliver the vaccine on a weekly basis 
during a period of 3-6 months, until the specified volume has 
been delivered.” (Socialstyrelsen, 2009: p.41). 
Ahead of the event of an influenza pandemic, it was 
envisioned that the vaccine arriving in Sweden would be 
comprised of two components, antigen and adjuvant, which 
require mixing prior vaccination and contain enough for 10 
doses. The timescale for delivery of the vaccine was estimated 
to be between three and six months, “with weekly deliveries of 
0.7-1.4 million doses each.” (Socialstyrelsen, 2009: p.66). 
 
4.5.2 New Zealand 
The New Zealand Ministry of Health published the ‘New 
Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A framework for action’ at 
the start of 2010 ahead of the arrival of the pandemic vaccine. 
New Zealand had secured two pandemic vaccine guarantees 
which would go live from the point of pandemic declaration. It 
was noted that it would take several months for the pandemic 
vaccine supplies to arrive in New Zealand after pandemic 
influenza declaration because in order for the manufacturers 
to produce a vaccine it is required “a vaccine that will protect 
against the pandemic strain cannot be made until that strain 
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has developed and is identified.” (New Zealand Influenza 
Pandemic Plan, 2010: p.142). 
It was noted that the numerous aspects would influence the 
pandemic influenza vaccine order size, campaign strategies 
and timing of vaccine delivery: “…including the nature 
(including the virulence) of the pandemic virus, the size of 
pandemic waves that may have already affected the 
population and the probable timing of vaccine deliveries. The 
process of vaccinating the population may be further 
complicated if each individual needs to be vaccinated twice 
because of the novel nature of the pandemic virus: 
management of this would probably involve administering two 
vaccinations about three weeks apart.” (New Zealand 
Influenza Pandemic Plan, 2010: p.142). 
The timing of the vaccine delivery was illustrated as having a 
prominent impact on the New Zealand response strategy: “For 
example, late delivery of a vaccine in a moderate to severe 
pandemic may mean greater efforts need to be placed on the 
Keep It Out and Stamp It Out phases to flatten the pandemic 
curve and spread the impact more evenly over time.” (New 
Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan, 2010: p.59). However, in 
terms of vaccine delivery timing, it was recognised that New 
Zealand would need to wait several months for the arrival of 
vaccines following pandemic influenza declaration: “A mass 
vaccination programme is unlikely to start for six months or 
more after a WHO declaration of a pandemic and production of 
vaccine. Decisions on the purchase of a vaccine need to be 
made by the Government, taking into account the costs and 
benefits to society of reducing the impact of the pandemic. 
Key decisions will centre on: length and intensity of 
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containment measures and measures in the Manage It phase; 
speed of transition to the recovery phase; immunisation 
programmes.” (New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan, 2010: 
p.59). 
 
4.5.3 Japan 
The ‘Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Action Plan of the 
Japanese Government (2007)’ in Japan was prepared with the 
expectation of an avian influenza H5N1 virus causing the next 
pandemic influenza. Therefore, the plans often referred to 
initial manufacture, stockpiling and use of the pre-pandemic 
influenza vaccine to provide healthcare workers and public 
service officials with protection should they wish to have the 
vaccination. The plan was structured according to distinct 
pandemic influenza phases with vaccine measures explained 
according to each phase.    
A distinction of Japan in comparison to so many other 
countries was the intention to produce and supply a domestic 
pandemic influenza vaccine for the Japanese population. The 
plans detailed provisions for securing domestic companies to 
produce the vaccine, isolating the new virus strains, ensuring 
quality, securing hen eggs, in addition to each prefecture 
identifying the number of healthcare workers and public 
service workers for priority vaccination. During the event of 
pandemic influenza, Japan envisioned that vaccination 
campaign guidelines and immunisation priority assessments 
according to epidemiological information and manufacturing 
capacity would be calculated. Part of the Pharmaceutical 
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Affairs Law allowed the ability to import vaccines produced 
and approved outside of Japan should the domestic vaccine 
supply not be ready or approved.  
According to the Japanese Government planning in 2007, it 
was prepared for all of the Japanese population to be 
vaccinated using the pandemic influenza vaccines, and for 
immunisation campaigns to commence as soon as the vaccine 
supply was received.  
 
4.5.4 Singapore 
The Singaporean Ministry of Health published the ‘Influenza 
Pandemic Readiness and Response Plan’ in early 2009 and 
made mention of the pandemic vaccination policy in the event 
of an influenza pandemic. As like many other countries, the 
Singaporean Ministry of Health recognised the manufacturing 
time required to produce and supply in quantities a pandemic 
vaccine: “…it is very likely that vaccines will only be available 
after 4-6 months. In the initial stages, these will be in short 
supply. However, vaccination is the key strategy in response 
to an influenza pandemic.” (Ministry of Health Singapore, 
2009: p.21). Like Sweden, Singapore highlighted the 
important role of vaccination during an influenza pandemic 
response, and explained the need for priority groups in the 
immunisation strategy, as also stated by Japan: “Initially, 
when vaccines are in short supply, vaccination will be provided 
to priority groups, such as those at higher risk of influenza-
related complications and essential services. As the vaccines 
become more readily available, vaccination will be expanded 
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to the rest of the population.” (Ministry of Health Singapore, 
2009: p.21). 
 
4.5.5 Canada 
The Public Health Agency of Canada published pandemic 
influenza plans online and produced a specific pandemic 
influenza vaccine document titled: ‘Preparing for the Pandemic 
Vaccine Response’ which was published in 2008, although 
Canadian planning predates this by nearly two decades. The 
pandemic vaccine aspect of the Canadian response to an 
event of an influenza pandemic has been held in high regard, 
for instance, the plan states that: “Immunization with a safe 
and effective pandemic vaccine has always been considered 
the cornerstone of the health response to pandemic influenza 
in Canada.” (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2008: p.3). 
The Canadian plan explains that the intention is for the 
Federal Government to obtain enough pandemic vaccines in 
order for all Canadian people to have the vaccine and to aid 
swift supply throughout the country: “The federal government 
has made a commitment to secure enough pandemic vaccine 
for every person in Canada in order to help prevent illness due 
to the pandemic virus. In addition, the federal government is 
committed to working with the provincial and territorial 
governments to ensure that the pandemic vaccine is made 
available to as many people as possible as quickly as 
possible.” (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2008: p.3). 
Although Canada is separated by distinct provinces and 
territories, the federal government would be involved with and 
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oversee a pandemic influenza response due to the disease 
spanning provinces and territories. 
Canada was many steps ahead of other countries in respect to 
pandemic vaccine guarantee contract. In 2001, Canada 
established a ‘pandemic readiness vaccine contract’ valid for 
10 years with a domestic manufacturer. Canada’s 
preparedness actions and statements emphasise the 
importance held for pandemic vaccines as reiterated here: 
“the need for a safe and effective pandemic vaccine as early 
as possible in the global outbreak has remained the ultimate 
means to achieve the goals of reducing morbidity, mortality 
and societal disruption due to an influenza pandemic.” (Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2008: p.4). 
Canada outlined their vaccination strategy, which was: “to 
provide a safe and effective vaccine for all Canadians as 
quickly as possible; to allocate, distribute and administer 
vaccine as efficiently as possible to the appropriate groups of 
people; to monitor the safety and effectiveness of 
immunization programs.” (Public Health Agency of Canada, 
2008: p.6). 
Canada, like so many other countries, produced a pandemic 
influenza plan based on a set of assumptions for the next 
pandemic influenza which directly affected vaccine planning. 
Canada expected the novel influenza to emerge outside of the 
country and arrive about three months’ after identification, 
although air travel could reduce this estimate. It was 
recognised that illness from pandemic influenza and deaths 
would occur and may have a first wave peak prior to obtaining 
the vaccine. The Pandemic Vaccine Working Group of PIC put 
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forward these (5 of the 8 mentioned here) vaccine specific 
assumptions:  
 “A pandemic vaccine will become available in time to 
have an effect on the impact of the pandemic in Canada. 
The extent of the effect will largely depend on the timing 
of vaccine availability in comparison to pandemic activity 
in Canada. 
 Two doses of vaccine will be needed in order to optimize 
protection (i.e. more protection will be provided by a 
second dose of pandemic vaccine). The two doses would 
be given approximately one month apart. 
 The new pandemic vaccine is not likely to be 100% 
effective, but even a vaccine with relatively low efficacy 
(e.g. 30%) will help curb the effect of the pandemic. 
 Concern regarding vaccine safety and reactogenicity will 
likely be inversely proportional to the severity of the 
pandemic in Canada. 
 Depending on the timing of the pandemic and 
availability of the pandemic vaccine, seasonal influenza 
immunization programs may not be initiated or 
completed, as the pandemic vaccine program is the 
priority.” (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2008: p.5). 
Interestingly, Canada identified population groups ahead of 
the emergence of a novel influenza that progressed into a 
pandemic influenza; however Canada would not list the order 
of priority groups because this would only be done once 
knowledge about the virus had been assessed. The sub-groups 
discussed were broadly categorised according to age and 
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profession details. Whilst not setting a priority list order, 
Canada also had no policy decision in place concerning where 
the first vaccine doses would be sent within Canada. They 
explained that a simple per capita approach could be applied 
in order to be most equitable, however, other factors may 
influence the decision at the time. For instance, it was 
explained that in reality, vaccine dose supplies may be 
considered more important in areas of Canada where the 
disease activity was accelerating in order to try to suppress 
the disease in these locations. But then, on the other hand, 
mass immunisation programmes in areas where the disease 
had subsided or disease activity was low may provide the 
preferable situation to deliver an immunisation programme 
because resources would not be allocated elsewhere. These 
decisions were planned to be made during the pandemic 
influenza event and through not formulating this aspect of the 
plan and setting a policy prior a pandemic influenza, it was 
explained that this built in an element of flexibility and the 
ability to respond to current information and knowledge and 
with technology of the time (Public Health Agency of Canada, 
2008). 
 
Table 9. Key vaccine specific content of pandemic 
influenza preparedness policies. 
Study 
countries 
Vaccine specific pandemic influenza preparedness 
policies 
Sweden In 2007, one guarantee agreement with vaccine 
manufacturer for pandemic vaccine agreed. “Mass 
vaccination is currently the only measure which could 
possibly stop a pandemic…” (P.39) Sweden did not stockpile 
pre-pandemic vaccines of H5N1 prior 2009 due to the 
uncertainty surrounding the next pandemic influenza virus. It 
was planned that the vaccine would be monovalent and 
would include adjuvants that most likely require two doses 
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for immunity. Overall ambition for everyone to be vaccinated. 
Vaccine would need to be prioritised due to limited initial 
supply. 
NZ Delay of vaccination for six months initially expected. Supply 
held of 400,000 doses of pre-pandemic vaccine (H5N1). 
Prioritised frontline health care workers and people identified 
as high risk of life threatening complications. Supply amount 
dependent on pandemic influenza virulence and disease 
activity in respect to the likely timing of the vaccine delivery. 
Expectation that two vaccinations spread three weeks apart 
would most likely be required. 
Japan Japan intended to produce and supply a domestic pandemic 
influenza vaccine for the Japanese population. Had an 
interest in pre-pandemic vaccines. Japan wished to vaccinate 
all of the Japanese population as soon as possible. Japan 
would identify health care workers and public service workers 
for vaccination prioritisation.  
Singapore Singapore would be without a vaccine at the start of a 
pandemic and the waiting time would take at least six 
months. The initial supply of vaccines will be limited and 
groups will be prioritised. Vaccination will extend to the entire 
population in time. 
Canada Developed vaccines will not be available during the first wave 
of disease activity but it is assumed to be available in enough 
time to have an overall impact on the pandemic influenza. 
Immunisation is the most effective strategy to prevent 
influenza infection and mortality. Vaccination all that wish to 
reach the vaccine. 
 
 Pandemic influenza vaccines ordered and deployed 4.6
in 2009-10 
All five of the study countries reportedly ordered and deployed 
pandemic influenza vaccines during the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic according to the published literature.  
Sweden and Canada reportedly received the pandemic 
influenza vaccines first, with the initial batches arriving in 
October 2009 in small quantities and then increasing to larger 
quantities over the coming months. This was followed by 
Singapore and Japan a few weeks later. New Zealand was the 
last to implement an immunisation campaign due to the 
southern hemisphere time of year and the availability of the 
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vaccine. New Zealand launched their immunisation campaign 
at the start of their autumn; February 2010, almost a year 
after the emergence of the novel (H1N1) virus.  
All countries used the monovalent pandemic influenza vaccine 
but to varying extents; the differences of vaccine use were 
multifactorial. The main differences were due to policy, 
disease activity, vaccine arrival timing, and knowledge during 
the course of the pandemic influenza. Table 10 shows the 
quantities of vaccines ordered and product type. 
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Table 10. Pandemic influenza vaccines purchased in 2009, population size and target immunisation 
coverage. 
Country Number of doses 
ordered (million) 
Vaccine product Population size 
in 2009 (million) 
Target 
population 
coverage 
provided 
Sweden (The Swedish Institute 
for Communicable Disease 
Control, 2011; Statistics Sweden, 
2010) 
18 Adjuvanted GlaxoSmithKline 
vaccine Pandemrix®  
9.3 Entire Swedish 
population 
New Zealand (Jennings, 2013) 0.3 Non-adjuvanted Celvapan® 4.4 Risk groups and 
front-line HCWs 
Japan (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2011; 
MHLW, 2010; Igari et al., 2010) 
9.9 (Novartis 2.5 & 
GSK 7.4) plus 
domestic products 
Various products: Imported 
included adjuvant & domestics 
were inactivated, unadjuvanted 
127 Entire Japanese 
population 
Singapore (HAS, 2014; Ministry 
of Health Singapore, 2009; 
Vaughan, 2009) 
1.3 (1 from CSL 
Limited, 0.3 from 
GSK) 
CSL Ltd Panvax® H1N1 / 
Panvax® H1N1 Junior - vaccine 
inactivated monovalent & GSK 
Pandemrix® 
4.8 Entire 
Singaporean 
population in plans 
Canada (Eggleton and Ogilvie, 
2011; Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2012) 
50.4 (dose order 
reduced when known 
that one dose was 
required) 
Adjuvanted GlaxoSmithKline 
vaccine Pandemrix® and small 
number of unadjuvanted vaccine 
for pregnant women 
34 Dose order was 
based on 75% 
uptake and the 
need for two 
doses per person 
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As shown in Table 10, Sweden ordered enough vaccines to 
provide each citizen with two doses of the vaccine. This was 
similar to the approach taken by the United Kingdom. Canada 
ordered enough vaccines for the majority of the population; 
when the dose quantity changed from two doses to one, 
Canada had enough for each citizen. Japan ordered a 
relatively small number of vaccines to provide coverage to 
almost all citizens but largely sourced the vaccines 
domestically. Singapore and New Zealand ordered fewer doses 
in relation to population coverage. However, New Zealand has 
an annual agreement for seasonal trivalent vaccines so in April 
2010 New Zealand received many more doses.  
Table 10 shows national population size and target vaccination 
coverage.  Sweden and Canada reported higher than average 
pandemic influenza vaccine uptake rates of 60% and 40% 
respectively. 
 
Table 11 includes the vaccination uptake rate and proportion 
of ordered vaccines utilised. Sweden and Canada reported 
higher than average pandemic influenza vaccine uptake rates 
of 60% and 40% respectively. 
 
Table 11: Vaccination uptake rate and proportion of 
utilised vaccines in study countries 
Country 
Vaccine uptake 
(of population) 
Number of vaccines used 
Sweden (The 
Swedish Institute 
for Communicable 
60%  
6,070,604 doses of Pandemrix® 
were administered. An estimated 
5,560,000 of the population 
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Disease Control, 
2011)  
received at least on dose 
New Zealand 
(Jennings, 2013; 
The ANZIC 
Influenza 
Investigators, 
2011) 
24%  
One-quarter of the population 
received monovalent and/or 
trivalent seasonal influenza 
vaccine 
Japan (Tomizuka 
and Matsuda, 
2010) 
17% 
 
22.8 million (Imported: 3,645 
doses were dispensed & 541 
received the vaccine) 
Singapore 
(Vaughan, 2009) 
Not found 
405,000 doses had reportedly 
been used by December 2009 
Canada (Eggleton 
and Ogilvie, 2011) 
>40%  Not found 
 
The immunisation schedules varied between the countries in 
terms of the timing and priority groups. All countries decided 
to prioritise the vaccine. Japan, Singapore and New Zealand 
focused on providing it first to healthcare workers whereas 
Sweden and Canada’s first priority group included children, 
pregnant women and persons with respiratory conditions 
severely compromised by influenza-like-illness. Japan’s 
subsequent priority groups were pregnant women and high-
risk persons, followed by pre-school aged children.  
Canada was one of the first countries in the world to receive 
the pandemic vaccine (Eggleton, 2010), and it was the first 
study country in this research project. However, the vaccines 
were not approved for use until 21st October 2009 (Canadian 
Pharmacists Journal (no author listed), 2009). In Sweden, the 
vaccines became available on 13th October 2009 for use 
(Venice II, 2011). Japan’s vaccination programme began on 
19th October 2009 with foreign produced vaccines, and later 
domestic vaccines became available (Yasuda and Suzuki, 
2009). Singapore was the last northern hemisphere study 
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country to commence vaccination on the 3rd November 2009: 
however it was the first South-East Asian country to provide 
the pandemic influenza vaccine (State of Health, 2012). New 
Zealand received a limited number of monovalent doses in 
February 2010 which were reserved for their first priority 
group of healthcare workers, after which New Zealand moved 
onto focusing on the seasonal trivalent influenza vaccine which 
included the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic virus 
component from April 2010 (Jennings, 2013). 
 
 Country overviews  4.7
This section provides a short summary of the key information 
concerning country specific details of pandemic timing, 
implemented response strategies and vaccination campaign 
details. The text boxes are provided for each study country 
and the information has been reproduced from earlier 
chapters.  
 
Table 12. Overview of key information for Sweden. 
Pandemic timing: first confirmed cases early May 2009; three cases by 
20th May 2009; first wave during the summer with a peak in 
epidemiological week 29; second wave peaked in epidemiological week 36: 
geographical spread of infection north to south of Sweden 
Actual response strategies: notifiable disease on 15th May 2009; 
surveillance; diagnostic services; health messages; two phases of strategy 
response (search and contain, mitigation) 
Vaccine deployment timing: October 2009 
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Vaccine prioritisation: children with chronic conditions aged between 6 
months and 3 years old, all children aged between 6 months and 3 years 
old; pregnant women; people with respiratory conditions severely 
compromised by ILI; critical infrastructure employees 
 
Table 13. Overview of key information for New Zealand. 
Pandemic timing: first confirmed case 25th April 2009; nine cases by 20th 
May 2009; cases mainly only reported in city areas by 22nd June 2009; 
first wave between April and December 2009 and peaked in June; second 
wave peaked in August 2010; 10 deaths during 2010 
Actual response strategies: pandemic plan activated; airport screening; 
notifiable and quarantinable disease on 30th April 2009; six phases of 
strategy response (containment and management); antivirals (treatment 
and prophylaxis); isolation; surveillance; diagnostic services; health 
messages; Flu Centres; a handful of school closures 
Vaccine deployment timing: February 2010 (monovalent doses for 
healthcare workers); seasonal trivalent influenza vaccine inclusive of H1N1 
component from April 2010 
Vaccine prioritisation: healthcare workers (monovalent vaccine); annual 
influenza risk groups including pregnant women (seasonal trivalent 
vaccine) 
 
Table 14. Overview of key information for Japan. 
Pandemic timing: first confirmed cases 9th May 2009; 401 cases in 16 of 
the 47 prefectures by 4th June 2009; 85 confirmed deaths by 1st 
December 2009 
Actual response strategies: airport screening; quarantine; thousands of 
school closures; surveillance; diagnostic services; health messages 
Vaccine deployment timing: November 2009 (October 2009 for imported 
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vaccine that was rarely used) 
Vaccine prioritisation: health care workers/medical staff; pregnant women; 
persons with chronic illnesses; children ≤5 years old; people aged ≥65 
years old; available to all. 
 
Table 15. Overview of key information for Singapore. 
Pandemic timing: first confirmed case 26th May 2009; first death 18th July 
2009 
Actual response strategies: notifiable disease on 27th April 2009; airport 
screening; isolation; contact tracing; antivirals; surveillance; diagnostic 
services; health messages; three phases of pandemic influenza 
management; flu centres;  
Vaccine deployment timing: November 2009 
 Vaccine prioritisation: healthcare workers 
 
Table 16. Overview of key information for Canada. 
Pandemic timing: first confirmed case 23rd April 2009; six cases by 28th 
April 2009; 496 cases (one death) by 20th May 2009; cases reported in all 
provinces and territories by 11th June 2009; first wave during the spring 
with a peak at the beginning of June 2009; second wave during autumn 
with a peak at the beginning of November 2009 
Actual response strategies: surveillance; diagnostic services; health 
messages; antivirals  
Vaccine deployment timing: October 2009 
Vaccine prioritisation: pregnant women; health care workers; persons 
based in remoted community locations; persons aged <65 years old with 
chronic conditions; children aged between 6 months and 5 years 
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 Development of the interview guide 4.8
The examination of the pandemic influenza preparedness 
policies was extremely helpful in the pursuit of formulating the 
interview questions ahead of organising the study country 
visits. It provided an understanding of how long countries had 
planned for a pandemic influenza event, the assumptions in 
preparation for a new pandemic (e.g. Avian influenza 
originating from Asia), and the anticipated response measures 
(e.g. entire population would be vaccinated; two doses 
required for immunity).  
The literature review, both of pandemic preparedness policies 
and the history of pandemic influenza in the twentieth century 
and past response measures, gave the researcher country 
specific insight into how the study countries have previously 
experienced pandemic influenza. This context was important 
ahead of embarking on country visits and upon reflection of 
the interview data. 
 
 Summary of pandemic influenza policies chapter 4.9
This pandemic influenza policies chapter has covered 
pandemic preparedness, study countries pandemic influenza 
plans, vaccine agreements prior to 2009 and the (H1N1) 
vaccines ordered and deployed during the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic. These four aspects of this chapter were an 
important foundation to build upon before interviews in the 
field were conducted. The following chapter is concerned with 
the pandemic vaccine use interview findings.   
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5 Study 2: Pandemic Influenza Vaccine 
Interview Findings 
 
This chapter examines the use of vaccines during the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in five study countries: Sweden, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Japan and Canada. The emergent 
themes from the interviews with key pandemic influenza 
personnel form the discussion. 
 
 Participants characteristics 5.1
The interviews were with key pandemic influenza response 
personnel such as public health officials, policy makers, 
clinicians, government officials, surveillance and agency staff, 
all of whom were working at the time of 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic in a national role and could comment on 
antivirals, vaccines, non-pharmaceutical measures and wider 
societal issues. Whether or not participants had worked across 
all elements of pandemic response or had a specific role, such 
as the national vaccination campaign, depended on the 
structure of services in countries. Typically participants could 
discuss the uses of antivirals and vaccines but fewer 
participants were knowledgeable of the non-pharmaceutical 
measures within their country. 
Participant job titles and organisations have not been included 
here in order to prevent the identification of individuals and 
breach confidentiality agreements made at time of interview. 
Some of the highly specialised senior participants held the 
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only position in their country e.g. Head of Pandemic Influenza 
within the organisation X in country Y.  
The interviewing process has resulted in 36 interviews with 39 
people in five study countries, as summarised in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Summary of number of participants and 
number of interviews 
 Participants Interviews 
Sweden 8 7 
New Zealand 10 9 
Japan 7 7 
Singapore 7 7 
Canada 7 6 
Total 39 36 
 
One unforeseen issue that arose was that a small number of 
participants would not be interviewed alone. In one instance 
the participants explained that they had equal roles and input 
and that this required them to be both present in an interview 
at the same time. The researcher was concerned about the 
effect of this dynamic on the interview process but found that 
these interviews were positive in that the participants seemed 
relaxed together, took a longer amount of time to explain 
points than average and the participants complemented the 
discussion by adding in extra detail and helped each other 
recall events. The researcher believed it was more important 
to secure interviews with the ideal participants rather than be 
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inflexible about the interview participation or force an 
interview set-up on reluctant solo participants.  
 
 Interview data  5.2
The data collection resulted in 42.5 hours of audio recordings 
and this equated to just over 300,000 spoken words (both 
interviewer and participants).  
 
Table 18: Interview data collection summary. 
 Audio recording time Transcript word count 
Sweden 7hr 25m 47,018 
New Zealand 12hr 25m 94,320 
Japan 8hr 48m 41,389 
Singapore 6hr 58m 60,910 
Canada 6hr 56m 60,953 
Total 42hr 32m 304,590 
 
The interview data collection summary table (Table 18) 
demonstrates that countries such as Sweden and Japan, which 
have a language other than English, took on average a longer 
time to conduct and produced fewer spoken words. 
Nevertheless, the quality of the data from these countries was 
no less than the other study countries.  
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 Pandemic vaccine use focus 5.3
When this research was designed, four core policy areas were 
proposed to be examined, one of which was the pandemic 
influenza vaccines. As stated earlier in the thesis, the 
pandemic influenza vaccine work package focus in this project 
was: 
“…[to] examine the use or non-use of monovalent pandemic 
influenza vaccines, including timing of deployment and type 
(inactivated, live, adjuvanted etc.), policy intention (pre-
pandemic) versus policy implementation (and reasons for any 
discordance).” 
In other words, the following research question simply covers 
the proposed above: How and when were the pandemic 
influenza vaccines used during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic? 
This chapter will refer to the narratives from participants 
regarding how the pandemic influenza vaccines were used in 
the reality of a pandemic influenza.   
 
 Interview themes 5.4
This section forms the central focus of this chapter because it 
presents the pandemic influenza vaccine findings from the 
interviews conducted with key response pandemic influenza 
personnel.  
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5.4.1 Distribution and Access 
 
5.4.1.1 Access 
All of the study countries had a pandemic vaccine 
procurement agreement in place prior to the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic onset. These vaccine agreements 
were organised before 2009 so that in the event of an 
influenza pandemic emerging, countries could have access to 
a developed pandemic influenza vaccine for their citizens. By 
formularising an influenza pandemic vaccine agreement, all 
study countries would have a vaccine to respond to an 
emerged pandemic influenza threat. The vaccine procurement 
agreements varied slightly between countries. Singapore and 
Japan had a multi supplier vaccine agreement, compared to 
the singular pharmaceutical company supplier route in 
Sweden, Canada and New Zealand. Both Canada and Japan 
had facilities within their nations to source a domestically 
developed vaccine.   
Japan had a vaccine agreement to source a vaccine from 
abroad as it was predicted that they would not be able to 
produce an adequate supply of domestic vaccine quickly 
enough during a pandemic influenza scenario. The cost of a 
dual supply route was significant and the costs were further 
impacted due to the low uptake rate of the imported vaccine: 
“…we cancelled the imported vaccination, but we still paid lots 
of money maybe, it’s quite big money, we can use such a big 
money for elderly care or for children but yes we have made a 
contract [….]. First we ordered 37 million doses from GSK and 
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212.5 million doses from Novartis, so that’s the total amount 
is equivalent to all the Japanese people to be vaccinated two. 
In Japan yeah we imported for 99 million persons, so we have 
120 million persons, we can produce vaccination for about 20 
million people by domestic companies. But for 99, 100 million 
people, we didn’t have the capacity of producing the 
vaccination.” (JA3)  
Whilst Japan had the facilities for domestic production of the 
vaccine in time, Singapore did not. Singapore, like Japan, 
decided to have a multi supplier for the pandemic vaccine in 
order to access the pandemic vaccine supply quickly for their 
population: “…my guess would be it’s to not put your eggs all 
in one basket because supply, demand and supply, which 
suppliers would be able to supply you in the first instance.  
Which supplier would be able to get the, what is that, the 
regulatory approval for use and things like that so with all 
these factors coming in I think that’s probably how it came 
about.” (SI2) Another participant commented on the vaccine 
multi supplier arrangement: “I think it was just a matter of, 
because before that, as part of the plan, we already have 
arrangement with Australian company for pandemic vaccine 
supply.  That’s, that was, that’s got that as part of our plan, 
our preparedness plan and though we maintain that so.  But 
at the same time, the people in charge of procurement were 
also asked us, is there any other supplier who can possibly 
give the vaccine earlier than the Australians.  And then so GSK 
offered some vaccine earlier.” (SI6)  
The multi supplier route in Singapore was due to the logistics 
of quickly gaining a supply of the pandemic vaccine for 
Singaporeans: “I think it was a matter of logistics of our, of 
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how much, how many doses can you give to me ASAP and it 
was X number of those were Australian and then I look at the 
other company and how many can you give me.  In the end 
it’s, so they were not pre-decided, it was better how much, 
how much doses, how many doses can you give to me.” (SI6) 
As noted above, the two study countries with multi suppliers 
(Japan and Singapore) were situated in Asia, which was the 
region where it was predicted that the next pandemic 
influenza may emerge from. During the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic, Canada required a small quantity of 
unadjuvanted vaccines and sourced these from an alternative 
supplier after discussions with their singular supplier, and thus 
through the course of the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic became a country with multi suppliers.  
Sweden and Canada accessed the monovalent pandemic 
influenza vaccine but due to the timing of the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic disease activity within the 
southern hemisphere and time required for the development 
of the pandemic influenza vaccine, New Zealand received a 
small quantity of monovalent pandemic influenza vaccines 
which was soon supplanted by the trivalent annual influenza 
vaccine containing components against A(H1N1). The 
monovalent pandemic influenza vaccine was rolled out in 
limited quantities to first priority groups in January 2010 and 
then in March the seasonal influenza vaccination programme 
commenced: “But the Ministry because there was limited trial 
information with this Baxter cell culture vaccine, as a whole 
virus vaccine, the Ministry wanted all the boxes ticked in 
terms of the relevant information and FDA eventually lead to 
FDA approval so all the boxes weren’t ticked until end of 
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January, 21st January or whatever of 2010 […].  And then in 
March we started the seasonal vaccination programme which 
included the new H1N1 pandemic component so that we then 
moved into the normal seasonal influenza vaccination cycle.” 
(NZ4)  
Some of the study countries discussed the adjuvant 
component of the pandemic influenza vaccine as this 
component would be new to be used (for some countries) 
during a future pandemic influenza. The adjuvant component 
would enable the rapid production of large quantities of 
pandemic influenza vaccines compared to past techniques. A 
small quantity of unadjuvanted vaccine would be accessed for 
particular population groups, such as pregnant women.  The 
Canadian pandemic vaccine agreement in place prior to the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic with GSK included the 
purchase of the adjuvanted monovalent pandemic vaccine in 
the event of a novel influenza. When describing the 
adjuvanted vaccine agreement CA2 participant said: “They 
had gone, as I say, to an adjuvanted vaccine, for very good 
reasons, in terms of production capacity and other, I think 
with H1N1 it wasn’t necessary that, the adjuvant wasn’t 
necessary in terms of immune response, but for others, with 
things like H5N1, which was the large concern before 2009, 
the adjuvanted vaccine really was something that was 
necessary from everything that I had seen.  So GSK did 
almost exclusively adjuvanted vaccine.  They did agree that 
they would produce a small quantity of unadjuvanted because 
there was concern at the time about pregnant women, and 
there just wasn’t enough evidence on the use of the adjuvant 
in pregnant women.  So we did arrange with the, with GSK to 
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supply some unadjuvanted vaccine, it was a question of the 
timing of that.  And there was concern that it would not be, 
the unadjuvanted would not be available in time.  So we were 
told that we needed to find an alternative source, and we 
ended up contracting for a small, I think 200,000 doses of 
unadjuvanted vaccine from CSL, and that was done, it was a 
contract with the company but CSL had to get permission from 
the Australian government, and there was some dialogue 
between the Canadian government and the Australian 
government to allow that to happen.  And then the 200,000 
doses were brought in and it was allocated across the country 
based on estimates of pregnant women across the country, 
and then it was maintained primarily for pregnant women.” 
(CA2)  
 
5.4.1.2 Distribution  
The need for gatekeepers, those forming part of the pandemic 
influenza response personnel, for the distribution of the 
pandemic influenza vaccines was discussed by participants 
from Canada, Japan and Singapore. It was explained that 
there was a requirement to have “…gatekeepers for how the 
vaccine was distributed…” (CA1), alongside a review of disease 
activity data for an appropriate response. One participant in 
Japan spoke of the vaccine distribution plan challenges and 
the numerous decisions required by response personnel at the 
time: “…during the course of vaccination in the Autumn, how 
to provide vaccine, what is the priority and how to secure the 
logistics, these are very difficult operation, these two are 
something that I remember well.” (JA7)  
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Sweden and Japan took the decision to provide enough 
pandemic influenza vaccines for the entire population, Canada 
and New Zealand purchased for the majority of their national 
populations (Canada subsequently had enough for the entire 
population after the one dose revisal), whereas Singapore, in 
contrast, purchased a limited portion of pandemic influenza 
vaccines. It was explained that in Singapore, influenza vaccine 
uptake rates had historically been low so would indicate that 
ordering vaccines for the entire population would be an 
inappropriate use of resources. 
Several participants from Sweden mentioned that the decision 
taken to purchase enough vaccine for the entire country 
population was mainly a political decision. Resource allocation 
for pandemic vaccines was made available to all: “It was I 
would say that decision was largely a political decision 
because from the National Board of Health we went to the 
government and said of course show the different options on 
how much to buy, what do you think is reasonable, or what 
kind of level would you like to go for, and they found it very 
difficult to, and we said we don’t really know what groups go 
for in this case if we want to give less than to the whole 
population because for vaccines we really show a chance to 
affect the disease activity, not only to protect people but also 
to actually, on the individual, but also to get an impact on 
disease activity, and we told them quite clearly that at this 
stage we don’t know if there’s going to be vulnerable groups 
we don’t know what they’re going to look like and how big 
part of the population that will be so I think, and this is maybe 
something you should also ask <****> but, what, how the 
discussion went with the government, but I think they went 
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for the National Board of Health’s sort of thinking that is very 
difficult to do anything else than to go for a whole population 
because how we sort of communicate who’s going to get it 
and who’s not going to get it, if there is not enough for 
everybody I think those it comes down to equitable……so that 
part is very very strong in Swedish healthcare there should 
always be equitable access to healthcare and that’s very 
strong in the law surrounding our healthcare and so on and I 
think from that sort of, in that kind of culture it was very 
difficult to say anything else even if, of course technically you 
could go out and say sure we’re never going to reach a level 
of coverage below or above 70 80% or something that, but 
that, it’s also very difficult to communicate because we know 
that we have a coverage in childhood diseases of 98%.” 
(SW5) This equitable access to the vaccine by the entire 
Swedish population was also discussed by participant SW7: 
Interviewer: Do you know they went with the whole 
population instead of just… 
SW7: “Just to avoid the discussions I think. And we had the 
vaccine for the whole population.” 
Interviewer: In the agreement? Did you have that in the plan? 
SW7: “Yeah. And they were able to distribute it too, at that 
time, so I think to make it more fair, Sweden is a fair country 
isn’t it?” 
Interviewer: Yeah. So for equality and access? 
SW7: “Yeah, for everybody. Why should special groups have 
it, and so on. I think this part of you know, I think that people 
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in Sweden the public think that the government is supposed to 
take care of them and that the government is supposed to be 
fair, and I think that’s part of it.” 
The vaccination campaign formed the backbone of Sweden’s 
pandemic influenza response in 2009: “The biggest event was 
the vaccination campaign, because we took the decision that 
we should offer everyone in the country the vaccination, that 
was the biggest issue and when we started the campaign it 
was all over the papers and then in some cities people were 
queuing up and I think Sweden in the end, we had the highest 
coverage of people being vaccinated. We had the highest. So, 
and that was of course, after the pandemic it has been 
thorough decision in media and amongst people, ‘was it 
necessary to vaccinate the whole country’ and things like that 
so it has been many decisions about this, many articles in the 
papers.” (SW6) 
Interviewer: Do you know why Sweden chose to get enough 
for the entire population? 
“Well, as you will never know the severity of a new virus, this 
you have to, you have to prepare yourself for the worst case 
so that’s why. It was a preparation, it is a preparedness 
preparation for the worst case, so, but on that issue, I’m not 
sure whether there were more countries with the planning to 
vaccinate the whole population, there was certainly more 
countries but they didn’t achieve. And it’s also of course a 
political issue because if this was to be a very very severe 
pandemic, how do you choose between people.” (SW6)  
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Once the vaccine began arriving into Japan, it arrived in 
batches and this supply required priority groups to be 
arranged: “I do not remember quite well but I presume Japan, 
as a government, intended to provide the vaccination for all 
the population but we couldn’t do it all at once as the 
productions are coming step by step so we ultimately wanted 
to vaccinate everybody but we certainly had to set a priority 
who should be vaccinated first and then second and third and 
fourth and going down.” (JA7) 
The discussions on the distribution of the pandemic influenza 
vaccines referred to the subject of the equitable allocation of 
vaccines. Key pandemic influenza response personnel 
presented the need to provide equitable access and distribute 
the vaccines fairly but the pressures of 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic demanded that vaccines would not initially 
be available to the entire country population. Therefore, the 
intentions of the plans were to provide equitable access and 
distribution of pandemic influenza vaccines but the reality of 
pandemic influenza response threatened the desired equitable 
allocation. Participants discussed this challenging area of the 
pandemic influenza response, such as when the vaccines 
become available it was necessary “…to agree on an equitable 
allocation of the vaccine.” (CA2). However, even though a 
distribution plan was agreed, in reality the pandemic influenza 
disease activity required changes to be made to the vaccine 
distribution plans: “And in theory what we were going to do 
and then in practice was a little bit different, but, because the 
vaccine was not really coming out in the same, at the same 
rate or as much, as quickly as we’d hoped it was going to be.  
So it was a question of organising an appropriate allocation on 
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a weekly basis, is what it came down to.  And then later we 
ended up having to, or the decision was taken to access a 
small quantity of an alternative vaccine.” (CA2)  
Frequently the pandemic influenza vaccine supply arrived later 
than anticipated which interrupted the planned vaccination 
campaigns within the study countries. The changing supply 
timeframe and vaccine quotas caused uncertainty and 
required pandemic influenza response personnel to make 
amendments to intended vaccination programmes. The supply 
of the pandemic influenza vaccine in Canada arrived slightly 
later than anticipated: “…I know that the dates kept getting 
moved up, we thought it was going to be a certain time and 
then there were some issues with the distributors and I think 
that was globally, and there was some messaging around 
then…” (CA1).  
Sweden had secured a pandemic vaccine supply before the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic emerged. Participants 
discussed the challenge of waiting for the supply to arrive and 
dealing with the fluctuating doses reportedly arriving in to 
Sweden: “…it was very frustrating with the lack of vaccine, 
and it was so changing all the time. The deliveries, the 
information would change several times a week, we had one 
week were it could be changed seven times, in a few days, 
and we had to recalculate all the time, and inform all these 
700 places that you won’t get what you were expecting, so 
you had to tell people to wait, and I think that was the hardest 
thing, to communicate how much vaccine they would have 
and how many people they could vaccinate, and then they 
were in turn, discussing with all the patients who were waiting 
for the vaccination, so that was frustrating.” (SW2)  
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Sweden’s pandemic influenza vaccine supply, Pandemrix®, 
was sourced from GSK. Sweden’s pandemic influenza 
distribution plan was in place before the vaccine batches 
began arriving: “…..we were prepared to start several weeks 
earlier, and we were waiting but in the end there was 
problems and we were promised delivery at least a couple of 
two three weeks earlier, everybody stood ready to start 
vaccinating but they had some technical problems with the 
vaccines and they had a delay in the delivery of them.” (SW5) 
“The main problem with the vaccine was lack of access for a 
long time, and that the deliveries were so uncertain we never 
really knew how much, how much vaccines we would get until 
it actually arrived, apparently the production process in the 
beginning was not very easy to [MUFFLED] so the amount, 
and that caused quite a lot of irritation because it was very 
difficult to plan how much vaccines to offer when we never 
really knew how much vaccines there was going to be 
available.” (SW5) “Well we hadn’t really prepared for, and I 
don’t know if the companies had before, but they had never 
told us about it, was the irregular distribution, we had, we 
knew that we were going to get vaccines during a number of 
weeks, weekly deliveries and somehow we had assumed of 
course we were going to get equal amounts each week but 
that was not true at all, in the first weeks we got 
comparatively little and then it became more and more and 
that was something we missed, or miscalculated, I don’t know 
who really is to blame about that, but that’s something we 
didn’t understand.” (SW5) Even with a vaccine arrangement in 
place, there was concern about when the first batch would 
arrive: “Yeah I think there was a lot of fear whether they can 
deliver it, whether they can honour the contract and were 
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indeed able to deliver the vaccine and then the problems in 
actual fact the take up rate was low for everyone.” (SI3) 
The participants discussed the quantity of vaccines and cost 
when making supply decisions. Initially many countries 
factored in the need for two doses per person into the quantity 
and cost calculations, which subsequently was altered to one 
dose per person after further knowledge was gained during 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. 
Singapore ordered approximately 1 million doses of pandemic 
influenza vaccine (700,000 from the Australian manufacturer 
and 300,000 from GSK) and this supply covered 
approximately one quarter of Singapore’s population. Other 
countries, such as Sweden, ordered enough vaccines to cover 
their national population, however Singapore ordered less 
based on the reasoning: “My understanding, which could be 
wrong, but my understanding is that the vaccines were 
expensive, I mean there is a certain cost and there’s also a 
concern not to waste things, but we also weren’t sure that 
people would actually take the vaccine. If you remember, I 
mean there are issues with adjuvant, there was a small 
adjuvanted vaccines, and adjuvanted vaccines have not been 
used in the United States because of concerns about the 
adjuvant and effects from it. So I think in the beginning when 
we were looking at it, we were looking at whether even if we 
bought vaccine for every man, women and child in Singapore, 
whether it would actually get deployed, because you know you 
only have a certain amount of period of time to give the 
vaccine, if you really want to make a dent on what’s 
happening, it doesn’t make sense to give vaccine to people 
who have already got the disease, kind of like shutting the 
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barn door after the horse is out. So in a sense you are in a 
race between the actual disease and preventing the disease 
with vaccine. So we know the way flu works is that, the attack 
rate for flu can be 20 to 30% in your conventional flu, okay, 
and it’s kind of like putting a drop of ink in water and you 
watch it diffuse, right. So you know in the first season it’s 
going to get X number of people in the transmission, whether 
it’s 20% or 30%, in the second season it will spread a little 
further but the people who got it in the first season are less 
likely to get it in the second season right, but your job is that, 
you don’t necessarily know who’s had it because you are not 
testing everybody because it’s too expensive and it’s just not 
feasible to test everybody, especially when the testing is so 
poor, that we talked about. So now you’ve got to give the 
vaccine to all these people that haven’t had it, but you don’t 
necessarily know who had it and who didn’t have it, and you 
have to do it ahead of them catching the disease for it to 
make any difference at all. So but in terms of looking at all 
that stuff, you know we basically decided it probably makes 
most sense to do it for the most vulnerable people, the people 
who are in the essential services people, people in the front 
line, so healthcare workers etc and people who are willing to 
take it because in the end we bought it and people didn’t want 
it. And then that was also tied to some funding issues, we had 
to price it so that it wasn’t just free but it wasn’t hideously 
expensive either.” (SI4) Ultimately, securing a supply of 
pandemic vaccine was more important than the 
live/inactive/adjuvant type vaccine components: “Yeah we 
were comfortable whether it was, whether it contained 
adjuvant, did not contain adjuvant, it didn’t matter as long as 
it was a vaccine against H1N1 yeah.” (SI6) 
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Interviewer: Do you know where that number’s from?  
Because I heard, you know the pandemic vaccine, it was 
about 25% coverage, is that based on expected uptake? 
SI5: “No, pandemic, a vaccine, you’re looking at, pandemic 
vaccine, you’re looking at whole population.” 
Interviewer: But in H1N1 you didn’t order enough for the 
whole population. 
SI5: “Again we can order more.  Again, when the vaccine was 
available, people also know the H1N1 is not that serious.  In 
my opinion, you know?” 
The experience of the initial cases in Singapore aided decision 
makers to decide how many doses of the pandemic influenza 
vaccine would be ordered: “So we accepted that first wave is 
mild but we were not sure that a second wave would be 
equally mild, it may be more severe and we were therefore 
that factored into our decision to get quantity of pandemic 
vaccine.  So we decided, OK let’s get quantity of pandemic 
vaccine and try to get people vaccinated before the second 
wave.  Because if we had not, if we were not worried about 
that second wave and we were, we were very sure that the 
second wave would be equally mild, I think we would not have 
got the pandemic vaccine. But there was no way you could 
know. There was no way you could predict that and nobody 
would dare to predict that, so that’s why we did get the 
pandemic vaccine and we push it out to the public.  So that 
was the, so the next thing we were worried about, but after 
that when the second wave came and it was equally mild, but 
it was OK.  We had no further worries after that.” (SI6) The 
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pandemic vaccine was free to the targeted population group of 
healthcare workers in Singapore: “I don’t think it was entirely 
free in Singapore.  It was provided free to the healthcare 
workers via the institutions, for example, Tan Tock Seng will 
pay for me for free but I don’t think it was for free for the 
public.  But it was for free for some of the institutions like 
some of the long term care facilities, nursing home and 
community home.” (SI3) The other study countries included 
free healthcare worker vaccination or at a very low cost. 
Singapore reportedly ordered one million monovalent vaccines 
against A(H1N1) (700,000 from and Australian supplier and 
300,000 from GSK) for a population of about 4 million at the 
time. The reason for this quantity and the use of the dual 
supplier was explained as: “I think we are just buying 
insurance for Singapore.  So first of all we don’t have vaccine 
manufacturing capacity in Singapore and with a population of 
5,000,000 it doesn’t sound practical for us to have … of the 
vaccine producing capability.  So then we can only rely on our 
friendly neighbour to extend assistance.  So we have existing 
contracts with Australia, CSL, in producing vaccine for us and 
that happened, they did supply the vaccine to Singapore … 
25%, a quarter, of the population how do we come to the 
calculations.  I think this is nothing atypical because if you 
look at the outbreak preparedness in fact you have to depend 
on the national strategy who are the individuals you would like 
to protect, right?  So it would be the key service delivery 
persons so that your country can continue to run and function.  
By looking at this kind of distributions and using this kind of 
strategy we then decided perhaps we need to cover at least a 
quarter of the population.” (SI3) 
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“Yeah although we were lucky we didn’t order for the whole 
population.  So our population is five million and we took the 
provision that each person needs two doses and so potentially 
we should have over ten million doses but at the end we only 
ordered one million doses.  But then there was only enough 
for 500,000 people or 10% of the population and, but that 
decision was influenced by the mild nature of the pandemic, 
OK soon there was a … prediction that because of the mild 
nature and people’s perceptions, the vaccine that you buy and 
you offer will not be, people will not be scrambling for it.” 
(SI6) 
It was further explained that following the pandemic influenza 
announcement, there was a need in Canada to order the 
adjuvanted version of the vaccine because there had been 
developments in the field of influenza vaccination since the 
agreement had been set up: “So in the pandemic 2009 we had 
to, although we had a contract that had an option to allow us 
to purchase pandemic vaccine, we had to actually negotiate 
the terms of the amendment to actually exercise the option.  
So we had to negotiate with our supplier the quantity of 
vaccine that we were going to get, even the price, because the 
technology that we were getting, we were getting an 
adjuvanted vaccine, whereas at the time the contract was put 
in place in 2000 that wasn’t a possibility, we were planning to 
get an adjuvanted vaccine in 2000 so we had a price structure 
in the contract but that didn’t apply to an adjuvant, so we had 
to negotiate the contract amendment.” (CA2) And even 
though the agreement was explained well, there was still 
some doubt in the past about the necessity of the pandemic 
vaccine contract for a future pandemic influenza event: “…I 
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think our, we, in terms of the vaccine supply itself we had, 
there were early issues that were really kind of growing pains, 
putting into place a contract that no one really anticipated we 
would ever use, to be honest, but I think the pandemic 
vaccine response went, overall was, to me it was a highlight.”  
(CA2) 
The vaccine supply order covered enough for two doses for 
75% of the Canadian population. However, this generated 
discussion on what the appropriate order should be and 
required estimating a reasonable expectation of immunisation 
and ordering beyond this number in order for supply to exceed 
demand. Once the order was placed, information about the 
disease activity and further knowledge is continuously gained, 
for instance: “…so the order was in, and then you’re right, it 
was based on two doses for 75% of the population.  And we 
did have some leeway after placing the order in order to 
adjust it downwards, and we were really waiting as long as we 
could for additional data from the clinical trials that the 
company was doing in terms of whether or not there was 
reasonable expectation that one dose would be sufficient, and 
there was, that comfort level did arrive.  It wasn’t completely 
verified but it was a high enough comfort level to suggest that 
we would only need to worry about one dose.” (CA2) After 
receiving news that one dose would suffice, vaccination plans 
were amended with this knowledge.  
A cost sharing arrangement was put in place in Canada to 
enable the cost of the pandemic vaccine supplies to be shared 
between the federal government and provincial government 
with a 60/40 split, with the provinces providing decisions on 
the number of doses required in their localities. In addition, 
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the federal government purchased a second supply that was 
held as reserve stock “…and it was there if was needed, and it 
turned out it wasn’t need, but it was, the feeling was that we 
were, again, better to overact rather than under respond, 
so…” (CA2) 
Canadian provinces and territories are part of a voluntary 
collective vaccine procurement agreement whereby the cost of 
vaccines is shared. This is not compulsory due to the Canadian 
federation structure maintaining provinces and territories in 
charge of healthcare in their localities. This agreement was 
applied to the A(H1N1) pandemic vaccine “there was an 
agreement negotiated between the federal government and 
the provinces that there would be cost sharing for the vaccine” 
(CA2) and now the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network has 
been formed to span across Canada and circumvent the 
federal, provincial and territorial committee division.  
As explained by participant NZ4, New Zealand purchased 
some monovalent pandemic vaccine but soon used seasonal 
trivalent influenza vaccine: “…we purchased some but actually 
we only had it for a very short amount of time before the 
trivalent seasonal one became available and that gave 
protection against a wider range of viruses that were 
circulating in the world and that we assumed would be here. 
So actually it was available and it was used, but it was 
supplanted really by something that was more useful.” (NZ4) 
During both the seasonal influenza vaccine campaign and the 
pandemic influenza campaign, the vaccine was offered free of 
charge to risk groups: “…..that’s the same with our seasonal 
influenza, so that now, seasonal influenza, again this is all on 
the website, if you are immuno-compromised, if you are over 
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65, if you have other conditions that make you a higher risk 
so asthma, respiratory, then you can get it free of charge, and 
that’s the same for seasonal influenza, you know, that’s our 
normal policy and there are obviously a number of workplaces 
that subsidise it as well and it’s quite broadly pushed 
nationally…” (NZ6). 
In Japan, the pandemic influenza vaccine supply was mostly 
from a domestic manufacturer as explained: “…that’s what we 
are going to ask in the new research. Do Japanese people 
really do not have the vaccination made by foreign 
companies? But media, mass media, criticised the vaccination, 
imported from other countries, some media said that, that 
influenza vaccination, imported vaccination, has adjuvant, do 
you know adjuvant? Adjuvant is a component of vaccination 
which simulates immunity, yeah and that makes a strong 
immunity reaction for us and it’s already contained in like 
Human Papilloma Virus vaccination, something like that. We 
have already had a vaccination containing adjuvant but some 
media said imported vaccination has adjuvant, we don’t know 
what’s happening if we have adjuvant vaccination something 
like that, and it’s not really evidence based. But some people, 
I think it’s quite political things, some people didn’t want to, 
some people really disagree with importing vaccination form 
other countries.” (JA3) For other vaccines, Japan typically 
produces them within their country so the population is used 
to and trusts a Japanese product.  
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5.4.1.3 Delivery 
All the study countries provided the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic vaccination programme through both 
primary care and/or hospital healthcare facilities, with some 
country’s placing on specialist venues to provide mass 
immunisation.  
Sweden, Canada and New Zealand provided the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic vaccination programme through 
both primary care facilities and placed on specialist venues to 
varying degrees, with delivery differing by regional 
approaches. Sweden provided the pandemic vaccine in typical 
venues such as primary health care as well as putting on 
specialised organised venues for this event such as schools. As 
explained, the pandemic vaccine was provided in: “…they were 
both in the primary health care centre, the maternity centres I 
think they vaccinated the pregnant women, the centres for 
infants at school, so various places…” (SW2) And: “…as a 
principle the counties did set up their own ways of distributing 
to their citizens. Some counties used the existing system, 
some set up specific vaccination centres in schools or things 
like that, it differed, but that is an issue that National Board of 
Health and Welfare are more familiar with it but not practice.” 
(SW6)  
In Canada, there were differences in approaches in the 
method of how the pandemic influenza vaccine was delivered. 
In some instances, an individual’s usual physician would 
provide the immunisation, in other areas specific clinics were 
provided. The open clinics were considered accessible for all 
the family / small community to attend at the same time. This 
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is exemplified in the following interviewee accounts: “You 
could, and you could go to your physicians, your primary care 
practitioners, but they did run these big open clinics run by 
Ottawa Public Health.  Now they always do vaccination 
campaigns to make it accessible, because not everybody has a 
family doctor in Ontario and, so you had a choice, but it was 
just as easy to take your whole family and go to the school 
gym, it was, it was to make it accessible.” (CA1) 
“…some jurisdictions used their normal routes, right?  So the 
public health offices, family physician offices, so forth.  Other 
jurisdictions went with mass immunisation clinics or 
pharmacists taking on, we have, excuse me, pharmacists 
taking on more and more of the role now with influenza 
vaccine which is a really positive thing in terms of 
preparedness, right?  Getting the population to accept vaccine 
from, yeah.  So we had some challenges around that because 
we were asking people not only to get vaccinated and get 
vaccinated within a very short time frame we were asking 
them to go about it differently, right?  Whereas most 
Canadians are sure that they’re, their family doctor’s office or 
some clinic to get their vaccine in a fairly laissez faire way in 
the fall, now we were asking them to do this quickly and you 
weren’t going to go to your family doctor’s office, you were 
going to go and line up at the community centre for three 
hours, right?  Or some, you’re going to make an appointment.  
Some had some really interesting models of delivery 
particularly in Ontario around scheduling appointments and 
things like that.  There was also the challenges, the 
technological challenges, right, of just recording and 
monitoring all of these, tracking all of those vaccines.  So 
 206 
 
everybody filling out forms, and then how we keep track of all 
these forms and then who’s going to, sure you’re doing it on 
paper then who’s going to enter all this paper and so some 
were working from electronic, they were trying to do this in an 
electronic fashion.  So there were some really important and 
interesting lessons learned and I think some real process 
improvements, yeah, that will come out of it.” (CA5) 
In the remote northern communities of Canada, it was not 
possible for the local populations to visit their physicians for 
the vaccination, so a mass vaccination approach was taken 
instead: “No, we can’t in our, in our northern communities, it 
just doesn’t work that way.  Yeah, you really have to do a 
targeted, and, yeah.” (CA3a / CA3b) 
“Yeah, yeah, and that’s what, the same story was found in 
Nunavut, so we provided Nunavut with draft model of 
conducting, for conducting a protocol for mass vaccinations, 
and they used that.  And their uptake again I think it was in 
the 90%s.  Yeah, so, and then I heard another, at one of our 
meetings that we had after, the, the special populations 
meetings group that we had, we heard from them that 
targeted programmes that were targeting street people or, or 
whatever, were really, really high uptake there.  And then I 
think at a, at a meeting I was at in Europe last spring they 
were saying the same thing, the same was found, the targeted 
programmes seemed to be what really works best.” (CA3a / 
CA3b) The challenge was to rapidly vaccinate an entire 
community by the resource of nursing station staff within just 
a few days, and then fly the nurses/nurse practitioners onto 
another remote community to repeat the process: “That’s 
right, yeah, so we were targeting to do entire communities 
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within three days.  So we’d get up, ship a bunch of nurses up, 
get everybody in the community, of a community of like 500 
people, within 3 days we would have them working like 7.00 
am to 11.00 pm at night.” (CA3a / CA3b) 
The way the immunisation programme was delivered in 
Canada was down to the population, demographics and 
geography: “It’s just population, the demographics.” (CA5)  
When the public received the vaccine, it was free: “It was, 
yes, yeah, it was free to the entire population.” (CA1) 
Japan and Singapore provided A(H1N1) vaccination 
programmes through existing healthcare service of primary 
care and/or hospital facilities. In Singapore the hospital 
healthcare facilities provided the vaccination clinic, which 
included a specific fever tent where by patients with fevers 
attended. “Well in the hospital, in the healthcare facilities, it’s 
all provided from the Ministry of Health to the healthcare 
facilities.  So we did not set up a specific vaccination clinic for 
people to queue up, no.” (SI3) Japan provided the pandemic 
influenza vaccination within the existing healthcare service: 
“We designated a special place within the existing health care 
facilities, so it’s not gymnasium turned into a makeshift 
hospital, it’s not that hassle, but we set up in existing health 
authorities as vaccination centres.” (JA7) 
 
5.4.2 Uptake Rates and Demand 
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5.4.2.1 Appraisal of uptake rates 
Canada, Sweden and New Zealand spoke positively of their 
pandemic influenza vaccination uptake rates. There was the 
estimation that Canada achieved uptake rates in the highest 
band worldwide: “…I think our uptake was pretty high, 
probably amongst the highest in the world.  In terms of 
getting a vaccine for the population we were probably 
amongst the highest as well.” (CA2) Sweden reported a 
national uptake of 60% of pandemic vaccines by December 
2009. It was expected that Sweden would have a high uptake 
of the pandemic vaccine: “…we believed we were going to 
arrive somewhere there, maybe even more because we do 
have a high uptake of vaccines normally so there is a big 
tradition of high uptake of vaccines and then of course we got 
a bit worried when we got reports from many other countries 
where the uptake was very very low, but, so I don’t think, if 
you asked people beforehand I think many of them would 
have said sure, no 60 70 80% is not impossible.” (SW5) Some 
of the New Zealand participants struggled to clearly remember 
the vaccination against A(H1N1) campaign due to the 
incorporation of A(H1N1) into the seasonal vaccination 
programme. However, in New Zealand it has been noted that 
uptake rates for the influenza vaccine have increased each 
year since 2009:  
NZ9: “So it was in the seasonal vaccine, sorry our seasonal 
vaccine starts sometime in March, seasonal vaccine delivery 
and runs through to the end of July most years, and I’m pretty 
sure it was in the seasonal, well I’m definite it was in the 
seasonal vaccine for 2010. I know we got some of the 
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monovalent supply, but I honestly can’t remember who got 
it.”  
Interviewer: I read that it was healthcare workers, I think. 
NZ9: “I think it was probably even a subset of healthcare 
workers, and I can’t honestly remember if I had it or not. I get 
a seasonal flu every year anyway, I don’t think I got the 
pandemic strain, I don’t think I regarded myself as high risk 
because, there was the kind of high risk and then there was 
the essential work force, possibly I fitted into that latter 
category, but honestly I can’t remember whether I had it or 
not. If I had we would have delivered it here, we have a bunch 
of nurses who run the vaccine programmes for us.” 
Interviewer: So would it have fallen into the yearly vaccine 
programme? 
NZ9: “Yeah, it was a major promotion point for the 2010 
seasonal influenza vaccine which included the pandemic strain 
and we knew by then from the serosurvey, I think, 30 odd 
percent of people had already had antigens to A(H1N1), I 
can’t remember the percentages but there was a study 
published and so we realised that it was going to be a major 
component of the seasonal influenza given that it was still 
circulating broadly in the northern hemisphere, if we were 
going to get a reintroduction we would still have about two 
thirds of the population susceptible so we knew that it would 
be a predominant part of our seasonal patent and we 
promoted it on that basis.” 
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Interviewer: I read that about one million people had the 
vaccine, was this about what was expected in terms of the 
seasonal numbers? 
NZ9: “Yeah so we’d struggled to make a million, so New 
Zealand’s got a population of just over four million and it did 
have then, I can’t remember when we passed that milestone 
but it wasn’t long ago, and we had progressively kind of I 
guess with free seasonal flu vaccine for at risk groups was 
introduced in 1997 we kind of got 3 or 400,000 people and 
then it’s been slowly going up. And we would have expected 
probably about 800,000 in 2009 or 2010, and we got a big 
jump, not all, a lot of those people paid for it, it’s not a million 
people eligible on the basis of age or risk. But as I say, it’s 
gone up every year and it was a good number above a million 
for the year that’s just finished in terms of the seasonal 
campaign.” 
The uptake of the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
vaccine was reported as about one million people receiving the 
vaccine in New Zealand. When asked about the expected 
uptake one participant said: “Well we probably would have 
thought more people would have been interested in it but we’d 
have a period of flat where the vaccine uptake had plateaued 
and that was something that was unique to most countries, 
same in Australia, we’d got to the point where we couldn’t 
really improve the uptake nationally. Some countries post 
SARS, Korea for example sort of had big, as part of the SARS 
strategy the following year, so they could separate out SARS 
from influenza cases, sort of had massive substantial uptake, 
increases. Whereas we didn’t in New Zealand, didn’t manage 
that and really it’s only over the last year that there have 
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been substantial increases and got sort of pre-empted the H7 
outbreak so just a level of awareness that things have moved 
on, but no I would have liked to have seen far more after the 
pandemic.” (NZ4) 
Uptake rates of the pandemic influenza vaccine were 
discussed in terms of suboptimal uptake rates in Canada, 
Japan and Singapore. The reasoning given for lower than 
anticipated uptake rates included mild pandemic influenza 
event which reduced the request for vaccination and vaccine 
safety. Lower than anticipated uptake rates left study 
countries open to broader criticism over wasted public health 
resources.  
Overall, the lower than anticipated uptakes rates in Canada (in 
comparison to the volume of doses ordered during the 
pandemic influenza) has become seen as an over-reaction to 
an event that turned out to be less than originally thought. 
One participant explained how the volume of doses ordered 
made sense at a government level and working in a position 
specialising in pandemic influenza, however the general public 
opinion, which they could empathise with was focused on the 
waste of resources, doubt in those responsible for events and 
since 2009, seasonal influenza vaccinations rates have fallen 
below expectation levels: “…the general public, my, and I 
don’t base this on anything but just conversations you have at 
cocktail parties and so on, is people think that it was so 
overblown that we wasted mass amounts of, of resources for a 
non event, and so on and so forth.  And I think, seeing what a 
nosedive our already poor flu vaccine uptake rates, they, they 
took a further nosedive in the years after H1N1.  And it’s just 
this past season where we’re having more severe illness and, 
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and that sort of thing again, that people are, are starting to 
come around a bit.  But we saw a big hit like that in credibility 
from the general population.” (CA3a/CA3b) Also: “I think for 
sure, like in 10/11, 11/12, that people were pandemic'd out.  
It was kind of like OK, stop talking about it, because then 
after, like we spent the entire 2009 dealing with it, and the 
entire 2010 dealing with lessons learned.” (CA3a/CA3b) 
Japan reported an uptake of the pandemic vaccine of about 
20% in the population. The foreign produced vaccine was 
barely used in comparison to the amount purchased and the 
amount of domestic vaccine utilised: “22.8 million domestic 
doses were injected into Japanese persons, so we have 120 
million people so only 20 percent or something. But of course 
it depends on the age, maybe older people tend to have more 
vaccination, maybe 40, 50 percent. We imported lots of 
vaccination from GSK or Novartis but we only used 1,350 
doses from GlaxoSmithKline vaccination so maybe 0.1%.” 
(JA3) 
Interviewer: Right, not very many? 
JA3: “We didn’t use. Yeah because many people did not want 
to have vaccination made by other companies other foreign 
companies.”  
Interviewer: Oh really? 
JA3: “Yeah and for Novartis vaccination we just used 2,285 
doses so we totally ignored the imported vaccination because 
we have already had enough vaccination and many people 
didn’t want to be vaccine because there are so many who 
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have already infected H1N1 when we had the vaccination in 
December, or in January. “  
Japan’s population received more than 20 million doses of the 
pandemic influenza vaccine: “More than 20 million, I can’t 
remember the exact number, maybe more than 20 million 
people. […] Oh we expected more people, we provided for all 
population.” (JA6)  
When asked about the possible reason for the difference 
between the uptake of about 20% of the population compared 
to the provision for the whole Japanese population: “I don’t 
know why, maybe mass media’s announcement maybe it was 
effective, but it’s quite interesting that Japan is said that our 
vaccination strategy was very delayed compared with other 
countries. […] because we had, I mean for example number of 
vaccinations were very limited in Japan, I mean measles or 
polio these kind of vaccines, maybe in your country for 
example Hib what else chicken pox, [mumps, not as a public 
service…] …because a very long time ago, twenty years ago 
we had very severe cases of health damage after vaccination 
and they sued our government and they won, so we lost many 
cases in court and then we changed the law and we reduced 
some kind of vaccines as a public service and since then we 
had a very dark image against vaccination, so even if new 
vaccine was developed and other countries introduced it as a 
public services, in Japan it’s impossible, so what we call a 
vaccination gap occurred. Anyway so totally seven 
vaccinations, other countries have already introduced several 
new vaccines, but in Japan we didn’t. But very luckily after 
this pandemic happened, at that time many Japanese people 
noticed that there is a vaccination gap and our vaccination 
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policy is very delayed compared with other advanced countries 
so now we have a movement, tried to increase the kind of 
vaccination. […] the kinds of vaccination and just a half year 
ago we succeeded in changing the immunisation law and we 
succeeded in the increase in three vaccinations. So HPV 
vaccine and the Hib and [nemonitis] and now we are trying to 
increase another four vaccinations.” (JA6) 
 
Table 19. Example of triangulation of data in regards to 
vaccine uptake rates. 
Key interview 
themes 
Epidemiological data Pandemic preparedness 
plans 
Vaccine uptake 
rates: 
 Suboptimal 
 Lower than 
anticipated 
Immunisation coverage 
e.g. <20% in Japan 
Mild pandemic event for 
the majority of people 
Early first waves of 
infection arrived before 
vaccine 
Severe pandemic 
influenza planned for, with 
the expectation of high 
vaccination demand 
Inflexible plans 
Vaccines arrive before 
disease peak 
 
5.4.2.2 Uptake rates in distinctive population groups and 
localities  
Canada, Sweden and Japan participants spoke about 
pandemic vaccine uptake rates relating to specific population 
groups. The specific population group of aboriginal populations 
was associated with high uptake rates whereas low uptake 
was reported for the specific population groups of healthcare 
workers, religious groups and young adults. 
The pandemic influenza vaccine uptake was considered to be 
very high in the specific population group of First Nations 
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persons in Canada and this was considered to be the result of 
a well-planned mass immunisation programme of delivering 
vaccines through clinics. For instance: “we knew that the 
vaccine was going to be rolled out the week of October 26th, 
so we started planning this in the summer about how we were 
going to roll out the vaccine and do these clinics within a four 
week.  So how are we going to get everybody immunized in a 
four week period? And so we had to take nurses that you 
know, hadn’t been necessarily working with clients because 
they were doing more policy work, and get them recertified, 
and we sent out an extra 40 staff from headquarters that 
normally don’t work in northern reserves, and shipped them 
out.  That was a huge organisational challenge, because 
oftentimes it’s weather dependent” (CA3a/CA3b) This hard 
work paid off because it resulted in very high uptake rates in 
these parts of northern and remote Canada: “Yeah, so it was a 
big, it was a big endeavour, but we planned very, very well, 
and so we got a, a very large uptake of the, higher, higher 
than the Canadian average.” (CA3a/CA3b) Achieving an 
uptake of approximately 90% in the First Nations and 
aboriginal population was challenging and resource intensive: 
“…so the face to face meeting with the people, it’s not big 
government says you got to do it and so they’re all going to 
come out and get it, no, it’s the relationships.  And that’s why 
it has to happen at a community level and at population 
bases, you know, where the trust has been established.” 
(CA3a/CA3b) This incredible uptake rate was compared to the 
Canadian overall uptake rate of 42%. 
On the other hand, healthcare workers, as per seasonal 
influenza uptake rates, had low uptake rates of the pandemic 
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influenza vaccine in Canada: “…healthcare workers historically 
are one of the lower compliance groups with getting 
immunised for flu and unless you have a physician champion 
in your organisation who is actively promoting and engaged in 
the programme, that’s, sometimes it doesn’t work.  Long term 
care I think there’s better uptake, because people see that 
population at risk with the flu and I know BC has recently 
passed legislation for mandatory immunisation of healthcare 
workers. And if they don’t then they have to wear a mask.  
So, and that’s been challenged, but that’s the first province to 
actually take that step.  So, but even in my own office, and 
people work with this and I said, did you get your flu shot, ‘I, 
I’m not, I’m not convinced,’ so it’s kind of interesting that it’s, 
there’s scepticism around the flu vaccine.” (CA1) It was 
presumed that the reason for this may be due to effectiveness 
concerns or adverse effects from the vaccine or lack of 
education on the matter: “I only had it once and I got really 
sick, that seems to be the thing, there’s a lot of, a lot of 
misconceptions and, but we have a lot of work to be doing in 
terms of improving vaccination among healthcare workers in 
particular, yeah.” (CA1) 
It was reported that the uptake in the Swedish Muslim 
community was less than the national average because of 
concern about pig components of the vaccine as it would 
protect against swine flu. Therefore, public health 
professionals charged with the delivery of the vaccination 
campaign engaged with religious leaders to communicate 
about the vaccine and alleviate fears: ”…we had a large group 
of Muslin community here, and they were afraid of the vaccine 
since it was the swine flu and so they responded to that, and 
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didn’t want to have the vaccination. So I think we had to, 
when they had their Friday sermons, do you say that, we went 
there and with some spokesman, we tried to inform them. 
[…..] they thought it was just some kind of link with swine so 
they didn’t want to have it.” (SW2) 
The uptake of the pandemic vaccine within the group of young 
adults was limited and it was thought that communications to 
this population could have been more effective: “…I think that 
one of our weaknesses that was you know, the groups that 
are, was heavily affected was the young people, and they 
didn’t get the message, it was older people, families, that got 
the message, they younger people they didn’t care much, and 
that was one of the problems because they died, the young 
people died, but I think we could have been a lot more 
effective in our communications to the youngest.” (SW7)  
Countries discussed regional differences in pandemic influenza 
vaccine campaign provision and uptake rates. In particular, 
Canada experienced regional differences which were explained 
by differences in Canadian geography, and ethnical and socio 
economic diversity. 2009 saw the highest purchase for 
influenza vaccination in Canada since records began, counting 
both before the pandemic and post it, with a figure of 13 
million doses. There were differences between provinces on 
whether seasonal influenza vaccines were held back until after 
all pandemic influenza vaccines had been administered or to 
just the pandemic influenza immunisation programme in 
conjunction with the seasonal influenza programme. As 
explained: “I think this, it’s an example of where the provinces 
did things differently, there were a number of provinces, 
maybe five or six, that held off on their seasonal programme 
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until they rolled out, pretty much rolled out H1N1 completely, 
there were other jurisdictions that went ahead as normal and 
put H1N1 in where it, when it was available.  So at the end of 
the day I don’t think we came close to actually using the 13.5 
million but in terms of demand it was, certainly was the 
highest that we’ve had.” (CA2)  
It was explained that demand varied both between and within 
provinces of Canada, some of this surge demand was 
unforeseeable whereas some demand came down to the way 
in which the immunisation campaign had been organised 
locally: “…it came down to some provinces did a better job, 
from what I understand, of allocating the vaccine within their 
jurisdiction to avoid that kind of issues, others did run into 
problems with clinics being just overwhelmed basically with 
the demand, unexpected demand.  But again, I think it varied 
across the country, even within jurisdictions it probably varied 
in terms of their capacity to deliver the vaccine.” (CA2) The 
variable pandemic influenza vaccine uptake rates throughout 
Canada were also discussed by this participant:  “Yeah.  There 
was a real demand.  It was hugely variable across the country 
again because the country is so diverse.  That’s the one thing 
about Canada is that geographically, ethnically, socio 
economic, like the diversity is just really something. […..] And 
different parts of the country there would be different demand 
and certainly different parts of the country different uptake.  
[…] And differential uptake with the different models that were 
used for programmes, differential uptake in, some of our first 
nations were aboriginal communities.  Because our aboriginal 
communities really did get hit fairly hard in the first wave they 
certainly were aware of their vulnerability in terms and so 
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uptake in our aboriginal communities was quite good for 
vaccine.  So that was quite positive.” (CA5) 
 
5.4.2.3 Demand and motivation for obtaining the 
pandemic influenza vaccine 
Sweden and Canada spoke of a surge in demand for the 
pandemic vaccine at the start of the pandemic influenza 
vaccination campaigns and experienced demand for the 
vaccine out stripping initial supply. This was an inverse 
relationship between demand and supply. Both Sweden and 
Singapore noted that a decrease in demand for the vaccine 
coincided with a drop in pandemic influenza disease activity.  
Some of the Canadian interviewees spoke about the surge of 
demand seen for the pandemic vaccine. Frequently, members 
of the public queued outside healthcare centres waiting for the 
pandemic vaccine, even though addition staff had been laid on 
to meet the extra anticipated demand. With the extra staff 
working on the mass immunisation programme, it would still 
require many days to vaccinate the population. “…for example, 
I can talk about Ottawa, where people lined up and it, they 
were in clinics every day, but it’s a big resource thing for just 
Ottawa Public Health, so they were having to bring in other 
nurses and other people to assist, volunteers and, so the 
demand was just more, they couldn’t possibly deliver all the 
vaccines in one day to meet, to match the people lined up 
outside, so they actually started giving people numbers and 
saying, no you’re not going to get in before the next two 
hours.” (CA1)   
 220 
 
The demand for the pandemic influenza vaccine from the 
public exceeded supply because at the start the vaccine 
arrived in limited batches from pharmaceutical companies: 
“Yeah, the demand from public was much much bigger than 
the amount of vaccines available for quite a long time.” (SW5) 
At the beginning of the pandemic influenza vaccination 
campaign, the Swedish population demand for vaccines 
outstripped supply: “…from the beginning, the people were 
very motivated and asked for the vaccine and got no vaccine.” 
(SW4) 
Interviewer: They were asking for the vaccine before it had 
actually arrived? 
”Yes, you had the decision that we should start this campaign 
and then people started to demand, why can’t I be 
vaccinated? And of course we, even when the campaign 
started, we didn’t get enough in, and then there was another 
role for us, of cause it was to have the contact with the drug 
company for example, because they couldn’t have the contact 
with 21 either, and then we were extremely criticised by the 
media, why don’t we get the…? Media, television, radio, why 
don’t we get the vaccine? And you know the main problem 
was that we didn’t get the vaccine fast enough, which is very 
very interesting which we are discussing for the future. That 
there are very much, I think that is one of the main problems 
that the epidemic has already started when we received the 
vaccine and we didn’t get vaccine, we get 100,000 doses or 
half a million doses but from the beginning there was an 
enormous demand for more, television reporters where are 
the …? And the drug companies, of course they tried but there 
were other countries also. So that was a very, if you ask for 
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the concern from them from the beginning, how could we 
vaccinate all those people, I think they did it excellently, the 
organisation was excellent in those county councils, but then it 
changed to why don’t we get enough vaccine and then it just 
dropped off of course with the epidemic.” (SW4) 
Interviewer: What the disease activity or the demand? 
“The demand dropped of course when the disease activity 
dropped, and I think there was many people, there was still 
some people who had planned to be vaccinated but, for 
example, this place we should have the visit of, we should be 
vaccinated, but when it was the time, the epidemic was 
already faded away.” (SW4) 
An inverse relationship was seen in terms of demand and roll 
out of the vaccines. At the beginning of the campaign, the 
number of doses of vaccines was limited and demand was 
high, over time more vaccine doses became available and 
demand decreased. As explained: “…the roll out of the vaccine 
was, and again in retrospect it was, it probably was 
predictable that it would, the roll out was slow.  As the 
company ramped up production, and they were going with a 
fill line for example, and we’re now actually investing in, we 
have a new long term contract also with GSK and we’re 
investing in expanded filling capacity because that was 
identified as one of the bottlenecks in production the last time 
round.  But as they ramped up, production ramped up, filling, 
any issues that were going to arise were going to arise early.  
So the vaccine came out slowly at first and then the weekly 
picked up over time so that we were getting more, and 
demand, well obviously was heaviest at the beginning…” (CA2) 
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The amount of vaccine to order was calculated following an 
assessment of the disease characteristics of the pandemic 
influenza circulating: “…of the influenza vaccines to be put into 
their calculations because we reckon that under unusual 
circumstances the take up rate, the coverage, will go up, 
people will actually fight for the vaccines in order to, which is 
what happened in America a few times with the vaccines 
dropping.” (SI3) 
By the time the vaccines had arrived in Singapore, the 
demand had waned and there was not the reported incidences 
of queues outside surgeries for the vaccine because: “…during 
the last pandemic for the reason because, as I mentioned, we 
don’t have the vaccine producing capability over here, we can 
only rely on our neighbours and our neighbours need to 
protect their own interest so in other words they will only start 
to manufacture for us after they have met their own internal 
need, right?  You know ideally you take care of your own 
country first before you can extend your help to your 
neighbour.  So by the time the vaccines became available to 
Singapore it was relatively late and by that time most of the 
Singaporeans are well informed enough that it was not a 
fantastically severe disease.  So similarly for the healthcare 
workers, not all the healthcare workers decided to go ahead 
and take up the vaccine.” (SI3) 
The motivation for obtaining the pandemic influenza 
vaccination was described in Sweden as an individual level of 
fear regarding contracting the disease and on a societal level 
of collective responsibility as citizens to all contribute which 
arguably played a role in achieving high vaccine uptake rates. 
In Singapore, there was a low uptake of the pandemic 
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influenza vaccine which corresponds to the typical low 
motivation for seasonal influenza vaccination.  
In Sweden, the motivation for vaccination was described as a 
fear of contracting pandemic influenza at an individual level 
but also a sense of collective responsibility felt by the 
population to get vaccinated: “…the reason to vaccinate is 
fear, but it’s also some kind of course, many people, get out 
the message, it’s a matter of loyalty, you should vaccinate 
because then you contribute to less spread in society, and 
then you are, I don’t know what you call it, it’s not just for 
yourself, it’s for many other people, you decrease the risk with 
people with underlying conditions and so if you go to 
vaccinate.” (SW4) 
The uptake of the influenza vaccine was reported as low in 
Singapore normally during the seasonal influenza period 
(twice a year peaks due to the tropics location) and this was 
the same experience during the pandemic influenza 
vaccination campaign. “So every winter you have upsurge in 
all your flu cases and that, but we don’t have that, we have 
influenza throughout the year and then there’s no definite 
season.  And the, so if people have incorporated it into their 
lives, it’s taken as something, it’s, the symptoms because it, 
the way it manifests, the clinical features of it, it’s just 
basically fever and cough basically.  And people get 
respiratory infections quite often and people get something 
like the common cold almost.  And something that is not 
serious, and that’s why even the uptake of seasonal flu 
vaccine is not very high, even with a lot education and we try 
to get people who are at higher risk to be vaccinated.  But 
they’re not, the uptake is quite low still.  Yeah the, the 
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perception is that it’s, is not something coming or serious.  
Yeah and actually the 2009 pandemic reinforced the public 
belief in that influenza is not serious. Yeah because from the 
general public’s experience with the 2009 pandemic was, you 
don’t, people were not like dying and a lot of people were ICU 
and that’s why when the pandemic vaccine was rolled up there 
was a hoopla uptake.  So that’s what, not, it’s not surprising 
then that for that seasonal influenza, the general public 
continues to think that it’s not very serious.” (SI6) 
The pandemic influenza vaccine arrived into Singapore in 
October 2009: “End of October but the, that was the first 
supplies coming into Singapore but by the time you actually 
roll out to the public, make it available to the public, it was the 
first week of November.” (SI6) 
The pandemic vaccine uptake was lower than expected due to 
the perception that this flu was characterised by mild 
symptoms and the concern for the safety of a vaccine 
developed rapidly, as explained: “Yeah because, there, it was 
quite interesting that because of the disease, the disease and 
the perception that the disease is mild, there were a lot of, 
they were concerned by some parties and groups of people 
that this is a, this vaccine is not so safe, it’s not properly 
tested. It’s a rush and it’s developed in a hurry and things go 
through the internet and they says, no so there’s no need to 
be vaccinated, the disease is mild and you will get all kinds of 
side effects.  So we had to counter that through public 
education and say that, if you belong to this group A, B, C 
then it’s better for you to be vaccinated, don’t worry either 
way the vaccine is safe and so forth, we had to reassure the 
public.  But still because of the overriding perception and 
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based on the actual fact that the disease was quite mild.  And 
not very different or actually quite similar to seasonal flu, 
most people said, there’s no need to be vaccinated.  Yeah so 
we had a lot of unused vaccine.” (SI6) 
 
5.4.2.4 Implications of vaccine uptake rates on other 
public health measures 
The high reported uptake of vaccines in Sweden might have 
reduced the need for other public health measures, such as 
antivirals: “I think, I believe, that since so many people were 
vaccinated, that contributed to that fewer people taking 
antivirals, that’s my impression without knowing.” (SW3a) 
 
5.4.3 Prioritisation 
The study countries Japan, Canada and Sweden discussed how 
the initial batches of pandemic influenza vaccines were 
required to be prioritised but over the course of the 
vaccination campaign would be available to everyone. 
Singapore set aside vaccines for healthcare workers but did 
not have priority groups or enough purchased for the entire 
population. New Zealand had a small batch of monovalent 
A(H1N1) influenza vaccine, with which healthcare workers 
were prioritised. The monovalent vaccine was replaced in a 
few weeks by the seasonal influenza trivalent vaccine 
containing A(H1N1) influenza.  
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Canada planned to have vaccines available to all and on 
equitable terms however, the nature of pandemic influenza 
vaccine production meant that a discussion of priority of 
vaccines would need to occur before the roll out of the 
vaccination campaign. However, for some of the Canadian 
interviewees, the term ‘priority groups’ sat uncomfortably and 
instead the preferred term was ‘allocation of vaccines’ because 
“…within a month there was enough vaccine for everybody in 
Canada who wanted it…” (CA3b), as illustrated: “We worked 
really closely with our FPT colleagues around vaccine 
prioritisation, so when Canada was developing the pandemic 
vaccine there was a series of discussions around the roll out of 
the vaccine, because you knew we were only going to get a 
certain amount of doses each week, and how were we as a 
country going to prioritise those doses?” (CA3a) 
The uptake of the pandemic influenza vaccine against A(H1N1) 
in Singapore was reportedly lower than expected so there was 
no need to strictly prioritise it: “…I mean in an ideal situation 
if let’s say the uptake was very high then obviously it would be 
shunted to the people at high risk or complications first but I 
think in this case the uptake was actually quite low so there 
was enough to go round.” (SI2) 
Whilst other participants said that in reality Sweden did not 
prioritise the pandemic influenza vaccine for specific 
population groups: “And then they started to identify the key 
functions, key competences, and then they started to see, the 
questions that were raised at that time when they had more 
clear picture was if they had antiviral medicine who could get 
that to make that they wasn’t infection and so on, should we 
prioritise the vaccine and so on, it connected with that. But at 
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that time we decided that it was no positive, no one could get 
before the other one in the line, it was mass vaccination, 
instead of just a few groups.” (SW7) However, some 
participants from Sweden did explain that vaccines in the 
initial weeks were only available to specified priority groups. 
 
5.4.3.1 Priority vaccination groups 
Sweden, New Zealand, Singapore and Japan prioritised 
healthcare workers and/or critical infrastructure employees as 
the first group to be eligible for the initial supply of pandemic 
influenza vaccines. The risk of healthcare workers contracting 
pandemic influenza and contributing to the spread of disease 
through employment was an important risk to mitigate 
against, as well as prioritising the maintenance of healthcare 
services and critical infrastructure through providing the 
vaccine to key employees. Canada took a different approach 
which was organised by the geographical challenges of the 
vast country: starting in the northern remote and isolated 
communities where healthcare is provided in mostly nursing 
stations and spread out across sparsely populated land. The 
risk of remote and isolated individuals contracting pandemic 
influenza may have left them vulnerable to severe outcomes 
and medical access issues.  
CA3a: “And so after many meetings and much discussion and 
much look at the science, it was decided that pregnant 
women, First Nations in remote and isolated communities and, 
who else were designated priority groups?”  
CA3b: “Well we weren’t using the term priority groups.” 
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CA3a: “Oh no, sorry.” 
CA3b: “That was, yeah, that was taken off the table. Because, 
because it was a matter of allocation, not that there wasn’t 
enough vaccine, and so priority did have to be set. There 
would be, in a matter of weeks, enough vaccine for 
everybody, so then these other risk groups were allocated the, 
the, had their allotment or their, so yeah. […..] And as usually 
the case with vaccine allocation in this country the smaller 
jurisdictions, including the northern territories, are often given 
the first allocation, and just because it’s easy, there’s what 
35,000 people?  Something like that in, in Nunavut, in the 
whole territory, and so it’s easy just to knock those off, get 
them done and then, then start doing the logistics with the 
larger jurisdictions like Ontario BC, that sort of thing.  During 
H1N1 Manitoba was first hit, but then Nunavut...”  
In some areas of Sweden, they tried to prioritise particular key 
workers, e.g. health care professionals, to get the vaccine first 
but this was difficult to enact due to equal access 
arrangements in Sweden (Note MSB is the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency): “…but then there are key positions in 
society that you should, people working in health care and so 
on. MSB tried, but it never worked out, it was very difficult to, 
in some places they tried to vaccinate people in key positions, 
but it’s very difficult to do because it’s a matter of equity, why 
should…? It’s also political, extremely difficult.” (SW4) 
Interviewer: So that’s the prioritisation of, is it critical 
infrastructure? 
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“Yeah, it’s the critical infrastructure. To me it’s not the 
average healthcare worker, it’s probably the technician at the 
hospital, who is responsible for IT and so on, but it never 
worked out.” (SW4) 
Interviewer: Trying to define that group? 
“Yeah, of key positions, that’s very few people, usually 
infrastructure as you said.” (SW4) 
New Zealand did not have the vaccine to use until 2010 due to 
the timing of the disease activity and the production of the 
pandemic influenza vaccine. Initially the pandemic vaccine 
against H1N1 was prioritised by only being offered to 
healthcare staff: “…it came later, and we, we’re obviously 
aware of the potential second wave which can be bigger than 
the first wave [……] we were mindful of this potential second 
wave so we offered that to hospital staff and then the rest of it 
was made available, that staggered introduction was 
something that had to be managed very carefully.” (NZ1) It 
was explained that due to the nature of the monovalent 
pandemic vaccine being scarce in the first instance, it was 
necessary to prioritise it at the beginning and therefore it was 
necessary to explain the reason for prioritisation of one group 
before another: “Well in terms of you know, people’s 
perception of what we were doing, are you just trying to 
protect your staff first instead of us, why can’t we have it too, 
well there wasn’t enough to go round that monovalent stuff, 
so what we said was look, if a health worker gets sick they can 
spread it to many many other people, so that’s why we’ll offer 
this, but we’d still guarantee and succeeded in delivering 
 230 
 
trivalent vaccine to people well before the season started.” 
(NZ1) 
The monovalent vaccine against pandemic influenza H1N1 was 
prioritised for healthcare workers and offered free of charge in 
New Zealand: “We’re talking about the monovalent vaccine 
was free was only offered to the healthcare workers, was only 
offered through the healthcare system. Seasonal influenza 
vaccine is 2010 when that was rolled out was free to those at 
greatest risk from influenza and the guidelines was extended 
then to include pregnant women.” (NZ4) Typically the annual 
flu vaccine is available free of charge to vulnerable groups in 
New Zealand, such as people from deprived backgrounds, 
Maori Pacific persons.  
The pandemic influenza vaccine was available to everyone in 
Singapore, however, initially it was prioritised for healthcare 
workers to obtain the vaccine: “In terms of prioritising 
vaccine, of course we, when we, one of the priority groups to 
be vaccinated were healthcare workers.  So we set aside 
vaccine for them so that they would not have to compete with 
the public, so it was reserved for them.  But it wasn’t also very 
like, some healthcare workers still, there’s no need to get 
vaccine.” (SI6) The vaccine was initially prioritised for key 
essential workers. 
The pandemic vaccination campaign commenced in October 
2009 in Japan which coincided the first wave of disease 
activity. One participant discussed the gradual availability of 
vaccine doses which corresponded to the need to initially 
prioritise the vaccine: “The first vaccination project was 
October 19th, just during the pandemic first wave and we 
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provided it gradually so first one week we only two million 
[doses]. Second week, third week, another two million, 
another three million, so gradually gradually we could provide. 
So we had to decide a priority, so first priority group was 
medical staff.” (JA6) 
The first priority group at the beginning of the vaccination 
campaign in Japan was medical staff: “There’s a priority for 
vaccination in 2009, the first of all from end of October 2009, 
only for medical staff but only for one million doses.” (JA5) 
Individual medical centres received allocated vaccines, e.g. 
500 and these needed to decide their own allocation groups: 
“We should decide who to give this 500 vaccine to. It was very 
difficult.” (JA5) Some hospitals would have liked more than 
their individual allocated vaccines: “There were few, they 
wanted more, we wanted more doses because increasingly for 
us in this hospital we received if I remember 200, 300 doses 
so all paediatric doctors and all doctors of emergency and all 
nurses of paediatric ward and all nurses from emergency, but 
in some hospitals all staff could be immunised with the vaccine 
so very different, so depends which hospital you work.” (JA5) 
There was a demand from medical staff to have the 
vaccination.  
The subsequent priority groups in Japan were pregnant 
women, high risk persons and infants: “In the beginning of 
November the priorities goes to pregnant and high risk 
persons, with some immunocompromised or patient with 
cardiac disease or something like that. And then preschool 
aged healthy children and there’s something like that. […]You 
see this is Japan’s priority, written in Japanese, this is for 
medical staff, next one is pregnant women, first medical staff, 
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two pregnant women. This pregnant women, this is people 
with underlying diseases, at preschool, primary school and 
elementary school. There are many stages, it’s very difficult.” 
(JA5) 
 
5.4.3.2 Pandemic vaccine prioritisation challenges 
The prioritisation of the vaccine during the pandemic influenza 
was challenging work for key response pandemic influenza 
personnel: “…dealing with the different issues that came up 
there in terms of prioritisation and challenges around 
prioritisation because although we have contracts that really 
do allow us to provide vaccine for all of our population, well, 
everyone who will take it for sure it comes off in allotments, 
right?  And so it’s not, we’re not going to wait until we have 
enough for everybody so we have to roll it out in a progressive 
fashion.  So there was a lot of work around that 
prioritisation…” (CA5)  
Deciding on the prioritisation order was morally difficult, and 
remains difficult to this day, with no clear cut answer as to 
what the correct action is: “…and I’ve had discussions with 
people, OK, like if I have ten doses of vaccine and does the 
big burly policeman want to get in line in front of the one year 
old child or in front of the elderly grandmother or the pregnant 
woman?  Which one are you knocking off line?  Do you know?  
So these are very, very tense issues and they will continue to 
be because we will never have the kind of resources that are 
infinite, right?” (CA5)  Considering and defining consistent 
categories of who belonged to priority groups was difficult to 
 233 
 
do, particularly during a time pressured environment of a 
pandemic influenza: “It, with first responders it’s the question 
of also defining adequately who first responders are.  And in 
critical infrastructure, a worker is someone that, everyone has 
a different view of what’s critical infrastructure that needs to 
be maintained, so…” (CA2) 
The prioritisation of the pandemic vaccine was challenging to 
determine in Japan: “…and then if a vaccine is produced it will 
be given to the, it is necessary to think of one by one and who 
is a priority and who is a second priority this is another 
difficult issue but this is needed to think about the priority, the 
prioritisation. And the policy in Japan the vaccine should be 
produced to cover most of the, almost all the people.” (JA2) 
Japan discussed the need to prioritise a pandemic vaccine in 
the inter-pandemic planning period: “Several years, maybe 
three before 2009, 2007 or 2008, we had a decision about 
that, about priority and we had decided very roughly, for 
example for the children. […] before 2009 we had a discussion 
and we had decided roughly the priority and then from August 
until September we had a very serious discussion, we had a 
meeting consisting of researchers, experts and the anti-
vaccine group, anyway so many kinds of people we welcomed 
and we had a serious discussion, more than 10 times, 20 
times.” (JA6)  
Interviewer: Really, it took that long to decide? 
“Yeah, every two days we had these kind of expert committee 
from mid-August to mid-September, so one month, and finally 
we had consensus, and then we published to the people, 
Japanese people, public comments, we received 3,000 public 
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comments we received and we analysed. Yeah using these 
public comments and experts discussion we had decided the 
priority. First priority was medical staff, and then next one was 
pregnant women.” (JA6) [Document shown in interview] 
Interviewer: People with underlying diseases. 
“Yes, and for small children.” (JA6) 
Interviewer: Is it based on information such as what you know 
about the virus, who you knew it was affecting? 
“Yes right.” (JA6) 
Interviewer: The WHO said about pregnant women and very 
young children. 
“We used information from the WHO and from United States, 
from Mexico so in August or September some journal 
published the data so we used that data and WHO 
recommended that the first group should be medical staff so 
we used that idea, and one of the paper announced that 
pregnant women were high risk so we decided to prioritise 
pregnant women and underlying people.” (JA6) 
Overall, the immunisation programme, in terms of roll out and 
vaccine type, was considered to be one of the most major 
components of the Canadian pandemic influenza response: “I 
would say probably one of the major elements would be the 
rollout of the vaccine and the need to prioritise who was going 
to get vaccine first just because of our, the progressive 
supply.  I would say the vaccine as well because we 
introduced an adjuvanted product for the first time and so that 
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was a really challenging exercise trying to ensure people felt 
comfortable with the safety and efficacy of a new type of 
product in a pandemic situation.  So the vaccine rollout was 
really one of the major, major elements.” (CA5)   
“We did that for our primary care partners as well as our acute 
care partners, and we had instruction sheets for staff, and we 
set up vaccination for health care workers that were going to 
be working in these flu assessment centres as key prioritised 
groups for vaccination when and if it became available.” (CA6) 
 
5.4.4 Risk Groups equated to priority groups 
Frequently, the priority groups translated to the risk groups 
identified as most vulnerable to severe outcomes from the 
2009-10 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza, although if the vaccine 
doses had arrived in large enough quantities then these 
priority groups may not have been required: “…we had 
expectation that we would get sufficient vaccine early enough, 
that it may not be necessary, but it was a precautionary 
measure to ensure that there was a plan in place if the 
vaccine was not coming at the rate that it was, it could be 
administered to the general public, that there needed to be 
some kind of a plan in place that, again, that provinces could 
follow or not depending on their own decisions, but in terms of 
how they should, or guidelines for how they could prioritise 
based on the best available science.” (CA2) 
When determining the priority during the pandemic influenza, 
information was required about the risk groups: “…if the 
pandemic come, we need information which population is most 
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severe or which population is needed, and also we have to 
save the severe older person or we have to save not so severe 
young infant for our future, it is very difficult decision but we 
say the people and also the policy maker this time we have to 
decide on this, sometimes it’s a very cruel decision. But at the 
moment we don’t have any pandemic so nobody knows which 
one is the best scenario.” (JA2) [In regards to the 
2009pdmH1N1]: “Actually the consensus has been made that 
a medical person is the first priority because they had to be 
immunised and they have to watch the patient, and the 
second priority is the related people, not only for the doctor, 
but nurse, laboratory people, that’s all medical people.” (JA2) 
Interviewer: So keeping the health system running? 
“Yes, yes, and also the next rank is the people who work for, 
the term of the life line, to keep the minimum people alive for 
example food.” (JA2) 
Interviewer: So like your essential workers? 
“Yes, yes, some workers.” (JA2) 
Interviewer: So that could be anything, not just healthcare 
workers? 
“For example, traffic workers, and also medicine producer 
companies, and also people who work in Ministry etc yeah.” 
(JA2) 
Interviewer: So your essential workers, to minimise societal 
disruption? 
“Yeah.” (JA2) 
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5.4.5 Locality prioritisation  
Even though prioritisation was introduced across Canada, 
difference provinces and territories implemented their own 
priority groups, which occasionally varied and led to questions 
as to why it was available to specific groups in one area of the 
country and not other areas: “One of the other issues was 
around, in terms of pandemic vaccine in particular, is that, 
because we plan that, our planning would allow for all 
Canadians to have access to vaccine over time, like we can’t 
give vaccine to everybody all at the same time, it won’t 
become available all at the same time.  So there’s a need, […] 
to prioritise who would, the, how the first batches of vaccine 
would be rolled out, and so of course each province and 
territory would get their allocation of vaccine.  […] it would 
have been in batches, so there would have been like a first 
supply and then further, subsequent production, more supply, 
so the initial availability of vaccine required prioritisation and 
so there’s, along with that there were some issues with 
inconsistent, consistency that there was some differences of 
implementation.  You’ve probably heard that as well across 
the country, which also can lead to confusion and why do 
people in this province get, why do certain people, certain 
groups within this province get it and other provinces weren’t 
doing it the same way, so there were some issues around 
that.  And again it was about communicating who the, why 
there was a need for prioritisation that eventually there would 
be vaccine for everybody, but that because there was a 
limited supply there was a need to determine who should get 
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it, who really needed to be in that first line of, that first tier of 
first targeted groups, yeah.” (CA4) 
 
5.4.6 Timing of pandemic influenza vaccination campaign 
 
5.4.6.1 Disease activity and vaccine arrival 
In terms of disease activity, the necessary production time 
required meant that the vaccines arrived after Canada had 
experienced their first wave of novel influenza: “The other 
challenge with vaccine was we got our vaccine, just the 
timelines to produce vaccine and our vaccine came in just as 
we were going into our second wave and so we were playing 
catch up at that point and that has a lot to do with your 
strategies, right?  If you know you’re going to be in the middle 
of, you know you’re going to be in a pandemic wave you have 
to treat people who are most at risk of complications or, yeah, 
they get big, bad outcomes whereas if we’d been a little bit 
ahead of that wave we might have tried to hit the 
transmission, get those kids vaccinated before they were too 
sick.” (CA5) The vaccination campaign timing in reference to 
the disease activity meant that there was a real focus on 
delivering the vaccine to persons who may be at risk of the 
most severe outcomes. The strategy switched from trying to 
vaccinate transmitters (e.g. children) to vaccinating those 
most likely to require hospital care and may die (e.g. risk 
groups). 
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In Japan, the vaccines began arriving in November which was 
after the peak of pdm09H1N1 disease activity: “We didn’t get 
the vaccine, it wasn’t available until after the peak of the 
pandemic so the vaccine was a little bit late.” (JA4) The 
disease activity was earlier than the vaccine arrival: “…the 
peak was in September or October, it was a little bit earlier.” 
(JA3) 
 
5.4.6.2 Portion of pandemic influenza response 
In Japan and Singapore, the pandemic influenza response 
using vaccines was limited due to the timing of the vaccination 
campaigns in relation to disease activity and the number of 
vaccines used. The vaccines had arrived after these countries 
had experienced their first pandemic influenza waves. 
“…vaccination is, was very limited, vaccination for pandemic 
2009 is, was very limited, only vaccination only began in 
November or December and at that time the peak in most 
areas in Japan, pandemic influenza has, had been finished at 
that time, so very limited but, so, but of course please ask 
doctor, please ask a practitioner, they vaccinated many 
patients with pandemic H1N109 after the peak of epidemic, so 
vaccination is not, has not main role for decreasing Japanese 
fatality.” (JA1) 
“Vaccine campaign started in November or early December, 
that was already just after the peak of the pandemic influenza 
and before the peak come in the government decided to 
import the overseas produced influenza vaccine, urgently. But 
almost at the same time, the domestic vaccine is produced but 
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that was the time of the peak of the pandemic influenza. Of 
course, many people wished to be immunised but also total 
number is decreasing down and the people [forget].” (JA2) 
Japan did not experience a demand for the vaccines due to the 
timing of the first wave of disease activity: “No because the 
peak of the epidemic had already passed at the time when the 
vaccine was widely available. So this is October and November 
and many children could be immunised, could not be 
immunised until December, so many patients have already 
caught influenza during this so […] very late for these 
patients.” (JA5) Also: “So now people were realising that this 
is not a severe pandemic and also there is plenty of vaccine 
coming so a sense of scarceness rapidly disappearing at the 
end of November to December which was apparent in January 
so the issue was gradually shifting, atmosphere gradually 
shifting from October November December January and 
actually January it was apparent for everybody that the 
vaccine was actually oversupplied and next is how to return 
the vaccine because at the time of November or early 
December each medical facilities ordered a lot of vaccine 
which is coming end of December or January for general 
vaccination but in October or in January and February there 
was not that much appetite among the general population for 
vaccination because the pandemic is gradually ending so that 
many health facilities are facing a lot of stockpile of vaccine 
which they’re supposed to buy so there was the issue of how 
to return the vaccine or who is actually paying for the vaccine 
not used so the nature of the issue was shifting from the early 
phase to middle phase to later phases.” (JA7) 
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Naturally there was a desire for the disease activity to be held 
back until the vaccines had arrived and the campaign had 
started: “Clearly we wanted it to start October, mid-October, 
because that’s when we anticipated having vaccine available 
and at a local health agency level, you’re responsible for local 
surveillance, local response, but also local vaccine strategy.” 
(CA6)  
 
5.4.6.3 Perceived effectiveness of vaccines during the 
pandemic influenza response 
The interviewees discussed the perceived effectiveness of the 
vaccines contribution to the pandemic influenza response. 
Sweden interviewees felt that the vaccines could have played 
a role in reducing the burden of pandemic influenza, whereas 
Japan, New Zealand and Singapore felt that vaccines would 
not have played a major role. Canada, Japan and Sweden 
noted that no third wave of disease activity occurred and the 
role of vaccines in relation to this was unknown. 
The immunisation programme effectiveness was considered to 
have been limited due to the campaign timing occurring after 
a peak influenza activity, but at the same time the 
effectiveness was difficult to assess because immunisation was 
rolled out throughout the country: “We had that in our epi 
curve and you’ll see that when you’ll get the epi curve.  But 
the problem was is that we, our vaccine rolled out just as we 
were peaking and so, yes, it went down and maybe it wouldn’t 
have.  But public health is, you never get to see what would 
have happened if you didn’t do, you know.  And in public 
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health your successes are the things that don’t …  So you’ll 
see that, but there’s a lot of discussion about whether the 
vaccine really had an impact or didn’t have an impact because 
it would have taken its course anyway, but.  And those kind of 
decisions are the, or those kind of discussions are the very 
thing that are so challenging at the time that you’re rolling out 
a vaccine. Yeah, because you have experts saying, oh, there’s 
no point to this or people just don’t bother and on an esoteric 
level talking at a population and if you’re feeling lucky and 
you’re the one, but on the other hand the peak is a lot of very 
substantial illness, right?  So, yeah.” (CA5) 
“Here, with that same curve they said that the waning of 
disease activity was to happen too early for the vaccine to 
have had a significant effect, to explain that curve.  And more 
likely was the prevalence of disease in the first wave that 
immunity was developed.  And those who were going to be 
more severely affected were affected in the first wave.  But 
that’s what was said here, that, that our vaccine was, with 
that curve, because we had the same kind of curve, but when 
our vaccine started and, and when the disease activity 
dropped off, it was too close together for that to be a 
causative factor, yeah.” (CA3a / CA3b)  
Canada didn’t have a third wave of disease activity so it was 
possible that the vaccination campaign played a part in this: 
“But then it’s hard to say would we have had a third wave, 
had we not had?” (CA3a / CA3b) Canada’s disease activity 
dropped off in December 2009. 
The effectiveness of the pandemic vaccine in individuals was 
only briefly discussed by a few interviewees in Japan: “In 
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Japan the pandemic vaccine effectiveness was 70%, that was 
very high. That was 89% for pregnant women, this is what 
was reported in this journal, I mean 0.2224% of pregnant 
women with vaccination and 2.08% in pregnant women 
without vaccination so the effectiveness was about 90%.” 
(JA5) 
 
5.4.7 Side effects 
 
5.4.7.1 Promoting safety of new vaccine 
Resources were invested both before and during country’s 
pandemic influenza vaccination campaigns to promote the 
safety of the new influenza vaccine and encourage 
vaccination. National campaigns were launched, as well as 
targeted programmes towards specific population groups, and 
particular aspects of the vaccination campaign were addressed 
such as the adjuvant component of the vaccine because this 
was an alteration to previous campaigns. 
Before the immunisation campaign was launched and the 
vaccination clinics were opened, a lot of resources were 
invested in promoting the safeness of the new influenza 
vaccine to Canadian public. For instance, interviewees spoke 
about the work which involved responding to public anxious 
that the vaccine may cause injury to them or their children. 
Responding to these concerns was particularly important 
because children were a risk group and specifically targeted in 
the immunisation campaign: “Safety concerns that somehow 
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the vaccine was going to cause injury and particularly as 
children were identified as a real population of concern for us 
there was a lot of concern about the safety of the vaccine.” 
(CA5) 
One participant discussed their focused work with persons, 
such as First Nations and Inuit people, living in territories of 
Canada:  
CA3a: “Well there was a lot of work that we had to do prior to 
the mass immunization clinic, was the fact that it was a safe 
vaccine. So aboriginals, they’re more of a holistic, they look at 
medicine more holistically than we do, and vaccine is not 
always something that they would go to first.  And so we 
really had to work with our Grand Chiefs, for them to 
demonstrate, and they did it on, in the media that they got 
their, their shot to show that it is safe and no one’s trying to 
hurt you by giving you this vaccine and…”  
CA3b: “And you’re not, you’re not the guinea pigs.” 
CA3a: “Yes.” 
CA3b: “Because that was another perception, since aboriginal 
groups were prioritised to have the first allocation of vaccine, 
that was at times perceived as oh yeah, sure, you’re going to 
give it to us first before you give it to the white people, 
because if it hurts us then you won’t give it to the white 
people, so.” 
Interviewer: So the reason, you said that normally the vaccine 
would first go to the northern territories and so is that 
because the flu hit there first, or is it a delivery thing? 
CA3b: “That, it is just strictly based on numbers of, of 
vaccines, it’s just easier just to knock off those, get them out 
of the, low hanging fruit, right?  So yeah.” 
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Interviewer: I wouldn’t have thought that would be construed 
the other way, that it’s like being tested on us first, but it’s 
just something I wouldn’t consider, because I never worked in 
the area, so. 
CA3b: “Yeah, but there’s some long standing trust issues 
between the government and First Nations in this country, and 
so we didn’t…” 
CA3a: “And Inuit, not just First Nations.” 
CA3b: “And Inuit, yeah that’s right, for aboriginal, so.”  
Canada, like many other countries, has a group within the 
population who do not wish to have vaccinations against 
diseases primarily due to reported safety concerns and so this 
became an issue when delivering the vaccination campaign. As 
could be expected, infectious disease public health personnel 
found this low vaccine confidence challenging because they 
are knowledgeable about the impact of infectious diseases in 
history when public health measures such as vaccines were 
not available to the infected: “And then there’s the whole 
challenges around the anti-vaccine movement and how to deal 
with that and counter with that and, in the public health 
context.” (CA5) 
Interviewer: Is that something that’s a big challenge here in 
Canada? 
“I wouldn’t say, I would say it’s a big challenge.  I would say 
that it’s probably not as bad here as it is in the United States 
maybe or in certain European countries.  But, so it’s a 
challenge.  It is a challenge and it’s something that we’re all 
having to deal with in terms of vaccine confidence and people 
understanding the importance and really the revolutionary role 
of vaccines in public health because we’re a generation or two 
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removed now, right?  The people who are having children now 
are not the same people who saw their friends in iron lungs or 
who had children die as, in their school years from measles or 
scarlet fever or, do you know?  So it’s a real culture shift so 
it’s a challenge.” (CA5) 
 
5.4.7.2 Balance of risk when considering getting the 
vaccine 
Weighing up the perceived risk of pandemic influenza, both 
contracting the disease and possible outcomes, versus the 
concerns of the risks of adverse events associated with 
vaccines, were discussed in interviews. Perceived risks 
associated with the vaccines included greater concerns of 
vaccines than antivirals, the risk of side effects were greater 
with foreign produced products, and the risk of adjuvant 
vaccine used for pregnant women. 
Whether or not there was a risk of side effects associated with 
the vaccine, one participant questioned what was the worst 
case scenario of a pandemic influenza: “…and is it, even with 
an elevated risk of a particular adverse event, is it better to 
get the vaccine?  And that’s a decision that’s made with every 
vaccine but probably much more critical in something like a 
pandemic where there is clearly a disease that’s circulating, 
so…” (CA2) 
Whilst staff dealt with these vaccine safety concerns, it 
coincided with the event of a fatality of a previously healthy 
school boy who died from H1N1 influenza. To generalise, 
parental fear over vaccine safety was replaced with a surge in 
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demand, that was greater than the supply, for the vaccine for 
their children to provide protection against this worrisome 
disease: “One of the real, it’s really interesting to see the 
intersection of media and public health because one of the real 
take off points for our immunisation programme was the 
death of a teenager in Toronto, a young boy who was a 
hockey player, I’m not sure, 12, 14, something, but a young 
hockey player and who was well and then two days later had 
died of H1N1 influenza and so this was at the very front end 
when we were starting to roll out our vaccine programme so it 
really caused a real run on, real pressure on vaccine and, 
yeah.” (CA5) 
Another factor in the safety concern of the vaccine centred on 
the fact that this was the first influenza vaccine to use an 
adjuvant: “…we have had adjuvanted vaccines before that but 
not for influenza, right?  And so there was a lot of concern 
about the safety of the adjuvant, people understanding why 
we were using an adjuvant and like if, well, if you don’t know 
why don’t you just use the other one?  And it’s like, well, 
because we’re trying to be globally responsible, dose sparing 
and make sure that, we’re trying not to use up all of the 
antigens so that other countries, you know.  So trying to 
explain all of that and there’s a lot of suspicion around it and, 
yeah.” (CA5) 
When commenting about the safety of public health measures, 
one Swedish participant made an interesting observation: 
“The concern, at least what I see is directly towards 
vaccination, not to the same extent as using antivirals.” 
(SW3a) 
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There was some pandemic vaccine safety concern for the 
specific population group of pregnant women this was 
examined in Japan and resulted in pregnant women being 
offered a vaccine without adjuvant as explained: “The issue 
was there in Japan 2009 and we actually provided special 
measure for this issue, one of worry among pregnant women 
and also some scientists and physicians is possible side effect 
of adjuvant yeah. It might adverse the effect of pregnant 
women and their baby, that’s the common worry among 
pregnant women and some scientists and physicians so we 
actually produced certain amount of vaccine adjuvant free. In 
doing adjuvant free we are required to put more antigen in 
because adjuvant is usually adding and saving technology, by 
putting adjuvant you can reduce the amount antigen in each 
vaccination which is a resource saving measure so without 
adjuvant and also in Japan because of the limited time, 
considering the limited time we usually use a huge vial, one 
vial for 18, but for pregnant women we actually produced 
enough for one shot without adjuvant and we actually 
amassed all the people concerned about this this issue that 
okay we provide adjuvant free vaccine single use only for 
pregnant women. But I think this advertisement and 
explanation were accepted among pregnant women and 
physicians, very safe, don’t think there is a huge, a big worry 
about it.” (JA7) 
 
5.4.7.3 Reported side effects 
Countries discussed that fever, narcolepsy and anaphylactic 
shock were raised as side effects associated with the 
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pandemic influenza vaccines. These side effects were raised 
before, during and post national vaccination campaigns and 
evidence was sourced and appraised to determine any 
apparent risk, association and causation.   
A frequent topic of conversation in the interviews by some 
participants in Sweden covered the subject of narcolepsy 
reports, particularly in young persons, from 2010 onwards: 
“…we didn’t hear about it until about the summer of 2010, we 
didn’t hear anything about it during the campaign, we knew 
about the other side effects, the local side effects in fever, 
tenderness and the ones we were expecting, but we weren’t 
expecting narcolepsy. So that was the reports in Finland first. 
[Gets article/report] This is the summary from this county 
here actually, over the narcolepsy, the paediatricians here, so 
that’s a summary, and they made a study of the different 
records made the Medical Product Agency.” (SW2) 
SW3a: “The only thing that I think of that has been very 
special is this signal of narcolepsy because we and Finland 
were the first countries who discovered or at least thought we 
had a problem. In the beginning it was difficult to, not to 
persuade, but to have a serious discussion within the 
European system with the other authorities because I think 
they were suspicious about this signal because it came 
originally from one single doctor in the south of Sweden, so it 
was a very similar situation to this situation with autism, so 
very many thought now it comes again and it took quite some 
time and effort from our staff to convince or put enough 
scientific evidence to the others so they would accept that this 
might be a problem and that this might be a consequence of 
the vaccination.” 
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SW3b: “I think it was very much the discussion that well of 
course if you have read this in the paper that you get 
narcolepsy then you see that, and then you will report that, 
just because some other has said, the media. So not true 
cases, well maybe true cases, but sometimes you get a case 
but maybe you don’t report it. I think…” 
SW3a: “But it’s a disease that is difficult to diagnose and now 
we have received several cases of narcolepsy but we still don’t 
know if it’s cases that would have been developed, discovered 
later since there has been so much focus on looking for these 
cases, maybe we have this now, but within a few years it 
might decline, but I don’t know yet, but it has been a very 
special situation since the pandemic because there has been 
several research projects around this issue, we still work with  
issue almost daily, but it’s still a very big part of not the whole 
agency but some of us work continuously with this issue still.” 
SW3b: “But I would say that now the most people in the 
scientific community recognise this is a real affect, that they 
have a connection to the vaccine.” 
SW3a: “But we still don’t know the cause, mechanism.” 
SW3b: “But that’s a good start because at the beginning there 
wasn’t many people saying this is something, but still the 
question, is it local, just in Sweden or Finland, now you know 
that it has certainly has occurred in other places also.” 
SW3a: “Ireland, France, Norway, UK, there are several reports 
now that this is a fact or maybe that’s too strong but you have 
seen the same phenomena in other countries so it’s no longer 
a Nordic problem.”  
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Interviewer: Yeah, because when I first started doing a 
literature review, I saw the research focusing on Sweden and 
Finland for this and I heard a bit about those two countries, 
but I hadn’t heard beyond those two countries. 
SW3a: “There are several reports now, so that is good so we 
can move it forward, but the only thing is that we are missing 
cases in Canada, where you should have expected some as 
well, but we don’t know what…” 
SW3b: “We haven’t seen any cases in Canada, but then used I 
would say almost exactly the same vaccine, there was some 
differences but since we don’t know what is causing this, so.” 
Interviewer: Do you think you’ve got a different or more 
enhanced surveillance system here and that could be why? 
SW3b: “I don’t know, I suppose they have a surveillance 
system.” 
SW3a: “Yeah, but that could be a reason for us seeing the 
signal much earlier, than some of the other countries.” 
SW3b: “Sure, sure.” 
Interviewer: Canada is one of my countries that I’m going to 
so, I should… 
SW3b: “Right, ask them about narcolepsy, why haven’t they 
seen any, was it a different vaccine…” 
Interviewer: They had the same vaccine? 
SW3a: “They had the Arepanrix.” 
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SW3b: “It’s not actually the same, but it’s very similar…” 
SW3a: “They’re a different manufacturing procedure…” 
SW3b: “There are some differences in the manufacturing 
procedure.” 
In Japan, there was a demand for the domestic pandemic 
vaccine to be produced and when the pandemic vaccine from 
GSK arrived, it had a very low uptake. It was explained that 
the reason for this was: “Because one of the side effects of the 
one from overseas was fever.” (JA4) 
Interviewer: That was a concern to the people here? 
“Yeah that was part of it. I don’t think that the vaccine from 
overseas was widely available to the general public, so you 
had to meet current criteria. I believe and that was confirmed, 
that the vaccine from overseas couldn’t be used for the 
general public, it was not even distributed for use.” (JA4) 
Interviewer: So was it priority groups like healthcare workers 
and essential workers? 
“I don’t even think it was given to medical practitioners. I 
don’t think we used the GSK vaccine, we gave it to a few 
patients for research purposes. I don’t remember why.” (JA4) 
As also covered by participant JA5: ”Yes from UK 
GlaxoSmithKline. I have never heard of a patient who has 
received that vaccine. I know they’re imported, that vaccines 
were imported but I never heard of patients who were 
immunised with this.” 
Interviewer: Okay, do you know why that is? Were they 
waiting for the domestic one? 
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“We like Japanese products that’s the reason and also we are 
very conscious of the adverse effect of newly produced or 
reported vaccines.” (JA5) 
Interviewer: Okay, so is there a higher trust in the Japanese 
produced vaccine? 
“And also some side effects were reported I think in the news, 
so not so many patients were immunised through that.” (JA5) 
 
5.4.7.4 Legacy of side effects 
Concerns were raised by Swedish interviewees that the 
narcolepsy reports that have surfaced post the 2009 pandemic 
influenza vaccination campaign may have damaged Sweden’s 
potential future response with engaging with the general 
public about the importance of vaccination. “…I don’t think 
that the people in common will be, how should I say, 
obedient? I don’t think they will follow the instructions from 
the national agencies, the way they did in 2009, they took a 
large part of responsibility for themselves, but they vaccinated 
themselves to protect others, so a sort of way of solidarity. I 
think people will be more afraid of vaccines. It will be more of 
the individual, we see it nowadays with the general 
vaccination program, that people are more hesitant, so I… but 
if you ask me, I think we still did the right thing, we acted on 
the news that we got, a new strain that is spreading and it 
could be severe, high mortality in certain age groups, it’s very 
very hard to not to respond to that, it’s much easier to look in 
the mirror, in the retrospect, when you have all the 
information, it’s much easier, but when you are there and you 
have to make a decision. But it’s really hard to say, I don’t 
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know, I think we still have a political, the politicians still say 
that we should vaccinate the whole population if it would come 
again, so their view hasn’t changed, but I mean I think the 
people in common, they are not interested the way they were. 
But it depends, if you get a severe influenza, it will change 
overnight.” (SW2) 
“I think that left a real bad taste, otherwise I think that the 
information to the public, the effectiveness of the vaccine, I 
think everybody was kind of content at that time, and they felt 
safe, that the society took care of them and so on. We did a 
lot of work to coordinating the information to the public, that 
was a huge job and we did a lot of it here, yeah.” (SW7)  
“The main impact is the side effect, of narcolepsy, of course 
that’s a very very tragic, extremely tragic, I think it’s a, it will 
be put in the history books of medicine, like thalidomide, you 
know like the event in the 60s for example, this is about the 
same I think. So it’s extremely tragic and of course that’s 
been one of the major impacts and of course we are a little bit 
afraid that the willingness to be vaccinated next time, will 
decline as a result of that.” (SW4) 
 
5.4.8 Vaccine communications and the media 
 
5.4.8.1 Reports of first A(H1N1) mortality event 
The first reported deaths due to the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic were major events in the pandemic 
 255 
 
response and attracted media and public attention. The study 
countries of Sweden, Japan and Canadian spoke about the 
first influenza associated deaths impact: “then there were 
occasions when we had the first death in Sweden or people 
that were very very ill and perhaps some kids died and so on 
and then there was a big media discussion about that and 
then about the vaccine of course, who should have it and so 
on, but I think there were mostly in the media they were like 
reporting the thing that the agency said.” (SW1) 
A few of Canadian participants drew on memories of an early 
mortality event that became a media headline and created 
anxiety amongst the general public concerning the danger of 
pandemic influenza. A previously healthy school boy who had 
played hockey within the last few days died as a result of 
contracting pandemic influenza A(H1N1) and caused great 
shock across Canada and resulted in a public demand for the 
vaccine: “Again, with the vaccine issue there was, I don’t 
know when it occurred in the pandemic but there was a death 
of a, I think a 16 year old boy here in Ontario and that really I 
think brought things home to people.  Across the country 
there was a very high media attention and that created huge 
demand right across the country for vaccine and really, I 
think, brought attention to the pandemic.” (CA2) The memory 
was also recalled by these participants:  
CA3b: “there was a young hockey player in Ontario.” 
CA3a: “That’s right.” 
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CA3b: “And that one really hit the media, like 12 years old or 
something like that, died from H1N1, and that was, that was 
huge.” 
CA3a: “And then, and then the next day like six hour line ups 
for people…” 
And this participant as well: “One of the real, it’s really 
interesting to see the intersection of media and public health 
because one of the real take off points for our immunisation 
programme was the death of a teenager in Toronto, a young 
boy who was a hockey player, I’m not sure, 12, 14, 
something, but a young hockey player and who was well and 
then two days later had died of H1N1 influenza and so this 
was at the very front end when we were starting to roll out 
our vaccine programme so it really caused a real run on, real 
pressure on vaccine and, yeah.” (CA5) 
 
5.4.8.2 Individuals lambasted in the media for queue-
jumping  
At the beginning of the vaccination campaign, certain groups, 
those deemed risk groups during the pandemic influenza, 
were eligible to receive the vaccine initially. Where individuals 
or groups, in a sense, queue jumped ahead of these people 
and had the vaccine before their time, the media and general 
public were stunned by their actions. The outcome of these 
instances meant that people stuck more strictly to the 
immunisation order outlined in the campaign, as illustrated 
here: “So one of the other things, we were talking about 
things that made the media, once the vaccine got rolled out, 
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like the first week, one of our national hockey teams ended up 
getting vaccinated before anybody else, the Calgary Flames.” 
(CA3a) 
Interviewer: “How did they get that?” 
“Yeah, we’re not sure who authorised them to get the product, 
but that was a huge, like people were not pleased.  And so 
then nobody else, like everybody else respected the, the 
allocations after that, yeah.” (CA3a) 
Although there was a media and public upset about one of the 
hockey teams getting vaccinated before their schedule, in 
other countries, famous people and country heads have been 
filmed or photographed and shown by the media getting the 
vaccinated in order to boost public confidence and increase 
immunisation uptake rates. For instance, President Barak 
Obama was filmed by news channels getting the pandemic 
influenza vaccine in the early days of the United States 
vaccination campaign. Perhaps this hockey team may have 
helped with public confidence in the vaccine and contributed to 
vaccine uptake rates.  
When the priority groups were set by the government, people 
were expected to strictly follow the schedule order. The 
importance of keeping to the priority order as set out by 
government was emphasised in Japan. One instance, where a 
medic prioritised a family member was exposed in the media 
as a national scandal: “That was very strict first of all, very 
strict, for example one of the doctors at the clinic gave the 
vaccine, that was prepared for medical staff, to his grandson. 
At that time one of the doctors gave the vaccine to his 
grandson during the immunization period for only medical 
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staff at the end of October. So this was broadcasted to all of 
Japan, that was written in Japan. Yeah, his grandson with 
asthma, in Hyogo is near Osaka, a clinic doctor with the 
pandemic vaccine. […] Yes everyone can read it and on 
television. Very strict, the Japanese custom. It’s not a big 
news I think for you, but in Japan it’s a big news.” (JA5)  
 
5.4.8.3 Media supporting the effectiveness of the vaccine 
Countries spoke about the role of the media in assisting with 
the pandemic influenza response by releasing information 
about the efficacy of the vaccine and promoting uptake. For 
instance, the media covered the effectiveness of the pandemic 
influenza vaccine in older persons: “I know there was, there 
was a lot of press about the efficacy of the vaccine, 
particularly in older age groups, was it really, was it really 
effective, but they also said that some people that were older 
would have had some old immunity, so that it was less of an 
issue for them, so it wasn’t maybe the vaccine that was 
protecting them, it was the previous exposures because they 
were that much older, yeah.” (CA1) 
 
5.4.8.4 Media reporting on the safety concerns and 
adverse effects of the vaccines 
The other role of the media was to challenge key pandemic 
influenza response personnel regarding safety concerns and 
risk of adverse effects of the newly produced pandemic 
influenza vaccines. For example, the media discussed a 
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particular batch of the influenza pandemic vaccine that was 
associated with a higher than deemed usual amount of 
adverse events: “Well, I was, one lot that seemed to be 
associated with a higher level of adverse events, and so that 
created a bit of a media issue, but it was one lot of, I don’t 
know how many lots were actually released.” (CA1) 
Interviewer: Do you mean by fever and things like that … 
“Yeah, I don’t know exactly what the profile was of the 
adverse events but it was anaphylactic shock, I think there 
was a higher than expected, and again there was a lot of 
investigation done both by the company and by Health 
Canada, and there was never anything determined that could 
suggest that the lot was associated, that it may have just 
been an anomaly.  But there was a need to track where that 
lot had gone and to bring back samples for testing, number 
one, and then to make sure that it, whatever was left at that 
lot was embargoed and then brought back to the company.”  
(CA1) 
Those who had worked on the pandemic influenza response 
faced challenging questions from the media concerning 
narcolepsy reports: “Actually, I’ve been on a panel on TV one 
morning, on a morning sofa or something like that, when all 
these cases of narcolepsy were coming out, and the reporter 
asked me a question. Would you still recommend this, if you 
know this, you know the narcolepsy and the vaccine and so 
on, so I was responsible for the whole government at that 
time, and I said it’s always easy, it’s the same answer I gave, 
it’s always easy to be wise afterwards.” (SW7) 
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Interviewer: When you have all the information. 
SW7: “Yes, you always tend to be wiser afterwards, but at 
that time I thought it was the right decision, my children are 
vaccinated, so that’s the way it is I think, but it’s hard, it’s 
really hard, especially when you meet those children I think.”  
Interviewer: Has there been a huge media focus on individual 
cases? 
SW7: “Yes, yes, yes, it has. But in the same time it hasn’t 
been the same media focus on people dying with the 
influenza. So that’s interesting in a way.”  
 
5.4.9 Risk communications regarding vaccines 
Communications during the 2009-10 pandemic influenza 
involved the internet and social media to a far greater extent 
than previous infectious disease events which would have 
dominated domains such as TV and newspapers. The speed of 
communications on the internet and social media was much 
faster than that of previous communications so pandemic 
influenza response personnel needed to adapt their method of 
public health messaging to concurrent popularities. The need 
to actively manage and have a communications strategy was 
considered very important: both in releasing new information 
and addressing circulating stories. The power of one negative 
story could undermine a colossal amount of national public 
health work. Communication work was explained as being 
very resource intensive and challenging during a time of 
uncertainty. It was difficult for public health officials to speak 
with confidence about a vaccine that was new to use and 
where there was no fixed availability date. Consistent 
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messaging is important but efforts can be derailed in instances 
where new knowledge requires the need to change public 
health messages. 
“I think it’s just public awareness and messaging around the 
vaccine.  I think also what was different about this event than 
SARS, which is probably a global issue, is the impact of the 
internet and social media, that during SARS you would have, 
TV and the newspaper would be your predominant source of 
information, either daily, weekly or whatever, everything was, 
the pressure of having in time and there was all kinds, there 
were videos circulating.  There was one on the H1N1 vaccine 
with somebody walking backwards that went viral about, and 
it was actually turned out later to be a hoax, but they had 
somebody with serious neurological effects that were walking 
and they posted it as look what happened after I took the 
vaccine and […..] how one really negative message that may 
not even be based on anything factual can override positive 
messaging.” (CA1)  
An issue that arose in the territories of Canada related to 
additional resources sourced during the pandemic influenza 
and became a media headline: “Yeah, yeah, and then our 
most negative media for First Nations Inuit Health Branch was 
the fact that one of the nurses was plan, like supplies were an 
issue all around, and so she was doing her ordering, and she 
thought she was being, how’s the word?  She was, everybody 
was told like order more things of whatever, so she ordered 
more body bags for five particular communities than she 
normally would.  And so one of the, the chiefs found out and 
got upset and then went to the media, and then the media 
was like oh, Health Canada, this was before the vaccine came 
 262 
 
out, this was in September, they were like oh, so Health 
Canada is planning, instead of vaccine they’re planning to use 
body bags…” (CA3b)   
The vaccine and communication were considered crucial 
during the pandemic influenza response in Canada: “Yeah.  I 
think vaccine is really one of, the crucial one, crucial almost 
and communication.  Communication I cannot emphasise the 
importance of communication, and communication with the 
public, with the healthcare practitioners, just across the 
spectrum.  Communication was such a challenge and, yeah, 
huge, I can’t even begin, yeah.  And so again that’s something 
that we’ve really identified as a critical element and are trying 
to work on things like developing clinical guidance, processes 
for developing clinical guidance during the pandemics or in 
response to urgent events or things like, yeah, educational 
materials, developing antiviral guidance, having those things 
ready to go so that when you need them it’s a matter of 
updating them, tweaking them, changing the H1N1 to an 
H12N46 or whatever, being, there’s something about 
communication is just such a critical thing and it’s so 
fascinating and I have to tell you that this is probably not a 
very popular idea.  It’s the one that I feel I have the least 
hope for. Human nature is what human nature is, right?  And 
communication is such a challenging thing and I can see for 
vaccines and for antivirals I see all of these things that we’re 
doing make any difference.  Communication it’s just so hard to 
get it right.  And it’s the one thing that I can guarantee you 
will be the critical, will be a critical loop link every time.” (CA5) 
Providing communications during a time of uncertainty was 
difficult: “Also we didn’t know when the vaccine would be 
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available and or the effectiveness of the vaccine, so that was a 
difficult communication strategy with the public, it was 
untested, we didn’t have data, true data on its safety and 
efficacy, or effectiveness early on and that, from a 
communications strategy is very, very difficult and risk 
communication strategy to the public, and to physicians right?  
I mean it’s the nurses and physicians that are putting needles 
to arms and they have to be aware of the risks and we were 
using a new vaccine, an adjuvanted vaccine which hadn’t been 
used in Canada before, at all, so those were big unknowns.  
And then when was it going to take off, because we know 
there's seasonal, what was going to be the seasonal strain and 
was the seasonal strain going to have any impact?  Should we 
have a seasonal vaccine, should we also have the H1N1 
vaccine, and who differentially is going to have, be affected by 
the virus.  So there were significant questions, and then from 
a system response vantage point, we need leadership from 
the, you know in Canada it’s the Province that funds health, 
we needed leadership from the Province in terms of what 
would be funded, what won’t be funded, how will we, what 
communication strategy are we going to have at a provincial 
level, and will it work hand in glove with the Federal level 
because you know we have a, I would say a fractured health 
care system in terms of leadership.” (CA6)   
The forms of risk communication were similar across 
countries: press realises, website content, posters, TV 
adverts, newspaper pieces, social media, etc. “And all the 
news that we had, that was connected to the pandemic, was 
published on this website, and it started in April 2009, here is 
an article about treatment and vaccination for example. And 
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then it goes up to, so all the news that we had were collected 
here and for example, I said that we published summarises 
about adverse events that were reported. Here for example, 
status for reported adverse events of Pandemrix and then we 
did that continuously, and then at some point after the 
vaccination campaign was over, we made a final report and 
right after that we had this signal of narcolepsy and that work 
has been going on and is still going on since then. But all 
these articles are collected here.” (SW3a) 
Countries health risk communications were an attempt to be 
transparent and provide up-to-date information about the 
current disease activity within and outside each country, 
provide information concerning the actions individuals could 
take to prevent illness, build trust between government 
officials and the public, and to stamp out any surfacing 
inaccuracies and rumours. Timely risk communications were 
important and a small number of participants mentioned the 
endeavour to stay ahead of the presenting events through 
probability risk communications about pandemic influenza. A 
participant explained that within Singapore, it was described 
to the public that the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) would arrive 
into the country before any confirmed cases arrived. Once 
cases arrived, it was explained ahead of events that some 
people would experience severe illness and in rare instances 
some would die: “…public communication was very important, 
we had a very insightful Minister at that time […] he was very 
calm, he just said that, I would not be surprised by that 
situation, that situation that we would see cases of this new 
influenza in Singapore any time soon. So he kind of like pre-
empted the headlines by saying that, yeah it’s going to 
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happen, it’s not an issue at all. […] within about three weeks 
the first case of influenza was picked up by laboratory through 
lab tests you know and confirmed to be the new strain that 
had just emerged […] And then he said, I would not be 
surprised if we get our first case of death any time soon. So 
he just kind of one step ahead […] so indeed when somebody 
died subsequently it wasn’t a big issue because he said that’s 
the normal thing with influenza, so it’s a lot of communication 
and managing public you know and I think we also learnt a lot 
from him.” (SI7) 
 
5.4.10 Lessons learnt from this pandemic influenza 
vaccine response and preparations for a future pandemic 
influenza event 
Participants reflected on the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic by discussing the knowledge now known through 
the response experience. A frequent topic regarding using the 
pandemic influenza plans in the response was the need for 
flexibility so that the response could be proportional. It was 
often explained that plans needed flexibility built in so that the 
response could be tailored to a mild, moderate or severe 
pandemic influenza incorporating both low-high virulence and 
low-high severity. Plans required the ability to both scale up 
during a pandemic and also scale down a response. 
A challenge with the national responses was the differences in 
disease activity, both internationally and within countries. 
Canada and New Zealand both had cases at the start of the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic whereas Singapore did 
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not detect the first case until one month later. Similarly, as 
the WHO announced the post pandemic influenza phase in 
August 2010, New Zealand was tackling a large number of 
A(H1N1) cases. Countries experienced a large variation in 
disease activity, where a response could be well underway, 
such as the New Zealand cities, and other areas would have 
no cases, such as some of New Zealand’s small towns and 
villages. 
Both Japan and Singapore’s planning had detailed a pandemic 
response to avian influenza which proved not to be the case in 
2009.  
 
 Summary of pandemic influenza vaccine findings 5.5
This chapter has presented the vaccine results through the 
themes that were identified from data analysis. Vaccine 
sourcing and distribution were significant aspects of the 
response. Vaccine uptake rates varied between the countries 
and specific population groups, and demand for the vaccine 
was high when supply was low. Prioritising the vaccine proved 
challenging to navigate as it went against countries equitable 
access beliefs but it proved necessary during the pandemic.  
The timing of vaccination campaigns varied among the 
countries with Sweden and Canada commencing campaigns in 
October 2009 and New Zealand starting in 2010. Concerns 
about harm caused by vaccines were discussed and the role of 
communication messages and the media during pandemic 
response. The interview themes will be included in the 
following discussion chapter.   
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6 Vaccines Discussion 
 
This chapter will examine the dominant themes from the 
vaccine results section. Firstly, the use of influenza vaccines is 
reviewed, with attention given to supplier choices, differences 
between the hemispheres in response to influenza pandemics, 
and the legacy of previous influenza pandemics, in particular, 
the 1918 Spanish influenza. Secondly, specific population 
groups such as aboriginal persons and pregnant women are a 
specific focus, followed by vaccination priorities and influenza 
vaccine side effect concerns. Thirdly, the A(H1N1) disease 
activity and vaccine timing is explored alongside the perceived 
effectiveness of vaccines during the pandemic influenza 
response. 
 
 Use of vaccines during an influenza pandemic 6.1
The 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was the first time in 
an influenza pandemic scenario that multiple countries had 
access to a vaccine as a public health measure response. The 
WHO 2012 report ‘Vaccine Deployment Initiative’ outlined the 
coordination of the global donation of pandemic influenza 
vaccines to provide equitable access in resource-poor 
countries. The report explained that the “deployment effort 
was the first of its kind and moved unprecedented quantities 
of a new vaccine around the world.” (2012: p.2). The 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was the first time that these 
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quantities of vaccines were produced, and were required by an 
extraordinary number of countries. 
In the other influenza pandemics, it was not always the case 
that influenza vaccines were available as a public health 
measure. The 1918-19 A(H1N1) Spanish influenza pandemic 
was severe; it was estimated to have infected 50% of the 
global population and resulted in >40 million mortalities. This 
influenza pandemic began at the end of World War 1 and 
resulted in more deaths than those caused by the war. It 
severely affected young adults and specific populations such 
as those in Alaska, Western Samoa, and aboriginal populations 
in Australia and New Zealand (Monto and Sellwood, 2013). At 
the time of the 1918-19 Spanish influenza, vaccines were not 
invented as a public health measure, and, therefore, measures 
included border control, quarantine and bed rest, etc.  
In 1945, coinciding with the end of World War 2, the United 
States licenced inactivated influenza vaccines which involved 
the procedure of producing “more highly purified vaccines in 
which reactogenic contaminants had been removed.” (Keitel, 
Neuzil and Treanor, 2013: p.313). Hens eggs facilitated the 
growth of influenza virus and resulted in the large-scale 
production of seasonal influenza vaccines for the first time 
(Carrasco and Leroux-Roels, 2013).  
Influenza vaccines were used on a small scale during the 1957 
A(H2N2) Asian influenza pandemic and the 1968 A(H3N2) 
Hong Kong influenza pandemic. The United States intended to 
vaccinate against A(H2N2) in 1957 to prevent morbidity and 
mortality rates but the vaccine production only provided small 
quantities of vaccine. When influenza peaked in October 1957, 
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17 million doses had been manufactured but were too late to 
make an impact on the pandemic (Henderson et al., 2009). As 
explained by Henderson et al. (2009: p.272): “The national 
spread of the disease was so rapid that within 3 months it had 
swept throughout the country and had largely disappeared. It 
was reported that with the end of the fall epidemic, demands 
for vaccine declined sharply.” Similarly, vaccines for the 1968 
A(H3N2) Hong Kong influenza pandemic appear to have rarely 
been used; this has been inferred by the lack of literature 
found on this subject. In the article by Fukumi (1969), there is 
mention that some outbreaks of influenza infections occurred 
in August 1968 in the Japanese vaccine laboratories, and 
further investigation found that cases were confirmed but did 
not spread easily to close contacts.  
Developments in the field of vaccine types have produced a 
‘whole virus’ that is inactivated, as well as ‘split virion’ which 
involves procedures of virus disruption and in the case of 
‘subunit’, the partial extraction of antigens. Since 1977, the 
trivalent inactivated vaccines (TIV) have been utilised in 
seasonal influenza vaccines which have allowed for the 
inclusion of three circulating influenza strains (two A and one 
B virus) and the standardisation of 15µg haemagglutinin 
protein (HA) antigen per strain. Typically children received half 
of this HA dose in comparison to adults and more recent 
research has indicated that the senior population would 
benefit from a higher HA dose (Keitel, Neuzil and Treanor, 
2013; Carrasco and Leroux-Roels, 2013). Subsequently, two 
distinct influenza B viruses have been identified as circulating 
as of the 1970s (Hay et al., 2001) which has led to research in 
the vaccine field for a quadrivalent vaccine to include two A 
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and two B virus strains in the seasonal influenza vaccine 
(Keitel, Neuzil and Treanor, 2013). Eggs have largely been 
utilised to grow influenza viruses in embryonated hens’ eggs 
but during an influenza pandemic, this can potentially create 
availability problems in vaccine production. 
From the 1930s, aluminium was used as an adjuvant in 
vaccines and continued to be used for many decades. In 
addition, another adjuvant involved oil-in-water combinations. 
Over time more vaccines containing adjuvant were included, 
for example, it was incorporated within the influenza vaccine 
in the 2000s (Pasquale et al., 2015). Inactivated influenza 
vaccines are produced in either adjuvanted or non-adjuvanted 
preparations. The benefits of using adjuvants instead of non-
adjuvanted preparations include increased immunogenicity 
and better vaccine availability as more doses can be produced 
using less antigen (Pasquale et al., 2015). 
Prior to the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, several 
countries purchased H5N1 pre-pandemic influenza vaccines in 
an effort to provide an immediate vaccine in a novel H5N1 
influenza scenario. The concern was that in the event of a 
future pandemic influenza, vaccine production would be too 
time-consuming and not be available for the first and even 
possibly the second wave of influenza infection. Before 2009, 
H5N1 pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiles were considered to 
have “the potential to cut the number and severity of cases, 
but only if two doses are delivered before the onset of a 
pandemic, which may be logistically difficult to organise.” 
(Jennings et al., 2008: p.656).  
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Pre-pandemic influenza vaccines are an example of an 
anticipatory public health policy approach. Anticipatory 
measures have been estimated to be cost-effective whereby 
$1 spent in advance on preparedness can offset $4 in 
emergency relief spending and that prepared communities are 
more resilient to threats (DeLeo, 2016). Pandemic influenzas 
are acknowledged threats and, therefore, fit into the category 
of anticipatory problems, and although they are anticipatory, 
when risks and hazards such as pandemics do occur they are 
not detached from the associated uncertainty. Policymakers 
that participate in anticipatory policymaking ensure that they 
are able to act in times of uncertainty (DeLeo, 2016). Thus, 
pre-pandemic influenza vaccines are one example of 
anticipatory policymaking, and pandemic influenza vaccine 
agreements with manufacturers is another.  
Pre-pandemic influenza vaccines present more risks than 
typical influenza vaccine purchases to national policy makers. 
Firstly, will an influenza pandemic occur before the vaccines 
reach their expiration date? Secondly, will the stockpile of pre-
pandemic influenza vaccines match the pandemic virus that 
emerges? Even in 2008, Jennings et al. pointed out that 
stockpiles of the H5N1 vaccines were nearing the expiry date 
and would require government decisions on their use in an 
interpandemic period or go unused. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is now known that the purchase of H5N1 pre-
pandemic influenza vaccines was a mismanagement of 
resources due to the emergence of a novel influenza A(H1N1) 
virus in 2009: the threat of H5N1 does still remain, however in 
2016, the stockpiled pre-pandemic vaccines have either 
expired or almost reached expiry date. As a result, this short 
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experience has shown how pre-pandemic influenza vaccines 
are a double-risk and present complicated decisions for 
national policy makers to navigate.  
The 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was the first time 
that many countries could access large amounts of vaccine 
which created issues surrounding public demand for, and 
expectation of, vaccination within a short time. Prior to 2009, 
this scarcity issue was commonly recognised, so many 
countries entered into pandemic influenza vaccine agreements 
with manufacturers. This both acted as a reserve holding of a 
number of vaccines per country and informed pharmaceutical 
companies of potential vaccine requirements. Vaccine 
manufacturers were experienced with en-masse vaccination 
through the provision of seasonal influenza vaccines 
biannually, as well as childhood vaccination programmes. 
Multiple manufacturers provide these vaccines and this has set 
a precedent whereby countries may enter into pandemic 
influenza vaccine procurement agreements with a variety of 
suppliers.  
The 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was the first time 
that the procurement of pandemic influenza vaccines was 
tested in real life. A common issue that arose from this 
measure was the inflexibility of contracts. For instance, in the 
case of the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, as 2009 
progressed it was found that both the need for, as assessed 
by key national pandemic influenza response personnel, and 
the demand from the public for the vaccine waned. In these 
cases, countries wished to reduce influenza vaccine orders and 
make amendments to contracts. 
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One of the legacies for the future born out of the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic will concern the excess vaccines 
faced by a number of the study countries. The interviewees 
explained that they had faced criticisms for the unused 
vaccines; some were questioned if they had over reacted in 
their response to the pandemic influenza and others were 
criticised for wasting resources and for the economic cost. The 
legacy of excess vaccines may influence future policy 
decisions, where for instance far fewer vaccines are ordered. 
Alternatively, the ordering of vaccines may be able to move to 
a more real-time ordering process or countries may be able to 
order vaccines in batches rather than one contract order so 
that waste is minimised. A phased order process would allow 
countries to place vaccine orders in balance with the vaccine 
demand and uptake rates, which would maintain the 
appearance to the public of waste avoidance. This would 
reduce the desire to amend a vaccine order contract later into 
a pandemic influenza response if countries are faced with 
unused vaccines.  
The experience of excess vaccines may also influence future 
policy decisions regarding vaccine donations to other 
countries. Admittedly, the researcher did not draw participants 
into conversation on country vaccine donations but many 
countries faced the issue of excess vaccines and as a 
consequence, the option of vaccine donations became 
apparent. However, the experience of the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic was an example of vaccine donations 
arriving too late and in a reactionary response. It is apparent 
that further work on a formalised real-time donation 
programme is required where those evaluated as most 
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vulnerable to severe illness and mortality, and in economic 
need of support, receive vaccines. The Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) Framework, which became effective from 
2011, has a global role in the sharing of preparedness and 
response to pandemic influenza and one element of PIP 
includes the goal of increasing developing countries access to 
vaccines. In the future, an international approach to a pool of 
bought vaccines and dissemination may occur in countries that 
would typically procure vaccines from a pharmaceutical 
company. In 2013, the European Parliament and the Council 
of the European Union published their decision concerning the 
serious cross-border threats to health. This legislative act 
formally enabled EU Member States to voluntarily form a 
group that could jointly procure vaccines in a pandemic 
influenza scenario. This would enable participating countries to 
have a greater opportunity to obtain the best purchase price, 
possible order flexibility and equitable access to vaccines by 
partaking countries.  
In this research, it was reported that countries tended to 
follow two distinct approaches in pandemic influenza vaccine 
supply: single pharmaceutical company supplier (e.g. Canada, 
Sweden, New Zealand) or multiple suppliers (e.g. Japan, 
Singapore). Countries also followed two distinct approaches 
for the type of pandemic influenza vaccine provided: 
monovalent (Sweden, Canada, Japan, Singapore) and trivalent 
seasonal influenza vaccine containing the specific A(H1N1) 
component (e.g. New Zealand). The decision of how to source 
the influenza vaccine during 2009, as well as the type of 
vaccine provided, can be explained by how countries manage 
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risk at a time of great uncertainty. The supplier approach shall 
be explained in the next section. 
 
6.1.1 Single or multiple pandemic vaccine suppliers 
The study countries single or multiple supplier vaccine 
arrangements during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic was an interesting interview topic that highlighted 
the differing approaches by countries in securing influenza 
vaccines during a pandemic scenario.  
Singapore and Japan both had multiple supplier vaccine 
agreements which potentially enabled the sourcing of the 
vaccine as quickly as possible and reduced the risk of reliance 
on one pharmaceutical company in an emergency public 
health situation. The importance of securing vaccines to Japan 
and Singapore located in this region of the world may be 
reflected by past experience of infectious diseases. 
Historically, pandemics have been recorded as originating 
from Asia, and in the twenty-first century South-East Asia 
experienced outbreaks of A(H5N1) influenza and severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) (Monto and Sellwood, 2013), as 
well as other infectious diseases including Nipah virus, 
chikungunya and dengue virus (Lee and Pang, 2013). These 
diseases prior to 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic gave 
the first-hand experience in infectious disease response 
measures in several countries, including Singapore and 
Canada, and countries went on to focus on pandemic 
preparedness. This experience in Singapore and Japan’s 
neighbouring countries, coupled with the anticipated 
 276 
 
emergence of a novel pandemic influenza from Asia, provide 
an understanding of the multiple supplier vaccine 
arrangements. The reduction of risk and the speed of sourcing 
vaccines in a pandemic were summarised by a participant in 
the results section: “…to not put your eggs all in one basket 
because supply, demand and supply…” (SI2). 
In comparison, Sweden, Canada and New Zealand opted for a 
singular pharmaceutical company supplier route for the 
developed pandemic influenza vaccine. Canada, like Japan, 
had a supply of vaccines that were made domestically in the 
country, whereas Sweden and New Zealand had to buy the 
vaccines into the country from abroad. Canada and Sweden 
noted that they were amongst the first countries to receive 
the pandemic vaccine. Therefore, the feeling of being first in 
line might have contributed to an attitude of reduced risk and 
the need not to have multiple suppliers. The pandemic 
influenza vaccine supply to New Zealand was held with a 
regional manufacturer (Jennings, 2013), however, as 
explained by interviewees, the size of New Zealand and their 
presence in comparison to other much larger countries would 
mean that they would not be the first to gain the vaccine and 
therefore much emphasis was placed on other public health 
measures such as antivirals, border management and health 
communications.  
Interestingly, as noted in the Hine (2010) report on the UK’s 
pandemic influenza response, the UK had a multiple supplier 
vaccine agreements which perhaps indicated the UK’s 
discomfort at the time to ‘put all their eggs in one basket’ and 
the pressure to source a speedy and sufficient quantity of 
vaccines. Since the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, the 
 277 
 
2010 ‘Standing Senate Social Affairs Science and Technology’ 
report on the Canadian pandemic influenza response, noted 
that in the future contract in Canada would have “…the added 
change of having a backup supplier of pandemic vaccine. 
There is no requirement for the backup supplier to be 
domestic.” (2010: p.31). The new contract established in 2011 
required “…that the government must take steps to ensure 
that the backup supplier will add to Canada’s ability to ensure 
access to a safe and sufficient supply of pandemic vaccine.” 
(2010: p.viii). The report from Sweden concerning their 
preparations and management of the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic by Socialstyrelsen (2011) made no 
mention of multiple suppliers in a future pandemic influenza 
vaccine but that: “Future vaccine contracts should be more 
flexible, incorporating the possibility of staggered orders, a 
renegotiation option to meet changed conditions, and a focus 
on the treatment needed to achieve satisfactory protection 
rather than on a stipulation of two doses per person.” 
(Socialstyrelsen, 2011: p.40) 
 
6.1.2 Hemisphere vaccine response divide  
The timing of the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
disease activity in terms of the epidemiological features such 
as the arrival, waves and peaks in countries can be further 
understood with a comparison of the disease activity timings 
in twentieth-century influenza pandemics.  
As noted earlier, the 1918-19 A(H1N1) Spanish influenza 
pandemic began at the end of World War 1 (Monto and 
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Sellwood, 2013), with the United States reporting outbreaks in 
several locations including army camps in March 1918 
(Detroit, South Carolina and San Quentin Prison). Then the 
influenza appeared in France and other parts of Europe and 
United States areas associated with World War One troop boat 
landings in April 1918 (Oxford, 2000; Hsieh et al., 2006). The 
infection was reported in North Africa in May 1918 and then 
Britain, Russia, China, the Philippines and New Zealand in 
June 1918 (Potter, 2001). Outbreaks continued to occur 
during the course of the northern hemisphere summer of 
1918. However, the virus became more severe and 
widespread by autumn of 1918 (Oxford, 2000). Over two 
years A(H1N1) spread globally in an eastwards direction at 
first and along shipping trade routes (Potter, 2001). “Many 
countries experienced second (1918-19) and third waves 
(1919-20) of the more virulent form of infection. No figures 
exist for many parts of the world, but the pandemic is 
estimated to have infected 50% of the world’s population; 
25% suffered a clinical infection and the total mortality was 
40-50 million” (Potter, 2001: p.11).  
One of the most important lessons learnt from the 1918-19 
A(H1N1) Spanish influenza pandemic was that it could cause 
severe illness and deaths in otherwise healthy persons, with 
this pandemic ranking as one of the worst epidemics in human 
history comparable with historical events such as the Black 
Death (Potter, 2001). It spread quickly to other countries via 
shipping routes however countries such as Australia managed 
to delay the arrival of infection for several months through 
implementing quarantine measures. The influenza 
characteristics evolved during the course of the pandemic 
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meaning that the second and third waves of infection were 
more severe than first. Hospitals, morgues and the workforce, 
in general, were overwhelmed and war strategies were 
hampered by the spread of infection and resulting deaths. 
Therefore, this outbreak showed that an influenza pandemic 
can pose as much risk, threat and uncertainty within the 
global population to rival war, natural disasters and other 
diseases.  
The 1957/58 A(H2N2) Asian influenza pandemic originated in 
Asia and infections were first noted in the study countries of 
Singapore and Japan in May 1957. The infection spread and 
took hold in the southern hemisphere during the winter 
season and reached New Zealand by July. At this time, cases 
appeared on the west coast of Canada and spread in an 
eastern direction over land. Sweden reported A(H2N2) 
influenza from a land route spread westerly from Asia and 
Europe (Potter, 1998) at the end of June 1957 (Skog et al., 
2014). 
The 1968 A(H3N2) Hong Kong influenza pandemic first cases 
occurred in Asia in July 1968 and arrived in Singapore by 
August (Potter, 1998) and Japan in imported cases in August 
as well (Fukumi, 1969). Cases did not take hold in Japan until 
October 1968, with a wave peaking in January to February 
1969 (Fukumi, 1969). Cases peaked in Singapore in mid to 
late August 1968 (Lee et al. 2008). Canada’s first wave 
occurred in the winter of 1968 and peaked in January 1969 
(PHAC, 2010).   
New Zealand, due to its location in the southern hemisphere 
and the emergence of the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
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pandemic in their autumn (April 2009), managed to avoid 
many of the pressing vaccine issues as experienced by the 
northern hemisphere study countries because by the time the 
first vaccines were available New Zealand went into Spring. In 
a sense, New Zealand initially was dealt a heavy blow by being 
the first southern hemisphere country to detect cases on the 
25th April 2009 in travellers, and it later experienced a peak of 
disease activity between June and August 2009 (Jennings, 
2013). This timing corresponded to the winter season and it 
was known that in the 1918-19 pandemic influenza, the first 
wave arrived in New Zealand’s winter and was followed quickly 
by a very severe second wave in the spring. Due to these 
early cases at the end of April 2009 and the unavailability of a 
developed vaccine, New Zealand focused on other public 
health measures, using their island nation remoteness to their 
advantage. Located a four-hour flight from south-east 
Australia and with huge distances from other countries, New 
Zealand implemented strong airport screening, isolation of 
suspected cases and antiviral measures. Some interviewees 
had explained that it was possible that ILI may have become 
apparent in travellers during the course of flights and so flight 
crew and airport staffs were vigilant during the first six weeks. 
The small supply of monovalent pandemic influenza vaccines 
in New Zealand became available to healthcare workers in 
February 2010, although these vaccines had arrived into the 
country in late 2009. The monovalent vaccines were quickly 
supplanted by the seasonal trivalent vaccine incorporating 
A(H1N1). This vaccine event meant that New Zealand almost 
had the opportunity to sidestep the monovalent pandemic 
vaccine controversy reported by the northern hemisphere 
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countries, through rolling out the seasonal influenza vaccine 
that included A(H1N1). For the next pandemic influenza, if it is 
compatible with disease emergence and vaccine procurement, 
problems associated with a one-off mass vaccination 
programme will be avoided if the novel circulating strain of 
influenza can be included in the seasonal trivalent vaccine 
such as the New Zealand experience, as long as the pandemic 
target groups correspond to seasonal influenza groups. For 
instance, in the UK the pandemic influenza vaccine strategy 
prioritised children (Hine, 2010) but at that time, children 
were not targeted in seasonal influenza vaccination 
campaigns. However, developments since the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in the UK have seen the 
introduction of seasonal influenza vaccination campaigns in 
childhood from 2013 (Department of Health, 2013) which 
would normalise influenza vaccination in this population group.  
It is likely this hemisphere divide in vaccine response as 
demonstrated in the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic will 
perpetuate in future pandemics if disease activity corresponds 
to peaks in autumn and winter seasons (as typical in 
temperate countries seasonal influenza patterns) and the 
months required for vaccine development and production stay 
the same.  
It is interesting to speculate the potential impact of pandemic 
influenza vaccines in New Zealand, had the vaccines been 
available within 6 months, such as in Sweden. New Zealand’s 
first wave of 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic occurred 
between April and December 2009, with a peak between June 
and August, then cases plummeted in early 2010 until the 
second wave of influenza activity between July and October 
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2010, with a peak in August 2010 of about two-thirds the 
amount of the first wave peak. The second wave corresponded 
to annual seasonal influenza trends in New Zealand 
(Bandaranayake, 2011).  
The vaccination campaign in Sweden commenced in mid-
October 2009 using the monovalent A(H1N1) vaccine and had 
dwindled by February 2010. When considered beside Sweden’s 
first wave of disease activity it can be noted that the timing 
corresponded loosely with the first wave of disease activity, 
which peaked in November. Approximately 50% of the 
population had received one dose of the vaccine by December 
2009, with rates far greater in medical risk groups (Örtqvist et 
al. 2011; Socialstyrelsen, 2011). Sweden did not go on to 
have another wave.  
Countries located in the northern hemisphere typically opted 
for the monovalent A(H1N1) vaccine thus missing the trivalent 
influenza vaccine that year but New Zealand, similarly to other 
southern hemisphere countries had a choice: use the 
monovalent A(H1N1) vaccine; use the 2010 trivalent influenza 
vaccine including A(H1N1); use the monovalent A(H1N1) 
vaccine followed by a trivalent influenza vaccine. New Zealand 
had a forward purchasing agreement for pandemic vaccines 
and this provided the seasonal trivalent influenza vaccine 
including A(H1N1) between April and September 2010. During 
the pandemic, New Zealand made another agreement 
whereby 300,000 doses of non-adjuvanted monovalent 
A(H1N1) vaccine (Celvapan® H1N1) were secured for 
healthcare workers. This was received at the end of 2009 but 
not released for use until February 2010 (Bandaranayake, 
2011; Jennings, 2013).  
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If New Zealand had been able to provide the monovalent 
A(H1N1) vaccine to the wider population, had commenced a 
vaccination campaign at the start of 2010, where cases 
reportedly had fallen to zero after the first wave of disease 
activity, and had been able to share a similar uptake rate 
achieved in Sweden, then could have a second wave have 
been avoided? It was reported that between January and 
October 2010, New Zealand reported 1,768 confirmed cases of 
A(H1N1) influenza, of which 732 were hospitalised and 15 died 
(Bandaranayake, 2011). As reported earlier, the timing of New 
Zealand’s second wave did not occur until July 2010; with the 
benefit of hindsight, this gave several months whereby a 
monovalent A(H1N1) vaccine was developed and available for 
purchase. New Zealand, reported an uptake rate of about 24% 
of the population immunised against A(H1N1) influenza in 
2010 (Bandaranayake, 2011), had New Zealand been able to 
achieve higher rates of immunisation and an earlier 
monovalent A(H1N1) vaccine campaign, how many of the 
2010 influenza cases may have been evaded? Borse et al. 
(2013) have modelled that a vaccination campaign in the 
United States during 2009 could have prevented 4.2 million 
cases if it had commenced 8 weeks earlier. The timing of 
vaccination campaigns is a significant subject covered in more 
detail later in this chapter. 
The benefit of New Zealand’s vaccination approach meant that 
they could implement a typical seasonal influenza vaccination 
campaign, that would provide protection to those immunised 
against the circulating A(H1N1) virus and could be rolled out 
as per a typical seasonal influenza campaign. The 2010 
trivalent influenza vaccine including A(H1N1) rolled out as a 
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seasonal influenza campaign both would have benefited the 
healthcare sector in terms of staff working conditions and the 
use of resources, but it may have helped reduce the 
perception of risk to the public in a pandemic influenza 
scenario. Framing the vaccination within the typical public 
health measure of annual influenza vaccination may have 
helped avoid the subject of adjuvant in the monovalent 
A(H1N1) vaccine and sidestep the associated perception of 
risk and, therefore, increase the acceptance the vaccine. 
 
6.1.3 Legacy of 1918 pandemic influenza 
The 1918 pandemic influenza was referenced in both planning 
documents and interviews and has provided knowledge on the 
devastating potential impact of pandemic influenza. Although 
just shy of a century ago the 1918 pandemic influenza 
weighed heavily on key pandemic influenza response 
personnel and one learning outcome from that pandemic 
influenza was that the second wave was characterised as 
being much more severe than the first. This was referenced by 
some country participants and supported the need to provide 
appropriate public health measures should history repeat itself 
with a severe second wave of disease activity. Even though 
some participants referenced evidence at the time indicating 
that the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic first weeks 
were mild, and that the belief that the second wave would 
likely be equally mild, the uncertainty provided by prior 
historical pandemic influenza events and the inability to 
provide guarantees about future disease activity during 
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pandemic influenza, meant that countries provided large 
quantities of pandemic influenza vaccine to their citizens.  
What was interesting were the missing references to the 1957 
and 1968 influenza pandemics, which although were less 
severe than the 1918 influenza, would have been lived 
experiences by some of the interviewees. Instead, knowledge 
of the 2003 SARS high rates of fatality and quick transmission 
to many countries and the threat posed by avian influenza 
virus A(H5N1) as a potential future influenza pandemic were 
presented.  
 
6.1.4 Aboriginal populations  
In past influenza pandemics, and indeed, the pattern occurred 
again in the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, aboriginal 
populations were disproportionately affected by novel 
influenza in terms of increased severity of influenza illness and 
increased deaths. Rice (2005) reported that: “By far the most 
striking feature of the 1918 influenza pandemic in New 
Zealand is the massive difference between European and 
Maori death rates. Maori were seven times more likely than 
Europeans to die from the flu.” (2005: p.159). This death rate 
imbalance is all the more emphasised by the statement of Pool 
(1973) that: “The influenza pandemic of 1918-19 was the 
most important outbreak of disease from any cause in 20th-
century New Zealand.” (1973: p.274). Likewise, reports from 
the United States (Groom et al., 2009) and Australia of 
(Massey et al., 2009) found that aboriginal populations were 
severely affected by the 1918-19 influenza pandemic in 
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comparison to other population groups and city dwellers. 
Similarly, the First Nations and Inuit populations in Canada 
fared badly in the 1918-19 pandemic influenza with reports of 
the death rate to be over five times higher than the Canadian 
national average (Humphreys, 2009). 
This historical evidence of how aboriginal populations were 
disproportionately affected in past influenza pandemics may 
have perhaps contributed to Canada’s and New Zealand’s 
sensitivity to this equality issue. New Zealand prioritised the 
influenza vaccine and provided it to specific groups at no cost; 
this included Maori and Pacific Island persons living in New 
Zealand. Canada did not prioritise the pandemic influenza 
vaccine to First Nation and Inuit populations but indirectly 
prioritised the majority of these persons by prioritising 
“individuals living in rural and remote settings” (Standing 
Senate Social Affairs Science and Technology, 2010: p.34). 
Interviewees in Canada explained that one of the first areas to 
receive batches of pandemic influenza vaccines were the 
northern territories in Canada. This was challenging for key 
pandemic influenza response personnel as the working 
circumstances involved mobilisation in severe weather 
conditions, remote locations (at times no running water or 
alcohol sanitizer allowed on the premise) and lone nurse 
practitioners working at medical stations.  
Overall, pandemic influenza vaccination uptake rates in 
Canada were reported to be highest amongst the aboriginal 
populations. However, this vaccination campaign to target this 
specific group first, in what could be described as positive 
discrimination to perhaps to avoid a repeat of historical 
inequality, almost failed at the beginning. Canadian 
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interviewees explained that a great deal of resources were 
invested in promoting the safeness of the pandemic vaccine to 
aboriginal populations and an area of work focused on 
alleviating vaccine fears: “Because that was another 
perception, since aboriginal groups were prioritised to have 
the first allocation of vaccine, that was at times perceived as 
oh yeah, sure, you’re going to give it to us first before you 
give it to the white people, because if it hurts us then you 
won’t give it to the white people, so.” (CA3b). By focusing on 
aboriginal persons in order to avoid a repeat of pandemic 
influenza history, and by following current released 
information that First Nation people with A(H1N1) were three 
times more likely to be hospitalised and admitted to ICU than 
non-aboriginal persons, it is understandable that key 
pandemic influenza response personnel would attempt to 
provide the pandemic influenza vaccine as a priority to 
aboriginal groups.  
On the other hand, the fear from a minority group of having 
medicine first from the perspective of being ‘guinea-pigs’ 
before the wider population, has roots in the history of 
medicine. One well-known example is the Tuskegee Study, 
which recruited only black men for trials of syphilis treatment 
in the United States with devastating ethical standards. The 
study began in 1932 and continued for 40 years. Not only did 
the study fail to allow these men to cease participating in the 
trial nor provide informed consent, but the major controversy 
was also that once the treatment of penicillin became known 
and available to treat syphilis the recruited men were not 
given access to the drug (CDC, 2016). Based on the history of 
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medicine, the caution shown by ethnic groups for new 
medicines is understandable.  
Ethnicity studies examining aspects of infection rates, 
hospitalisation and mortality outcomes during the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic have demonstrated useful 
findings in this field. A study in the UK by Nyland et al. (2015) 
examined patient medical records, using the ethnicity 
classifications of white and non-white, and found that although 
treatment differences were noted (prescription of antibiotics 
and antiviral drugs), there were no notable differences in 
terms of admissions, severity of disease at point of admission 
and clinical outcomes between population groups. However, in 
contrast, Canadian First Nations and Aboriginal communities 
did experience a greater burden of disease during the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic: “A(H1N1) 2009 was associated 
with a 3- to 8-fold elevated risk of hospitalization and death in 
Canadian Aboriginal populations (including FN). Similar 
findings were reported for indigenous populations of the 
United States, Australia, New Zealand and other parts of 
Oceania.” (Boggild et al., 2011: p.347). Knowledge of the 
burden of disease during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic provides context and understanding for the priority 
of vaccination by key pandemic influenza response personnel 
in Canada. 
As noted by Nyland et al., (2015) the difference between the 
UK and Canada is that the minority ethnic population group in 
the UK is non-indigenous and the result of immigration over 
more recent decades, whereas the minority ethnic population 
group of First Nation and Aboriginal communities in Canada 
are indigenous. Research on ethnic disparities has considered 
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features such as biological factors and social determinants of 
health. 
New Zealand reported higher healthcare utilisation rates for 
population groups of Maori and Pacific Islanders. The study in 
the Wellington region by Verrall et al. (2010) found that 
“Pacific Islanders and Maori were 7 to 5 times more likely, 
respectively, than NZ Europeans to require hospital admission. 
These findings are consistent with observations from previous 
influenza epidemics. During the 1918 pandemic, the death 
rate was 7-fold higher in Maori than in NZ Europeans” (Verrall 
et al., 2010: p.101). Ethnic disparities in the United States 
during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic were 
reported by Dee et al., (2011) where it was found that 
Hispanics and Blacks had increased rate of hospitalisation and 
Hispanics and Asians/Pacific Islanders had higher rates of child 
mortality in comparison to White population groups. Dee et 
al., found that the vaccination uptake rate for Hispanics and 
Blacks were lower than Whites and that promotion of 
vaccination against influenza was important, specifically in 
underrepresented population groups, and would likely 
contribute to lower burden of disease and ethnic disparities.  
 
6.1.5 Setting vaccination priorities 
Seasonal influenza morbidity and mortality is associated with 
infants, pregnant women, the elderly and persons with co-
morbidities (Van-Tam and Sellwood, 2013). Typically, the 
population groups targeted for vaccination during seasonal 
influenza comprise populations at risk of severe outcomes and 
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death: young children, pregnant women, persons aged 65 
years and older, persons with chronic conditions (Carrasco and 
Leroux-Roels, 2013). All five study countries provide seasonal 
influenza vaccines to population groups by varying degrees.  
During pandemic influenza, morbidity and mortality groups 
may not necessarily correspond to typical seasonal influenza 
patterns, e.g. elderly persons are a reduced risk group. 
Therefore, the aims of pandemic influenza vaccination 
campaign may differ to normal and include “reducing mortality 
and morbidity, limiting societal disruption, ensuring 
maintenance of healthcare systems, ensuring the integrity of 
critical national infrastructures and limiting economic losses” 
(Carrasco and Leroux-Roels, 2013: p. 146). Some countries 
may have focused on those most at risk of severe outcomes 
(e.g. pregnant women), those at risk of infection due to work 
(e.g. healthcare workers), or highly likely influenza carriers 
and transmitters (e.g. young children). Several priorities are 
possible during pandemic influenza and all are equally valid. 
The WHO provided a vaccination priority order during the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic: healthcare workers; 
pregnant women; persons with specified chronic medical 
conditions; healthy young adults; etc. 
When interviewees explained their country specific 
prioritisation of the pandemic vaccines, it typically centred on 
the pandemic influenza risk groups. Interestingly, Singaporean 
key pandemic influenza response personnel raised the issue of 
whether the focus should be on identifying those that need the 
vaccine, not necessarily simply vaccinating all persons in risk 
groups. This would require knowing who has already 
seroconverted by the time the pandemic vaccine arrives. In 
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effect, vaccinating all risk group persons is a waste of doses if 
they have already been exposed and seroconverted, and 
therefore, scarce doses would be underutilised in a public 
health emergency. Thus, prioritisation is about both targeting 
the right risk groups and targeting those still susceptible (not 
already infected and recovered) when the vaccine is 
eventually available for country vaccination programmes.  
To add weight to this argument of identifying those who are 
still susceptible, an interesting article originating from 
Singapore examined the seroconversion in military persons 
and this highlighted the incidences of persons who displayed 
symptoms of influenza and those with asymptomatic infections 
(Lee et al., 2010). In this article, the aim was to identify 
whom to target with antivirals and the effectiveness of 
treatment, but this research highlights the usefulness of 
identifying who is susceptible to infection and who has 
seroconverted.  
The UK can be used as an example (as one of the so many 
countries) from the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in 
which children aged 3 to 16 years old were identified as most 
at risk of infection, and prioritised for pandemic influenza 
vaccination (Hine, 2010). Given that “data strongly suggest 
that children act as sentinels for influenza activity within 
communities and play a major role in propagating 
transmission in households and communities” (Van-Tam and 
Sellwood, 2013: p.4). This highlights the need to examine the 
appropriateness of targeting pandemic vaccines in this group. 
Assuming that the pandemic influenza vaccines arrive several 
months after novel influenza emerges and that children may 
be the first group to be infected, should not knowledge from a 
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representative sample be a requirement to determine 
seroconversion and disease susceptibility in order to best use 
pandemic vaccines and avoid wasting resources? Canada 
mentioned the movement away from targeting the vaccination 
of transmitters (e.g. children) to vaccinating those most likely 
to require hospital care and those at risk of dying because the 
vaccine arrived after the wave of disease activity. 
 
6.1.6 Side effects  
Pregnant women have long been recommended to avoid drugs 
in pregnancy, including vaccines, and care of pregnant women 
has moved away from doctor-led medicalisation of pregnancy 
care towards a non-illness approach led by midwives where 
possible. Before 2009, CDC authors reported that pregnant 
women in the United States should receive a trivalent 
inactivated influenza vaccine against seasonal influenza. 
However, the uptake rate was reportedly low, with 
approximations that pregnant women and healthcare 
providers were hesitant about the safety of vaccine use during 
pregnancy. The live influenza vaccine was not approved for 
pregnant women due to concerns about risks of adverse foetal 
outcomes (Rasmussen, Jamieson and Bresee, 2008). 
The 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was associated with 
a rapid change of policy in many countries in relation to 
influenza vaccine use for pregnant women. Pregnant women 
were recognised as a high-risk group for adverse outcomes 
from 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic infection (WHO, 
2009). In the UK, the Joint Committee on Vaccination and 
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Immunisation (JCVI) recommended for the first time that 
pregnant women should receive the influenza vaccination and 
be prioritised. The UK differed from other countries by using a 
vaccine containing an adjuvant (AS03) for pregnant women. 
The reason behind this was based on the speed of protection 
against A(H1N1) and that pregnant women were at increased 
risk of severe disease outcomes (CMO, 2009).  
The 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic vaccination policy in 
the UK was led by doctors wishing to vaccinate pregnant 
women against A(H1N1) rapidly which went against the grain 
of the culture of midwives providing care and advice. The UK 
now offers pregnant women with seasonal influenza 
vaccination with a reported uptake of 44% in 2014/15 
(Department of Health, 2015). Through working with midwives 
and normalising influenza vaccination in the pregnant women 
population group, future influenza pandemic vaccination 
efforts will likely be improved.  
Interestingly, Canada and Japan were concerned about the 
use of adjuvant pandemic influenza vaccines. The explanation 
for the concern covered the lack of evidence for the safe use 
of adjuvant vaccines in pregnant women and babies and the 
possible side effects of the adjuvant on pregnant women and 
babies. The worry by scientists, physicians and decision 
makers and the expressed inability to provide assurances to 
the public about the safety of adjuvant use in this group led 
both countries to order a specific batch of adjuvant-free 
pandemic influenza vaccine to provide to pregnant women. 
Participants from Japan explained that this process was 
followed even at significant resource cost in the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. For instance, the adjuvant-free 
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vaccine required more antigen component in the vaccine. 
Therefore, the cost was rationalised by one Japanese 
participant as one vial containing adjuvant would provide 18 
doses but one adjuvant free vial would only provide a single 
dose. As demonstrated, this special measure for pregnant 
women and babies was resource intensive but not a decision 
taken lightly by decision makers in these countries. At the 
time it was considered necessary in Japan and Canada but had 
the pandemic influenza been more virulent and associated 
with a larger burden of disease outcomes, it raises the 
question of whether the use of scarce resources, such as an 
antigen, is justified.  
In contrast to the decision-making in Canada and Japan about 
securing adjuvant free pandemic influenza vaccine for 
pregnant women during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic, the UK specifically chose a vaccine containing 
adjuvant for UK pregnant women. The UK position in 2009 
was to prioritise Pandemrix® (AS03 adjuvant) for pregnant 
women because early on, pregnant women were at high risk 
of severe morbidities and mortality. The UK prioritised 
pregnant women in their pandemic influenza vaccination 
campaign and received pharmaceutical support on the 1st 
October 2009: “The four health ministers heard that the 
GlaxoSmithKline vaccine had been licensed for those over six 
months and for pregnant women.” (Hine, 2010: p.36). Despite 
the UK efforts to prioritise pregnant women for vaccination 
and the identification of pregnant women as a high-risk group 
during the pandemic influenza, the UK did experience a 
number of deaths in pregnant women as well as those that 
required intensive hospital care. As highlighted in the opening 
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of the UK review report concerning the general mild nature of 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic compared to the 
avian flu as discussed in earlier planning documents: “Despite 
this, the relatively few deaths that occurred, including those of 
otherwise healthy children and pregnant women, were 
particularly tragic and poignant.” (Hine, 2010: p.f1). However, 
it remains unknown whether the deaths of UK pregnant 
women were due to inadequacies with the vaccine. For 
instance, were these deaths of pregnant women in those that 
had refused the vaccine? Or did these women contract 
influenza before the vaccine was rolled out in late October 
2009? These questions were highlighted in research by Dolan 
et al. (2012) where it was reported that there had been a poor 
recording of vaccination status in UK pregnant women in the 
study of 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
hospitalisations. 
The concerns regarding the use of pandemic vaccines with an 
adjuvant component in pregnant women and babies were not 
the only side effect discussed in relation to the pandemic 
influenza vaccine. After Sweden had completed their 
vaccination campaign, narcolepsy events reported from the 
summer of 2010 onwards began to emerge in Sweden and 
Finland, and this dominated parts of the interviews conducted 
in Sweden. The research on narcolepsy associated with the 
use of AS03 adjuvanted pandemic A(H1N1) vaccine appears 
complicated, conflicting and inconclusive at this point in time. 
For instance, Partinen et al., (2012) concluded that “…it likely 
that Pandemrix vaccination contributed, perhaps together with 
other environmental factors, to this increase in genetically 
susceptible children.” (2012: p.1), and Szakács, Darin and 
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Hallböök (2013) reported that “Pandemrix vaccination is a 
precipitating factor for narcolepsy […]. The incidence of 
narcolepsy was 25 times higher after the vaccination 
compared with the time period before. The children in the 
postvaccination group had a lower age at onset and a more 
sudden onset than that generally seen.” (2013: p.1315). 
However, other research has not found the same conclusions. 
For instance, Persson et al., (2014) reported that their 
research “…could neither confirm any causal association with 
Pandemrix nor refute entirely a small excess risk. We 
confirmed an increased risk for a diagnosis of narcolepsy in 
individuals ≤ 20 years of age and observed a trend towards an 
increased risk also amongst young adults between 21 and 30 
years.” (2014: p.172).  
Studies of narcolepsy incorporating other countries have found 
that “[a]n increase in narcolepsy diagnoses was not observed 
in other countries, where vaccination coverage was low in the 
affected age group, or did not follow influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
vaccination.” (Wijnans et al., 2013: p.1246). Indeed, Sweden 
had one of the highest vaccination coverage rates. Countries 
such as Canada also used Pandemrix® but did not report 
heightened cases of narcolepsy. However, the vaccines used 
in Canada were manufactured in North America in comparison 
to the European produced vaccines used in Sweden. This had 
led to the allegation that this problem was factory-specific 
even though provided by the same manufacturer, 
GlaxoSmithKline, who were producing the same product 
(licenced name of Pandemrix®/Arepanrix®). In truth, there 
are some minor differences in the manufacturing processes. 
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Although the research into these narcolepsy events appears 
challenging and the findings are conflicting, it is no doubt a 
critical area for key pandemic influenza response personnel 
and pandemic influenza researchers to examine and 
understand at this time and apply lessons learnt to future 
pandemic influenza response.  
The side effect concerns discussed in this subsection, as well 
as communications in general, all relate to health risk 
communications in an influenza pandemic event. The WHO has 
released guidance on risk communications, one document of 
which is the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Risk 
Communication. The PIP Risk Communication guidance is a 
key document emphasising that strong risk communication is 
developed before a pandemic emerges. This includes specially 
trained risk communication professionals who can work the 
duration a pandemic response, engaging and listening to local 
concerns, use of appropriate communication channels, 
effective and correct public health messaging, trialling risk 
communication in a pandemic influenza scenario exercise and 
coordinated communications between relevant agencies, 
industry and the public. Therefore, countries that experienced 
challenges during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
will now need to review the appropriateness of risk 
communications used and implement any possible 
improvements in order to strengthen risk communication in 
the future. 
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6.1.7 Disease activity timing and vaccine arrival timing; 
perceived effectiveness  
A theme that emerged from the interview data was the desire 
to implement the pandemic influenza vaccination campaigns 
quickly and before significant disease activity. However, the 
disease activity frequently occurred before the arrival of the 
vaccine. Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore received 
the pandemic vaccine post-first wave peak of influenza 
disease activity, leaving just the study country Sweden as an 
exception.  
Sweden’s influenza disease activity remained very low during 
the summer months and the vaccination campaign was 
implemented alongside the increase in disease activity; 
campaign staff achieved high uptake rates and no subsequent 
waves. The vaccination campaign in Sweden was their major 
public health measure in response to the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic in comparison to the other study countries 
which utilised other public health measures to varying 
degrees. 
All countries, except Sweden, experienced an influenza activity 
peak before the arrival of the vaccines. Canada and Sweden 
received monovalent influenza vaccines from October 2009, 
Japan imported monovalent vaccines from October 2009, with 
the domestic supply circulating in early 2010. Singapore had 
the vaccine from November 2009 and New Zealand had a 
limited number of monovalent vaccine doses for healthcare 
workers from February 2010 with the bulk of the vaccination 
campaign rolled into the trivalent influenza vaccine from April 
2010. 
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The study countries experience in 2009-10 suggests that a 
well-timed proactive vaccination campaign associated with 
high uptake rates and before major disease activity may avert 
subsequent cases and waves of disease activity. The 
importance of vaccine implementation timing has been 
demonstrated by Borse et al. (2013).  
Borse et al. (2013) modelled the timing of vaccination and the 
timing of the arrival of 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. 
The article outlines that the United States vaccination 
programme from October 2009, calculated with incorporating 
pandemic influenza data, is estimated to have “prevented 
700,000–1,500,000 clinical cases, 4,000–10,000 
hospitalizations, and 200–500 deaths” (2013: p.439) over six 
months until April 2010. The authors explained that this 
prevention of public health burden of disease concerning the 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was due to the timing of 
the vaccination campaign and also vaccine effectiveness. More 
importantly, Borse et al. highlighted that if the vaccine had 
arrived and commenced two weeks earlier, then 2 million 
cases would have been averted; eight weeks quicker would 
have prevented 4.2 million cases in the United States. 
The northern hemisphere study countries received a supply of 
influenza vaccines at a similar time of year to the seasonal 
influenza vaccination campaign. For instance, Canada normally 
received influenza vaccines from mid-September but in 2009 
received vaccines slightly later in October. New Zealand in the 
southern hemisphere also coincided the vaccination campaign 
with their autumn which appears more intentional timing than 
that of the northern hemisphere vaccination campaign 
timings. However, it was noted that the small batch of 
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A(H1N1) vaccine did arrive in late 2009 and was released for 
use in February 2010. Therefore, using the argument 
presented by Borse et al. (2013), many clinical cases of 
A(H1N1) infection would have been avoidable if New Zealand 
had commenced a monovalent vaccination campaign rather 
than waiting for the seasonal influenza trivalent vaccine 
campaign in April 2010. The complicated aspects of pandemic 
influenza response were highlighted by interviewees and the 
usefulness of incorporating the A(H1N1) vaccine into the 
seasonal trivalent vaccine may have helped with the public 
acceptance of immunisation and increased the effectiveness of 
the vaccines during the pandemic influenza response. 
The interviewee language surrounding the disease activity and 
vaccination timing was polarised. It showed a distinction 
between the period of waiting for the vaccines to arrive and 
influenza rapid increases and peaks and the period of plentiful 
supply of vaccines and the subsidence of disease activity. This 
concept is illustrated in Figure 28.  
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Figure 28: Change in language of participants pre- and 
post-vaccine arrival 
 
The research covered the key pandemic influenza response 
personnel opinions on the topic of the effectiveness of the 
pandemic influenza vaccination. The intention was to review 
the public health effectiveness of the national vaccination 
campaigns, for instance, if a country utilised 10 million doses 
of pandemic influenza vaccines, how many cases, 
hospitalisations or deaths, may have been averted? What was 
the impression of the impact on the disease activity? However, 
upon reflection, this approach is subject to a huge amount of 
complexity, and the possibility for alternative interpretations 
by interviewees exists. For instance, from a non-public health 
and population perspective, key pandemic influenza response 
personnel with a background such as clinicians, may have first 
considered the vaccine effectiveness. It was found that on 
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average the pandemic influenza vaccine provided 90% 
protection against A(H1N1). Obviously, this distinction was 
important because, on the one hand, the vaccine may have 
been highly effective but on the other, the public health 
vaccine effectiveness may have been very ineffective.   
The effectiveness of the pandemic influenza vaccine providing 
individuals with protection against A(H1N1) was discussed 
briefly by only a couple of interviewees in Japan: “In Japan the 
pandemic vaccine effectiveness was 70%, that was very high” 
(JA5). In this instance, the interviewee went on to refer to the 
study by Yamada et al. (2012) which conducted research in 
the Hokkaido area of Japan where pregnant women were 
vaccinated against pandemic influenza A(H1N1) on average 
two to three months earlier than Japan as a whole. “More than 
60% of pregnant women reported having been vaccinated 
within 1.5 months after the availability of a vaccine for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009, and vaccination effectively reduced 
infection in this study; if a vaccine had not been available, the 
expected number of pregnant patients would have been 152 
(2.08% of 7328), and if all women were vaccinated, the 
expected number of pregnant patients would have been 16 
(0.224% of 7328). Thus, vaccination reduced the infection 
rate by 89%.” (Yamada et al., 2012: p.135) 
More commonly referenced by all the study countries was that 
initially it was believed that two doses would be required for 
protection but as the pandemic influenza evolved it was found 
that one dose would suffice. This change during vaccination 
campaigns caused difficulties for some countries to track how 
many doses individuals had received and thus the individual 
level of protection against A(H1N1).  
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The perceived effectiveness of vaccines during the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic response was grouped into 
factors including vaccination timing, uptake rates, subsequent 
disease activity and execution of vaccination campaigns.  
With regards to the vaccination campaign timing and the 
impact of the vaccines on the disease activity, there was often 
a shared international uncertainty between the interviewees of 
the impact of the vaccines. Respondents explained how trying 
to determine what would have naturally occurred in disease 
activity should no action have been taken is a common public 
health issue.  
There was discordance in the Swedish responses about the 
impact of the timing of the vaccination campaign on disease 
activity as there was not an assured answer to give; vaccines 
may have decreased the duration of the epidemic curve. 
Similarly, the Canadian responses reflected that the 
vaccination campaign may have reduced the epidemic curve 
quicker than what would have played out in due course 
without public health strategies. Nonetheless, answers were 
not committed to vaccines as being responsible. The Canadian 
vaccination campaign was rolled out as the influenza disease 
was peaking, whereas both the Singaporean and Japanese 
vaccination campaigns were implemented post-disease wave, 
so it was felt that the vaccines would not be used to prevent 
an epidemic. Both Canada and Sweden referenced that no 
subsequent disease activity waves were experienced after 
their vaccination campaigns and put forward that vaccines 
could have played a role or it may have been the result of 
another factor such as seroconversion.  
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Responses from some interviewees in Canada and Japan 
stated that by the time of the vaccination campaigns, some 
individuals would have been exposed to the disease already 
and developed immunity. This could have affected the success 
of vaccination uptake rates if the disease activity was earlier 
than implemented vaccination campaigns. The New Zealand 
vaccination campaign timing was an anomaly in the 
comparison of study countries because the monovalent 
vaccine was sparsely used from February 2010 and then the 
trivalent seasonal influenza vaccination campaign 
incorporating A(H1N1) was rolled out as usual in April.  
In Sweden and Canada, interviewees reported high uptake 
rates of the vaccine and pride in the campaign achievements, 
whereas the atmosphere was different in the other countries 
regarding vaccination. In Singapore, there was the belief that 
the vaccination uptake rate was not high enough for 
substantial impact upon an epidemic. Both Japan and New 
Zealand explained there was the sense of wait and demand for 
vaccines but by the time of the vaccination campaign 
commenced in each country the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic knowledge base detailed that it was not a severe 
pandemic as seen in history and there was no vaccine 
scarcity. It was felt that these factors contributed to lower 
than anticipated uptake rates. 
A few points were raised in terms of the execution of the 
vaccination campaigns. Interviewees across the countries 
spoke of the challenges of the prioritisation of the pandemic 
influenza vaccine in the first weeks of vaccination campaigns; 
this problem was shared in countries that ordered enough 
doses for the entire population. For instance, prioritisation was 
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often not well defined prior 2009 and calculations for specific 
populations (e.g. number of critical infrastructure personnel) 
were difficult and time-consuming during the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. Countries such as Japan have 
invested resources in defining and calculating priority groups 
during this interpandemic period as a preparedness measure 
and after lessons learnt in 2009.  
A small handful of participants from Sweden and Singapore 
questioned the defined priority groups for vaccination in the 
early weeks, as mentioned in an earlier section. Vaccinating 
risk groups such as those with chronic respiratory diseases 
was a measure to avoid severe morbidity and mortality 
outcomes from the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic 
infection. However a few interviewees said that was an 
acceptable measure if that was a country’s aim during the 
pandemic influenza response, but if the ambition was to 
reduce the transmission of influenza as quickly as possible, 
then children and young adults should have been prioritised 
first. Vaccine prioritisation is a valid area of discussion and will 
no doubt be a future issue in the next pandemic influenza if 
vaccines are released in limited batches as and when they are 
produced. This topic will no doubt require significant resources 
during a pandemic influenza if a consensus is not reached in 
an interpandemic period and differing views examined. United 
States researchers Lee et al. (2010) conducted a vaccine 
prioritisation computer modelling simulation after the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in order to provide evidence for 
decision makers for vaccine prioritisation. It was reported that 
“defined at-risk populations, rather than just the high 
transmitters (i.e. children), may result in slightly more 
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influenza cases but less overall morbidity and mortality, which 
corresponds to lower overall costs. […] While prioritizing 
children rather than using the ACIP recommendations may 
reduce the overall attack rate, it also will result in more 
hospitalizations and cost to third party payers and society.” 
(Lee et al., 2010: p.4878). 
Canada achieved vaccine uptake rates of approximately 90% 
in specific populations such as First Nations and aboriginal 
persons. In Sweden, responses about vaccination campaign 
achievements were frequently replaced by the reports of 
narcolepsy in children and young people. As one interviewee 
stated: “we got 200 young people with narcolepsy, but of 
course, with that we couldn’t know from the beginning of 
course, but of course when we evaluating it retrospectively we 
saved rather few lives, most of those lives were people with 
diseases, but realistically those saved lives, you could say 
those who died were mainly people with underlying conditions, 
so you must also, you shouldn’t just count saved lives, you 
should also count the saved years, Years Lives Lost and so on. 
To me, no one has done this calculation, but in my opinion, it’s 
rather clear that 200 young people, who have a long time to 
live, with probably chronic, as we know today, they will have 
this disease for the rest of their lives, in comparison with 50-
100 saved lives probably elderly people.” (SW4)  
The point raised by this interviewee is noteworthy in terms of 
evaluations conducted post-pandemic influenza response. 
After the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, the following 
formal reviews have been published: 
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 New Zealand: “Report for the Minister of Health from the 
Pandemic Influenza Mortality and Morbidity Review 
Group” (Perinatal and Maternal Mortality Review 
Committee, 2010) 
 Canada: “Canada’s Response to the 2009 H1N1 
Influenza Pandemic” (Standing Senate Social Affairs 
Science and Technology, 2010) 
 Sweden: “A(H1N1) 2009: An evaluation of Sweden's 
preparations for and management of the pandemic” 
(Socialstyrelsen, 2011) 
Published reviews by Ministry of Health officials in journal 
article format: 
 Japan: “Japan’s Actions to Combat Pandemic Influenza 
(A/H1N1)” (Shobayashi, T. 2011, review by the former 
Ministry of Health director for the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response Office) 
 Singapore: “Influenza A (H1N1-2009) pandemic in 
Singapore – public health control measures implemented 
and lessons learnt” (Tay, J., et al. 2010, review by the 
Ministry of Health Communicable Diseases Division) 
These national evaluations have enabled a greater 
understanding of national pandemic influenza responses in 
each study country. In particular, the evaluations from 
Sweden and Canada were very detailed, recording the stages 
of pandemic influenza, highlighting the successes and 
challenges. Comparing the country evaluations was difficult 
because different end dates were applied in reference to the 
number of cases, hospitalisations and deaths. Also, reporting 
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significant events is equally important to reporting times of 
inactivity. 
Fortunately, the momentum for pandemic influenza 
preparedness has continued for many countries beyond the 
response and evaluations relating to the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic. In recent years there has been the 
continued international threat of infectious disease outbreaks, 
such as recent cases of Ebola (from 2014), which has 
supported the need for national preparedness. Some of the 
study countries have published new versions of pandemic 
influenza preparedness plans: 
 Singapore: MOH Pandemic Readiness and Response Plan 
for Influenza and other Acute Respiratory Diseases 
(2014) 
 Canadian Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Planning 
Guidance for the Health Sector (some updates, post 
2010, have been made to the online subsections to 
incorporate evidence from the latest pandemic influenza 
response) 
 Sweden: Planering för beredskap mot pandemisk 
influenza (2015, content in Swedish)  
 New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A Framework for 
Action 2010 (some updates to the related policies and 
guidance post 2010) 
 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Action Plan of the 
Japanese Government was published in 2007 and no 
post 2010 plans were found in English. 
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 Evaluation issues and study limitations 6.2
The execution of research in several study countries and 
during a one week stay was a logistical challenge. 
Understanding the organisational structure was necessary in 
order to interview the relevant participants in each country. 
However, the organisational structure of pandemic influenza 
response varied among the study countries. Country 
documents and key contacts, in particular, helped with this 
challenge. By the time this research was conducted, some of 
the pandemic influenza committees had dissolved, so it 
involved more effort to contact key participants. 
It was unfortunate that New Zealand became the only study 
country from the southern hemisphere and that none of the 
three countries from South America could become involved in 
this research project. Some countries in the southern 
hemisphere were particularly affected by the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, thus the inclusion of a sample of 
these countries was particularly important in the planning 
phase. Admittedly, these countries may have had associated 
method challenges, such as interviews with a translator but 
this was accepted; representation from a sample of countries 
across the world was more important than the ease of data 
collection. 
The five study countries were similar by study design which 
meant that the countries were all high income, so the 
generalisability of the findings will be limited. Although it 
would have further complicated the research, on reflection it 
would have been interesting to have a sample that included 
middle income countries had resources allowed. The inclusion 
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of the country Mexico would have allowed for greater 
discussion of the emerging pandemic influenza. Interviewing 
personnel in Nigeria would have been enlightening as this was 
the first country in the African continent to publish a pandemic 
response plan ahead of 2009. Speaking with participants in 
countries that relied on vaccine donations most likely would 
have highlighted contrasts between countries because many 
donated vaccines did not arrive until 2010, which in many 
cases, was many months after initial cases were detected. 
Also, the inclusion of countries with high rates of co-morbidity, 
such as South Africa, would have framed the priority of 
pandemic influenza against diseases, such as HIV/AIDs, 
competing for health resources and presenting the potential 
greater severity of pandemic influenza impact (Nasidi, 2013). 
Through broadening the scope of the study by the inclusion of 
a more diverse group of study countries, a greater divergence 
of themes may have been presented which no doubt would 
have associated data analysis challenges. Despite these 
challenges, it would likely have highlighted the global 
inequality present in the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic. 
After conducting the interviews, the challenge of managing 
and analysing the interview data was apparent. Transcribing 
accented audio recordings was time-consuming. Planning had 
reflected the need to transcribe and review the data before 
undertaking the following country visit. The first two study 
countries (Sweden and New Zealand) had, on reflection, been 
scheduled too close together; future country visits allowed for 
much more time to examine the data. Analysing the research 
data was a learning curve: using NVivo in the first instance 
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generated a lot of codes but without much meaning. It drew 
attention to the frequency of recurrent words in a quantifiable 
manner rather than the examination of themes. Using the 
programme NVivo did not simplify the analysis process rather 
it was another method to be managed and was used in 
addition to traditional coding methods: all with their own 
benefits and limitations. 
Tong, Sainsbury and Craig (2007) developed a checklist for 
reporting qualitative research with reference to in-depth 
interviews and focus groups: ‘consolidated criteria for 
reporting qualitative research’ (COREQ).  The three main 
components of the checklist include: research team and 
reflexivity; study design; analysis and findings. This 32 item 
checklist has been useful to the researcher for the inclusion of 
content in the write up phase of this thesis. The use of the 
COREQ by researchers reporting qualitative interviews and 
focus groups is an important resource in producing quality 
qualitative research that is transparent and allows for the 
possibility that the study can be duplicated in the future.  
This thesis began broad and covered four public health 
measures at interview but ultimately concentrated on 
pandemic influenza vaccine use. A great deal of information 
was collected during the interviews but it was daunting and 
challenging to handle. With the benefit of hindsight, had 
pandemic vaccines been the focus at an earlier stage, greater 
depth regarding vaccine use would have been possible.  
This research allows for future work to follow either with the 
inclusion of the study countries or with another sample 
selection. The usefulness of using a selection of countries from 
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a worldwide sample is an important feature, particularly with 
pandemic influenza response. Future research would allow for 
the exploration of themes such as the vaccine supply 
difficulties and the associated decisions made since 2010.  
The transferability of these study findings to non-influenza 
pandemics is also a feature developed from this research. The 
world wide spread of a novel infectious disease other than 
influenza would present many of the response considerations 
of an influenza pandemic. As the study countries found during 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, it is important to 
define and quantify population groups in order to determine 
the number of doses of vaccines to secure from a 
pharmaceutical company. For instance, who are essential 
workers and how many people fall into this category? This is 
time consuming and debatable. Therefore, it is important that 
these conversations are conducted during an interpandemic 
period and decisions reached where possible. Undertaking 
these processes will feed into future pandemic preparedness 
plans. The concept of ordering vaccines in response to a non-
influenza pandemic is based on the assumption that the virus 
is known and a vaccine can be developed within months as is 
the case for influenza. Beyond this time period other public 
health measures will undoubtedly become necessary.  
The knowledge and experience of study countries 
implementing a national vaccination programme in reaction to 
the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic will be transferable 
to a non-influenza pandemic scenario in the future. Countries 
will remember the logistical issues of waiting for small batches 
of vaccines and the necessitation to prioritise the initial 
vaccines at the point of release into national vaccination 
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campaigns. Unfortunately a disease other than influenza will 
not allow for countries to potentially incorporate a vaccine into 
an annual programme such as the seasonal influenza trivalent 
vaccine to lessen perceived apprehension of a new vaccine. 
However, lessons learnt from risk communications will be 
important to apply within countries. Also, implementing 
consistent and similar response methods within and between 
countries may be more important in future pandemic response 
so that the perception of fairness and safety is upheld in the 
public and media viewpoint. 
 
 Summary of vaccine discussion 6.3
The vaccine discussion has covered the main research themes 
and made connections with the existing literature. It has 
included discussion regarding single or multiple vaccine 
suppliers, hemisphere differences in vaccination campaigns, 
and the impact of past influenza pandemics on vaccine use. 
Vaccination use and priority groups of specific populations 
were covered, as well as side effect concerns and the 
perceived effectiveness of vaccines. The following chapter 
gives the conclusions to the research project and includes 
recommendations.  
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7 Conclusions 
 
This qualitative research project has examined the use of 
vaccines during the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in 
five study countries. This pandemic, the first of this century, 
presented the first major opportunity for the use of influenza 
vaccines en-masse and countries navigated this emergency 
event with all of the available knowledge at the time and 
within the context of their specific national circumstances. 
Variations in pandemic influenza vaccine use materialised 
throughout the pandemic, and the interview discussion in this 
area has been enlightening. In this section, a summary of the 
key research findings will be provided, and an outline of the 
implications this research raises for future pandemic 
preparedness policies will be considered. 
The vaccine supply generated considerable problems for public 
health personnel in organising vaccination campaigns and 
communicating clear messages to the public. The first delivery 
of vaccine doses arrived later than anticipated in the 
countries. This led to the re-release of statements both about 
the number of doses delivered on particular dates and also 
dates at which priority groups could access the vaccine; this 
proved problematic and challenging. Interviewees worried that 
communicating updates would negatively affect the public 
opinion about national agencies capabilities to manage a 
pandemic response. It also went against the desire to 
communicate clear, consistent public health messages. The 
2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic has provided 
organisations with an experience of vaccine supply during an 
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emergency event. In the future, vaccine supply would require 
greater flexibility in order to react efficiently to vaccine 
delivery changes at short notice. In addition, an improved 
knowledge base on how to communicate uncertainty to the 
public would provide response personnel with greater 
confidence in navigating this complex area. 
The other aspect of the vaccine supply that was an interesting 
theme covered the single or multiple vaccine supplier routes. 
Both Japan and Singapore had chosen multiple vaccine 
suppliers, and this reflected the management of recent risk 
due to SARS and avian influenza experience. Post 2010, 
Canada has made mention of a non-domestic backup supplier 
and it will be interesting to see how many other single supplier 
countries will follow this path. On the other hand, spreading 
risk through multiple suppliers may reduce the speed of 
vaccine delivery. Both Canada and Sweden who had single 
suppliers received their vaccine supplies quickly compared to 
Japan and Singapore. It is unknown whether countries that 
ordered the largest number of doses would receive these first. 
This is something that would need to be considered when 
assessing the efficacy of vaccine ordering and supply sourcing 
in the future. 
The timing of deliveries and the equity of worldwide country 
access was brought into focus during the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic. It is questionable whether or not a 
national pandemic response can be termed successful if an 
international strategy involving vaccine supply and delivery is 
not considered. Increased international cooperation may need 
to be developed in future pandemics in order to overcome 
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these challenges, particularly in countries that share multiple 
borders. 
It may be possible to take advantage of the hemisphere divide 
in pandemic influenza response in the future. If the disease 
activity and vaccine production timing allowed, it may be 
possible to roll the pandemic virus strain into the seasonal 
influenza trivalent vaccine for one hemisphere. This may help 
nations to avoid the public perception of risk from a new 
vaccine and it would avoid the topic of a monovalent vaccine 
containing an adjuvant, which posed issues in some countries. 
Where seasonal influenza vaccination is commonplace, this 
may form an acceptable option for governments. Many nations 
have expanded seasonal influenza immunisation to cover more 
risk groups which will have covered a lot of groundwork for 
pandemic preparedness and vaccine use. However, this 
measure is timing dependent, and would require careful 
assessment of the timescales involved in order to make this 
approach effective; delaying vaccination during a pandemic 
event in order to merge with a seasonal vaccination 
programme may lead to further case development if it delays 
a response that may have proved critical.  
Past pandemic influenza of 1918-19 played an important point 
of reference to those working on a national response. Whilst 
the events of 1918-19 have been remembered, the 1957 and 
1968 influenza pandemics have had much less of an impact on 
current influenza awareness. The knowledge gained from the 
history of 1918-19 has provided a platform on which to build 
for response uncertainty and a lasting legacy. Some 
participants discussed how even though the 2009-10 influenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic was mild in the general population, and 
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that even though the first wave of disease activity was already 
underway, decisions were still made to acquire large quantities 
of vaccines for the total population. This reflected the fact that 
during the 1918-19 A(H1N1) Spanish influenza, most first 
waves that occurred in spring 1918 were followed by much 
more severe disease activity in the autumn. Reportedly, 
purchasing large quantities of vaccines appeared incongruent 
to the public when they had been told the disease was mild. 
This has resulted in the pandemic influenza response 
personnel suffering criticism of taking an over-cautious 
approach in an emergency event and wasting country 
resources.  
The waiting times for vaccine delivery during 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic and the earlier than anticipated 
onset of disease activity may lead future nations to invest 
more heavily in early response measures, for instance, 
antiviral drugs. This may appear more of a reactionary 
response to pandemic influenza personnel but perhaps the 
public would find immediate measures more appropriate as a 
real-time response can be realised and it requires less of an 
appreciation of vaccine procurement.   
The history of medicine is damaged by instances where 
population groups have been treated inequitably and harm has 
been caused. Some countries well-meaning approach of 
targeting populations, such as First Nations and Inuit persons, 
who had severe illness disparity in pandemic influenza 
outcomes, would normally be seen as a logical public health 
approach. But it could also be seen as a guinea pig approach 
to new and untested vaccines. Therefore, the historical scars 
from medical events require attention during an interpandemic 
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period. Outside of an emergency event, resources can be 
allocated to work towards equality of health care access and 
relationships built with respected community leaders. This is 
not to say that this work is not continually being conducted, 
but this research has highlighted the importance of this work 
and the critical foundation it builds for times of pandemic 
influenza response. 
It will be interesting to see how pandemic influenza vaccine 
priority groups are established in the future. The position in 
2009-10 was to provide vaccine priority to the risk groups: 
those at risk of severe morbidity and mortality outcomes. For 
instance, pregnant women, persons with chronic respiratory 
conditions, pre-school children, etc. Some participants 
discussed the frustration of providing vaccines to the correct 
people. A dose given to someone who has already 
seroconverted would be a wasted dose during a time of 
scarcity. In the future, having quick seroconversion 
technologies at the point of vaccination would help to allocate 
scarce resources. It would also reinforce the distinction within 
the public regarding who does and does not require 
vaccination. It is not clear how viable this would be in a future 
pandemic influenza scenario. If vaccine procurement 
undergoes radical changes in the future and vaccines can be 
sourced in the early weeks of a pandemic influenza, those 
considered highly likely to transmit the disease (e.g. children 
and teenagers) may first be targeted to stem the spread of 
infection. At the very least, vaccines can be targeted more 
efficiently if repeat serological surveys are performed.  
The 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic experience will 
have an effect on the future of influenza pandemic policies and 
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it will also influence other areas of medicine. The recognition 
that pregnant women were at risk of severe outcomes from 
pandemic influenza led to a sudden focus on the use of 
vaccines in this population group. The use of a vaccine 
containing adjuvant (AS03) was catapulted into the frame for 
a debate with a deadline. Although polarised country decisions 
were made regarding the use of vaccines containing an 
adjuvant, pregnant women now have greater opportunities for 
vaccine use. 
The literature emerging concerning narcolepsy reports in 
Sweden, and its neighbouring countries, appearing after the 
use of pandemic vaccine continue long after the subsidence of 
A(H1N1) cases. The discussion of narcolepsy among the 
interviewees was unique to Sweden; the other country 
discussions did, however, discuss the variation of public fear 
of side effects from new vaccines. In order to have high 
uptake rates, the risk of pandemic influenza needs to be larger 
than the considered vaccine risks. There is the concern that 
pandemic vaccine use will be problematic, particularly in 
Sweden, in a future pandemic influenza. Again, interpandemic 
resource investment addressing influenza vaccine use and the 
possibility of combining a vaccine into a trivalent seasonal 
influenza vaccine during a pandemic influenza scenario may 
help navigate this complicated area. 
Alongside the importance of communication strategies, the 
role and influence of the media during a pandemic influenza 
response cannot be ignored. Poignant cases such as the first 
country death, particularly in instances of otherwise healthy 
children, quickly became national news. Public health 
engagement with the media became common; the success or 
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failure of implementing vaccination campaigns was not just in 
the hands of pandemic response personnel. The media 
became an instrument in the response: in the case of Japan, it 
enforced social conformism to vaccine priority groups; in other 
countries, politicians were broadcast receiving the vaccine, 
possibly in order to allay any public fears over new vaccines. 
The effectiveness of vaccination campaigns at the point of 
implementation was in part out of the hands of pandemic 
influenza response personnel by this point. The timing of 
disease activity before vaccination was required to encourage 
the public to have the vaccine, but if the vaccination campaign 
was too late, then the need for vaccination was no longer 
desired by the public and the programme ineffective. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the early timing of 
vaccination programmes has been shown to avoid cases, 
hospitalisations and deaths. In the future, if developments in 
the field of pharmaceutical techniques enable a quicker supply 
of vaccines, and if the time taken for the safety approval of 
vaccines can be improved, then vaccination campaigns can be 
rolled out earlier and become more effective. However, where 
the speed of vaccine production and the rollout of vaccination 
campaigns is not improved, the role of pandemic influenza 
vaccines in a future scenario is questionable. Some countries, 
such as New Zealand, could not provide pandemic influenza 
vaccines until 2010. If a more severe pandemic occurs in the 
future, the vaccine-use time window would be even more 
critical.  
Pandemic vaccines were the cornerstone of the response in 
Sweden and Canada, in comparison to Singapore, Japan and 
New Zealand. The focus on vaccines in Sweden and Canada 
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was associated with a high reported uptake. However, the 
interview data not included in this thesis highlighted the 
strong use of other public health measures, such as antiviral 
drugs, social isolation and border control in the other three 
countries. Pandemic vaccine use decisions were all taken in 
light of the investments in various other measures. Similarities 
across the study countries include that fact that: they all had 
pandemic influenza plans in place prior to 2009, all had a 
vaccine agreement secured with one or more pharmaceutical 
companies, all prioritised the vaccine in the early campaign 
weeks and all invested considerable resources in providing 
their citizens with a vaccine during 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic.  
The similarity in vaccine use across countries demonstrates 
the significance of the WHO calls for pandemic influenza 
planning a decade ago; this was first mentioned in the 
introduction chapter. The work conducted by international 
organisations laid the groundwork for many countries 
pandemic influenza vaccine preparations and the 2009 
response. The 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic was a 
mild disease for the general population and countries have 
demonstrated that their health services coped well in 
response. In the immediate post-pandemic period, countries 
were in an opportunistic time that was a critical juncture in 
policy development (Oliver, 2006). This crucial time after a 
pandemic influenza is an opportunity for reflecting on the 
successes and weaknesses of vaccine use during the 2009-10 
influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. Now we are in an interpandemic 
phase, where, if clear evaluations of vaccine use have not 
been made, then a degree of complacency has set in. If 
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pandemic influenza policy is less of a priority for politicians, 
then future pandemic influenza vaccine use may be hampered. 
Regardless of the time since the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic, there is a very real risk of a future pandemic, such 
as avian influenza.  
 
 Recommendations for policy makers 7.1
There are several recommendations that can be made to 
policy makers in regards to future pandemic influenza policies 
as a consequence of this research. Preparedness plans need to 
be flexible and allow proportionality in response to pandemic 
severity. Plans that are too specific, such as preparedness 
tailored to a specific strain of influenza (e.g. Avian influenza), 
may be too restrictive for effective implementation in the 
future.  
Infrastructure within countries needs to be adequate to cope 
in peak activity periods. This requires a national influenza 
surveillance system that can detect and report novel influenza 
in real-time and laboratories that are capable of confirming 
cases quickly and operating at high capacity for weeks or 
months at a time.  
This interpandemic phase is a time where preparedness 
activities should be maintained to ensure that responses in the 
next pandemic influenza event are proactive rather than 
reactive. Vaccine related issues that are likely to cause 
contentions during a pandemic influenza response, such as the 
prioritisation of vaccines in the initial batches, should be 
discussed, agreed and prepared as much as possible in 
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advance. Significant resources can be used during a response 
concerning groups competing for prioritisation and defining 
population groups within a nation. The interpandemic period is 
a time of establishing and maintaining networks and 
collaborations between all agencies likely to have a role in 
pandemic influenza response. Pandemic influenza scenario 
exercises have an important role during this time to allow 
response personnel to test, evaluate and refine preparedness 
policies. 
Future pandemic vaccine policies need to incorporate a greater 
international and global dimension. Vaccine purchase 
agreements have demonstrated that vaccines can be secured 
by high income countries. National actions are contradictory to 
the nature of the disease of pandemic influenza. In the future, 
it is hoped that there is a greater collaboration between 
countries to pool vaccines and allocate these resources to 
international populations at high risk of severe illness and 
mortality. If this co-operative vaccine donation scheme cannot 
be agreed, donated vaccines need to be incorporated into 
plans and supplied in a timely manner in order to be of use.  
The final recommendation returns to the use of the seasonal 
trivalent influenza vaccine. Countries should either persist with 
using this vaccine in annual campaigns or for those countries 
without it, they should incorporate it into national health 
protection programmes. This will develop familiarity and trust 
in a vaccine that will be significant in a future pandemic 
influenza event. 
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 Personal Reflections 7.2
I feel very fortunate to have been granted the opportunity to 
study the 2009-10 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic at the 
University Of Nottingham. This experience has challenged me 
far more than I could have ever anticipated, but by 
confronting these difficulties I have grown and developed as a 
researcher.  
Not only have I developed my academic skills further during 
these last four years, I have also acquired additional 
welcomed extras; self-confidence in lone travel and meetings 
with senior experts, life lessons in managing a large project 
and personal growth in becoming more knowledgeable about 
other cultures. Perhaps the most important acquisition has 
been to gain an in-depth appreciation of the challenges faced 
by those working to deal with these global-scale issues, and 
the effort and determination they must input to analyse, 
improve and enact upon past experiences to ensure the 
success of future ones; this is a lesson that I will be carrying 
with me in my future in public health. 
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Appendix A: GSK Ph.D. Funding Proposal 
 
An international study of the interface between public health 
policy responses to the 2009-10 influenza A/H1N1 pandemic 
and epidemiological disease pattern. 
 
Background and Context: 
During March and early April 2009, the public health 
authorities in three separate regions of Mexico reported 
unusual clusters of severe influenza-like illness. On April 21, 
2009, CDC reported that two unrelated children in California 
had recovered from a novel influenza strain A/H1N1, which 
contained gene segments from swine flu virus. The children 
had not had contact with pigs. Two days later, CDC reported 
five more H1N1 cases, three in California and two in Texas. At 
the same time, the Pan-American Health Organization was 
notified of several H1N1 cases by Mexican authorities. 
On April 24, 2009, Mexico’s Health Ministry announced that a 
new strain of influenza was affecting the country, with just 
over 1,000 suspected cases. The Mexican government also 
announced that it was closing schools and cancelling public 
gatherings such as sporting events and concerts in Mexico 
City. Subsequently, on April 25 the WHO Director General 
declared a formal “Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern” (PHEIC). 
By April 27, 2009, WHO announced that containment activities 
of the outbreak were not feasible and the global pandemic 
alert level was raised from Phase 3 to Phase 4. Two days later, 
the WHO Director-General raised the influenza pandemic alert 
level from Phase 4 to Phase 5 (characterized by human-to-
human spread of the virus in at least two countries in one 
WHO region). The declaration of Phase 5 provided a strong 
signal that a pandemic was imminent and that the time 
remaining to finalize the organization, communication, and 
implementation of the planned mitigation measures was short.  
By the 30th of April 2009, the CDC reported a total of 1918 
suspected cases and H1N1 (including 286 probable and 97 
confirmed cases). 
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On June 11, 2009, after almost 30,000 cases had been 
confirmed in 74 countries, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) officially declared that a global pandemic of novel 
influenza A/H1N1 was underway by raising the global alert 
level to phase 6. This action was triggered by the emergence 
and global geographical spread of the new H1N1 virus in at 
least one other country in a different WHO region. 
After the WHO declaration of a pandemic on June 11, the 2009 
H1N1 virus continued to spread and the number of countries 
reporting cases of 2009 H1N1 nearly doubled from mid-June 
2009 to early July 2009. As of 31 of July 2009, 168 countries 
and overseas territories or communities had reported at least 
one laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic influenza H1N1.  
All continents were affected by the pandemic.  
The pandemic began to taper off in November 2009. As of 21 
February 2010, more than 213 countries and overseas 
territories or communities had reported laboratory confirmed 
cases of pandemic influenza H1N1 and at least 16226 deaths 
were also confirmed. As of 25 July 2010, more than 214 
countries worldwide and overseas territories or communities 
have reported laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic 
influenza H1N1 and over 18398 related-deaths had been 
confirmed.  
On August 10, 2010, however, following advice from the 
International Health Regulation Emergency Committee, the 
WHO Director General declared that the A/H1N1 pandemic 
was over.  Since then, the world has entered the post-
pandemic phase.  During this period, one of the main activities 
expected is that evaluations of the pandemic response will be 
performed within organisations, at local, regional, national and 
international levels, and by individual Governments in terms of 
the national response. 
 
Rationale for Study: 
Whilst a great many pandemic evaluations are underway at 
national or sub-national level, relatively few are in progress at 
international level. WHO has begun an investigation into the 
global response to the pandemic, under the auspices of its 
International Health Regulations Committee.1 However this 
review will focus predominantly on the global coordinating role 
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of WHO, the global response in terms of its proportionality to 
pandemic impact, and the functioning of the International 
Health Regulations, 2005. Other reviews are also underway or 
have been recently completed by the European Union 
(including EU Health Council and Council of Europe),2 and the 
WHO Regional Office for Europe.3 
However, these reviews generally concentrate on operational 
responses and emphasise common underlying themes/areas 
of difficulty, e.g. communications and coordination. They do 
not however attempt to analyse the individual public health 
policy responses made within individual countries, e.g. 
decisions taken to use or not to use vaccines. 
We perceive an opportunity for a study that will compare and 
contrast different policy approaches to the 2009 pandemic in 
relation to the epidemiological and public health impact within 
countries. By making specific international comparisons in 
areas of known policy discordance, it may be possible to 
improve future pandemic preparedness and highlight 
difficulties and problems that arose. By comparing, for 
example, countries with a high versus low use of pandemic 
vaccines and the size and duration of post-vaccine influenza 
activity, lessons might be learned about the potential impact 
of vaccination on subsequent pandemic waves.  This would 
then feed into the `risk behaviours’ of governments as they 
balance preparedness for pandemic risk against alternative 
resource allocations.   
An international study of public health policy differences will 
most likely have important social scientific, public health and 
policy implications.  In relation to the impacts of the research, 
focusing on this issue from a combined epidemiological and 
social science perspective may allow further understanding 
and more successful application of the research findings than 
would be the case if the research was based within a single 
discipline. The work would reflect priorities expressed by both 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and Medical 
Research Council (MRC): ESRC for work on the ‘social 
dimensions of preventing and responding to threats from new 
and existing infectious diseases’ and the ‘underpinnings of 
interventions which promote the reduction of infectious 
diseases’; and MRC for ‘research [that] reflects changing 
health needs such as the global challenge to new forms of 
‘flu’.   
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Although the H1N1 strain in the 2009 pandemic has been 
relatively mild in its effects, it cannot be assumed that the 
same will be true of future 21st century pandemics and it is 
important to ensure that appropriate policy conclusions are 
drawn from the experience in order to inform future response 
planning.  At the same time, there is an opportunity to 
examine the complex interface between public health policy 
and the epidemiology of pandemic influenza.  
Within Sociology the concept of `Risk’ has developed as a 
major theoretical strand since Becks `Risk Society’ in 1992.4 
Beck defined risk as “a systematic way of dealing with the 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by 
modernization itself”.4 Becks work highlighted that 
contemporary societies face risks not faced historically or that 
risks had changed because of modernisation. Burgess in 2006 
argued that Risk has become a framework through which 
governments conduct their business.5 As Tony Blair put it 
“Risk management… is now central to the business of good 
government”.6 Sociologists are not concerned with actuarial 
risks but rather the processes by which Risk is decided and 
how it may be amplified or dampened and the way in which 
they are discussed and managed – both in themselves and in 
comparison to other perceived risks.7,8  A countries culture 
and political ideology may also impact upon how risk is 
perceived and the nature of the subsequent response for 
example decisions to procure and/or deploy antivirals/vaccines 
and to implement public health measure. Recent studies have 
also begun to consider the ways in which a sociology of risk 
can bring new understanding to public health and 
epidemiology.9 This study will utilise the sociology of risk to 
illuminate public health policy in relation to pandemic flu.  
 
Overall Aims: 
1. To examine, compare and contrast differences in public 
health policy between countries during the 2009-10 influenza 
A/H1N1 pandemic with reference to specific key areas (see 
Work Packages below) and in terms of timing (in relation to 
disease occurrence) as well as implementation and how this 
was affected by perceptions of risk. 
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2. To determine any apparent relationship between the 
timing and extent of public health policy differences in relation 
to disease activity.  
3. To review the implications for public policy in relation to 
pandemic preparedness and the response to future pandemics 
of potentially greater severity. 
4. To achieve 1-3 through the study of selected participant 
countries in any region of the world.  
 
Overall approach: 
A maximum of ten countries (initial target = 6-8) will be 
selected on the basis of being discordant from each other in 
terms of public policy in relation to specific major issues (see 
Work Packages) and having sufficient epidemiological data to 
allow for a fairly accurate description of disease activity and 
intensity at national level. Reserve countries will also be 
selected to allow for refusal to participate.  
 
A policy and epidemiological picture in each country will be 
developed based on: 
a) Government information placed in the public domain 
b) Interviews (where granted) with policy makers and 
public health officials 
c) Publicly available commercial data on the 
supply/distribution of antiviral drugs and vaccines  
 
*Work Packages:  
WP1 a) Literature review on the Sociology of Risk in relation to 
pandemic preparedness; b) Literature and ‘grey literature’ 
review of the policy related response to the 2009/10 pandemic 
and the epidemiological impact in different countries 
(purposive review to identify potential countries for further 
study) 
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WP2 Based on selected countries, this will examine the overall 
use or non-use of antiviral drugs (for post-exposure 
prophylaxis in households, aimed at the slowing of initial 
spread within countries and for treatment of cases). This will 
include an examination of the potential impact of policy 
differences related to ‘treat all’ or ‘treat high-risk only’ 
policies.10 
WP3 Based on selected countries, this will examine the use or 
non-use of monovalent pandemic influenza vaccines, including 
timing of deployment and type (inactivated, live, adjuvanted 
etc.), policy intention (pre-pandemic) versus policy 
implementation (and reasons for any discordance).11 
WP4 Based on selected countries, this will examine public 
health (non-pharmaceutical) measures such as restrictions on 
mass gatherings, border closures/restrictions, suspension of 
urban mass transportation systems to the limited extent that 
these were practiced during the 2009-10 pandemic.12 
WP5 An examination of broader societal aspects of the 
pandemic response in 2009-10. To include: the role of the 
media; the effectiveness of government health 
communications; the impact of centralised vs. decentralised 
health communication; the role of HCPs in providing pandemic 
response (use of existing health care provision vs. establishing 
special vaccination centres etc). 
*It is not possible to determine the full feasibility of each Work 
Package in advance. Feasibility may depend upon data 
availability.  
 
Support requested: 
Funder: GSK 
2011/12 
PhD student tuition fees (home student): £ 3,570 
MRC-set PhD stipend (ex-London): £14,000 
Book/Miscellaneous items allowance: £1500 
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2012/13 
PhD student tuition fees (home student): £ 3,675 (est) 
MRC-set PhD stipend (ex-London): £14,350 (est) 
Book/Miscellaneous items allowance: £1500 
 
2013/14 
PhD student tuition fees (home student): £ 3,786 (est) 
MRC-set PhD stipend (ex-London): £14,782 (est) 
Book/Miscellaneous items allowance: £1500 
 
We anticipate up to 12 international trips of 6-night duration 
and have set an indicative budget for each trip: 
Flight: £1200 (based on BA coach class travel to Buenos Aires 
or Sydney) 
Hotel: £600 
Ground transportation: £200 
Subsistence: £300 
Trip total: £2300 
Travel is anticipated in Years 1 and 2 only. Indicative 
maximum travel expenditure: £13,800 per annum Years 1 and 
2. 
International travel costs (as agreed with Funder) will be 
provided for directly by the Funder or cross-charged on the 
basis of actual costs incurred for economy/coach class air fare 
and public ground transportation where available/practical.  
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Publications and Reports arising: 
In the interests of global public health, it is important that the 
findings of this project are placed in the public domain as 
quickly as possible. The PhD student and supervisors will 
therefore pursue a policy of ongoing publication as data 
become available as opposed to after the PhD is completed. 
The Funder will receive 6-monthly progress reports from the 
student, copies of all manuscripts under development and a 
final bound copy of the completed PhD thesis. In addition the 
Funder may nominate a senior professional (Dr R.South) to 
contribute to ongoing study supervision meetings (but not 
acting as an official academic supervisor). 
 
University Supervisory Staff: 
Professor J. Van-Tam, Chair in Health Protection, Epidemiology 
and Public Health 
Professor I. Shaw, Chair in Health Policy, Law and Social 
Sciences 
 
Proposed Timetable: 
PhD study period: February 2011- January 2014 
Ongoing Publications from Jan 2012 onwards 
 
References: 
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Appendix B: PICO Search Strategy 
 
Area MeSH 
thesaurus 
headings 
Free text 
Patient / 
Population / 
Problem 
pandemic 
influenza 
A(H1N1) 2009 
(pandemic AND influenza) OR 
(pandemic AND flu) OR 
*H1N1* OR *2009* OR 
*pdm* OR (influenza A) OR 
(H1N1 influenza) 
Intervention antiviral tamiflu OR oseltamivir OR 
relenza OR zanamivir OR 
inavir OR laninamivir OR 
peramivir OR rapiacta OR 
peramiflu OR antiviral* OR 
(neuraminidase AND 
inhibitor*) OR prophylaxis 
 vaccine Vaccin* OR (pandemic AND 
vaccin*)  
  border* OR flight* OR travel 
OR restrict* OR (thermal 
AND imag*) OR screen* 
  (personal AND protective) OR 
PPE OR hand OR hygiene OR 
wash* OR gel OR clean* OR 
mask* OR face OR SFM* OR 
(respiratory AND hygiene) 
OR tissue* OR respirator* OR 
isolat* OR self-isolat* OR 
home OR quarantine OR 
distanc* 
  school OR school clos* OR 
educat* OR work* OR 
closure* OR cancel* OR 
public gather* OR event* OR 
reactive OR proactive OR 
social 
 Communicable 
disease control 
 
  Phone* OR telephone* OR 
call  OR information* OR 
press* OR media*  
  Contain OR treat OR polic* 
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OR phase* OR program* 
campaign OR respon* OR 
strateg* OR mitigat*  
Comparison Sweden Sweden Swedish  
 Canada Canada Canadian*  
 Argentina Argentina Argentine 
 Japan Japan Japanese 
 Turkey Turkey Turkish 
 Singapore Singapore OR Singaporean* 
 New Zealand (New AND Zealand) OR New 
Zealander* 
   
Outcome Epidemiology morbidit* OR mortalit* OR 
healthcare OR pregnan* OR 
(underlying AND chronic AND 
medical AND condition*) OR 
healthy OR hospit* OR 
(mechanical AND ventilat*) 
OR ICU OR (intensive AND 
care)  OR confirm* OR 
(laboratory AND confirm*) 
OR case* OR effect* OR 
outbreak* OR disease* OR 
ill* OR risk OR infant* OR 
child* OR adolescen* OR 
pupil* OR student* OR young 
OR adult* OR old* OR elder* 
OR people OR person* OR 
men OR women OR pregnan* 
OR paediatr* OR pediatr* OR 
geriatr* OR patient* OR 
public 
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Search carried out in MEDLINE (OVID) 1996 onwards.  
Date of search: 23/07/2013. 
# Searches Results 
1 
exp Influenza A Virus, H1N1 
Subtype/ 
9214  
2  ((pandemic and influenza) or 
(pandemic and flu)).mp. or *H1N1*/ 
or *2009*/ or *pdm*/ or (influenza 
and A).mp. or (H1N1 and 
influenza).mp. [mp=title, abstract, 
original title, name of substance 
word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol 
supplementary concept, rare disease 
supplementary concept, unique 
identifier] 37734   
37734   
3 1 or 2 37734 
4 exp Antiviral Agents/ 181088  
5 
(tamiflu or oseltamivir or relenza or 
zanamivir or inavir or laninamivir or 
peramivir or rapiacta or peramiflu or 
antiviral* or (neuraminidase and 
inhibitor*) or prophylaxis).mp. 
[mp=title, abstract, original title, 
name of substance word, subject 
heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary 
concept, rare disease supplementary 
concept, unique identifier] 
103290  
6 exp Influenza Vaccines/ 10989  
7 
(vaccin* or (pandemic and 
vaccin*)).mp. [mp=title, abstract, 
original title, name of substance 
word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol 
supplementary concept, rare disease 
supplementary concept, unique 
identifier] 
149838 
8 
(border* or flight* or travel or 
restrict* or (thermal and imag*) or 
624067  
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screen*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, 
original title, name of substance 
word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol 
supplementary concept, rare disease 
supplementary concept, unique 
identifier] 
9 
((personal and protective) or PPE or 
hand or hygiene or wash* or gel or 
clean* or mask* or face or SFM* or 
(respiratory and hygiene) or tissue* 
or respirator* or isolat* or self-
isolat* or home or quarantine or 
distanc*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, 
original title, name of substance 
word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol 
supplementary concept, rare disease 
supplementary concept, unique 
identifier] 
2091098  
10   (school or educat* or work* or clos* 
or cancel* or public gather* or 
event* or reactive or proactive or 
social).mp. [mp=title, abstract, 
original title, name of substance 
word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol 
supplementary concept, rare disease 
supplementary concept, unique 
identifier]   
1934281   
11    exp Communicable Disease Control/ 141488   
12     (Phone* or telephone* or call or 
information* or press* or 
media*).mp. [mp=title, abstract, 
original title, name of substance 
word, subject heading word, 
keyword heading word, protocol 
supplementary concept, rare disease 
supplementary concept, unique 
identifier]  
2079509   
13 
(contain or treat or polic* or phase* 
or program* campaign or respon* or 
strateg* or mitigat*).mp. [mp=title, 
abstract, original title, name of 
substance word, subject heading 
word, keyword heading word, 
2506905 
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protocol supplementary concept, 
rare disease supplementary concept, 
unique identifier] 
14  4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 
or 12 or 13  
6230723   
15  exp Sweden/  31013   
16 (sweden or swedish).mp. [mp=title, 
abstract, original title, name of 
substance word, subject heading 
word, keyword heading word, 
protocol supplementary concept, 
rare disease supplementary concept, 
unique identifier]    
43293   
17 15 or 16 43293 
18 exp Turkey/ 17886 
19 
(turkey or turkish).mp. [mp=title, 
abstract, original title, name of 
substance word, subject heading 
word, keyword heading word, 
protocol supplementary concept, 
rare disease supplementary concept, 
unique identifier] 
25702 
20 18 or 19 25702 
21 exp Canada/ 68832 
22 
(canada or canadian*).mp. 
[mp=title, abstract, original title, 
name of substance word, subject 
heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary 
concept, rare disease supplementary 
concept, unique identifier] 
68730 
23 21 or 22 88188 
24 exp New Zealand/ 16801 
25 
((new and ZEALAND) or (new and 
zealander*)).mp. [mp=title, 
abstract, original title, name of 
substance word, subject heading 
word, keyword heading word, 
protocol supplementary concept, 
rare disease supplementary concept, 
unique identifier] 
30406 
26 24 or 25 30406 
27 exp Japan/ 56436 
28 
(japan or japanese).mp. [mp=title, 
abstract, original title, name of 
112883 
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substance word, subject heading 
word, keyword heading word, 
protocol supplementary concept, 
rare disease supplementary concept, 
unique identifier] 
29 27 or 28 113364 
30  exp Singapore/  5480   
31   (singapore or sinaporean*).mp. 
[mp=title, abstract, original title, 
name of substance word, subject 
heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary 
concept, rare disease supplementary 
concept, unique identifier]  
7280   
32  30 or 31  7280   
33 exp Argentina/ 6889   6889   
34 
(argentina or argentine*).mp. 
[mp=title, abstract, original title, 
name of substance word, subject 
heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary 
concept, rare disease supplementary 
concept, unique identifier] 
9608 
35 33 or 34 9608 
36 exp Epidemiology/ 11473 
37 
(morbidit* or mortalit* or healthcare 
or pregnan* or (underlying and 
chronic and medical and condition*) 
or healthy or hospit* or (mechanical 
and ventilat*) or ICU or (intensive 
and care) or confirm* or (laboratory 
and confirm*) or case* or effect* or 
outbreak* or disease* or ill* or risk 
or infant* or child* or adolescen* or 
pupil* or student* or young or 
adult* or old* or elder* or people or 
person* or men or women or 
pregnan* or paediatr* or pediatr* or 
geriatr* or patient* or public).mp. 
[mp=title, abstract, original title, 
name of substance word, subject 
heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary 
concept, rare disease supplementary 
concept, unique identifier] 
7453959 
38 36 or 37 7455982 
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39 
17 or 20 or 23 or 26 or 29 or 32 or 
35 
312837 
40 3 and 14 and 38 and 39 2217 
41 limit 40 to humans  1889   
   
 
Sweden specific literature:  
# Searches Results 
40 3 and 14 and 17 and 38  129   
41 Limit 40 to humans   106 
 
Turkey specific literature:  
# Searches Results 
40 3 and 14 and 20 and 38  259 
41 Limit 40 to humans   143 
 
Canada specific literature:  
# Searches Results 
40 3 and 14 and 23 and 38  722 
41 Limit 40 to humans   653 
 
New Zealand specific literature:  
# Searches Results 
40 3 and 14 and 26 and 38  155 
41 Limit 40 to humans   143 
 
Japan specific literature:  
 355 
 
# Searches Results 
40 3 and 14 and 29 and 38  780 
41 Limit 40 to humans   667 
 
 
Singapore specific literature:  
# Searches Results 
40 3 and 14 and 32 and 38  157 
41 Limit 40 to humans   155 
 Argentina specific literature:  
# Searches Results 
40 3 and 14 and 35 and 38  99 
41 Limit 40 to humans   90 
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Appendix C: Ethics Approval 
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Appendix D: Letter to participants 
Epidemiology and Public Health 
University Of Nottingham  
Clinical Sciences Building 
City Hospital 
Nottingham 
NG5 1PB 
United Kingdom 
 
17th June 2013 
 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
I am writing to you because due to your area of work I would 
very much welcome your participation in my research project 
which concerns the 2009-10 pandemic influenza.  
By way of introduction, my name is Leila Pinder, a student at 
the University of Nottingham and I am undertaking a PhD 
study under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Van-Tam 
(Health Protection & Influenza) and Professor Ian Shaw 
(Health Policy & Sociology).  Included with this letter is my 
CV, which shows my education of a Social Sciences 
undergraduate degree and a Masters in Public Health. It is 
with this educational background that I approach my PhD 
project and it is reflective of my discipline interests.  
My project is examining the interface between health policies 
and practices for the management of the 2009-10 pandemic 
influenza and the epidemiological experiences in various 
countries. In order to do this research, I will interview key 
stakeholders to develop an overview of eight countries 
national public health measures used in the 2009-10 pandemic 
influenza. The individuals who I would like to speak with may 
vary by job title somewhat within the study countries, but may 
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include public health officials, policy makers, national medical 
officers, epidemiologists etc., and their work role would have 
concerned their country’s national response to the 2009-10 
pandemic influenza. I will also report the study countries 
national epidemiological experience of pandemic influenza, by 
utilising publically available data. This will enable me to 
consider the generated interview themes in light of the 
national epidemiological circumstances. The identity of these 
individuals will remain confidential. 
It is hoped that the international approach in this project will 
provide further understanding of national health policies and 
practices decisions, as well as perhaps, risk perceptions and 
the uncertainties associated with pandemic influenza. Due to 
the number of countries studied in this student project and the 
resource limits of one researcher, it is accepted that an 
overview and not a comprehensive picture will be gathered of 
each country. However, the multiple study country approach 
may amalgamate trends across nations and therefore further 
contribute to an international understanding of a global 
disease. 
My studentship has been financially provided by 
GlaxoSmithKline. However, GSK have left the direction of the 
project to my supervisors and me, and as such have no 
involvement in the data acquisition, analysis or write up of 
results. My studentship will terminate in 2015 and by this time 
I intend to publish the study findings. In my thesis, and any 
journal publications, all interview data will be reported 
anonymously in order to protect the identity of participating 
individuals. 
If you agree to speak with me, the meeting would involve a 
one-to-one interview and at your agreement I would like to 
audio record our conversation. The meeting would take place 
within a nominated week, as I intend to interview a minimum 
of six individuals during a one week visit to your country. I 
anticipate that the interview would take up about 90 minutes 
of your time, and I hope to hear your thoughts and reflections 
in order to gather some insight into the management and 
experience of 2009-10 pandemic influenza within your 
country. I have a short interview guide, which will help me 
cover particular interests of the project, but the interviews will 
be flexible in content and structure. The interview questions 
will cover areas such as national antiviral use, pandemic 
vaccine, non-pharmaceutical measures, pandemic risk 
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assessment, epidemiology of the pandemic, etc. 
Unfortunately, I am unable to offer financial payment for your 
time. 
When I return to the UK, I will transcribe the interview 
conversation, as well as the other interviews conducted, and 
import the generated text into the computer programme Nvivo 
to assist me with coding the text for the analysis stage of my 
project. I will do this eight times, as I hope to visit eight 
countries over the following months.  
Should you be prepared to grant me an interview, or if you 
would like further information about the project before making 
a final decision, please contact me by email: 
mcxlp@nottingham.ac.uk I can also make available copies of 
official letters from the University of Nottingham confirming 
my PhD studentship and from both tutors confirming 
supervisory support should you or your organisation wish to 
inspect these or retain them on file. 
Thank-you for reading about my project and I hope to hear 
from you. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
Leila Pinder (Miss) 
University Of Nottingham PhD student 
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Appendix E: Interview Aid Memoire 
 
Below are one or two example questions under each subject 
covered: 
Subject Example of relevant questions/topics 
National 
overview 
Key events during 2009-10 pandemic A(H1N1) 
influenza 
Concerns during the pandemic influenza 
Risk Did the risk perception change over the course of 
the pandemic? 
Was the response proportionate to the perceived 
level of risk? 
Disease 
activity 
Epidemiological experience in study country (e.g. 
first cases/deaths timings linked to public health 
measures implemented at that time) 
Antiviral 
drugs 
How were antivirals used during the pandemic 
influenza (e.g. treatment policy)? 
Pandemic 
influenza 
vaccines 
Vaccines – use, type, amount ordered, timing of 
vaccination campaigns, uptake rates… 
Non 
pharma 
measures 
What other public health measures were used? 
How? When? Why? 
Wider 
societal 
aspects 
Health communications. Role of the media 
Was the existing health service utilised or were 
special pandemic influenza services provided? (e.g. 
vaccination centres, fever tents) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
